

***“It is about the flag on your chest!”* Footballers with Migration
Background in the German National Football Team.
A matter of inclusion?**

An Explorative Case Study on Nationalism, Integration and National Identity.

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June 2012

Foreword

Dear reader, the present research work represents, on one hand, my dearest wish to contribute to the understanding of some of the effects that the exclusionary, ethnocentric notions of nationhood and national belonging – which have characterized much of western European thinking throughout history – have had on individuals who do not fit within the preconceived frames of national unity and belonging with which most Europeans have been operating since the foundation of the nation-state approximately 140 years ago.

On the other hand, this research also represents my personal journey to understand better my role as a citizen, a man, a father and a husband, while covered by a given aura of *otherness*, always reminding me of my permanent foreignness in the country I decided to make my home. In this sense, this has been a personal journey to learn how to cope with my new ascribed identity as an *alien* (my ‘labelled forehead’) without losing my essence in the process, and without forgetting who I also am and have been.

This journey has been long and tough in many forms, for which I would like to thank the help I have received from those who have been accompanying my steps all along. I would like to especially thank my academic advisor professor Grete Brochmann at ISF at the University of Oslo for her support, wise guidance, and for giving me constant motivation by making me believe my work was valuable when I felt the most it wasn’t. I would also like to thank Jon Erik Dølvik at Fafo for taking the time to give me useful advice that helped me discover new angles for my research, which with certainty helped me improve it and finish it. My gratitude goes also to Sven Ismer at the Freie University of Berlin, who agreed to meet me and ‘unlock’ much of my research by giving me invaluable information.

I want to thank my aunt ‘Malina’ for never losing faith in me. To all my friends.

Finally, my eternal gratitude goes to my beloved Elin and my sparkling sons Julian and Mateo for their unconditional love, understanding, support and patience, which kept me going through this journey. Without them any of this would have been possible.

A mis amores, que ellos son mi hogar y mi país.

This thesis is dedicated to my grandfather, Elias Capon, for showing me the path and for teaching me that the world is a wonderful place!

Oslo, June 2012.

Summary

During the last football World Cup in South Africa, Norwegian journalist and writer Aslak Nore pointed out in a newspaper that in contrast to other Western European national football teams (NFT), the Danish NFT stood out since it did not include players with migration background. This, he claimed, was due to Denmark's lack of an effective integration strategy and its failed immigration and integration policies. Additionally, Nore claimed, Denmark's 'white' national team was also proof of the hostile attitudes from the government and the population in general towards Denmark's immigrant population.

Although Nore's explanation is a simplification of complex and complicated social phenomena such as integration and/or xenophobia and/or nationalism or patriotism, his argument had an interesting point: the ethnic composition of the Danish national team was certainly not representative of the proportion of immigrants or people with migration background living in that country. Furthermore, after a quick analysis of the ethnic composition of the other western European NFTs, it can be said that the number of players with migration background has not been representative of the proportion of immigrants who have arrived to Western Europe over the last 50 years.

Although it is true that factors such as integration and immigration policies cannot be excluded from an analysis at a macro level, at the same time other equally important factors at a micro level had to be taken into account to have a more complete picture of the above mentioned phenomenon. Thus, this thesis has drawn in the *sentiment-factor* related to people's notions of a national unity (notion of nationhood) and national sense of belonging, which make up the national ethos, as well as the values and meanings added to these notions at individual and national level in a historical perspective.

Thus, this thesis uses Nore's claim as a source of inspiration, and tries to figure out the premises that underlie the fact that players with migration background are underrepresented in most European NFTs.

In order to discern the mechanisms behind this phenomenon, the present research focus on Germany and its A-NFT (Senior NFT) as a case study. The intention behind this choice was to take advantage of Germany's historical ethnocentric notions of national unity (notions of nationhood) and national belonging, in order to confirm or reject the hypothesis that assumed an interaction between them and immigrants' integration level and sense of national identity. At the same time, this thesis analyses how the resulting effects of this

interaction have an impact on both the recruitment of players with immigrant background to the NFT, and the number of players with migration backgrounds who actually choose to play for Germany despite the fact that their national belonging and loyalty are constantly questioned, not only by proud nationalists, but also by ordinary citizens and the media. The assumption made in this thesis is that the interaction referred above has an impact on the ethnic composition of the German NFT.

The present study gives a brief explanation of the terms used in it, together with a short review of Germany's history of national formation and its social development for the last 70 years. This thesis also takes into account the history of immigration caused by the so-called *Wirtschaftswunder* in the middle of the '50s and the development of the immigration policy, as well as it focuses on the changes made with the immigration and citizenship laws in the late '90s. Germany's football history is also discussed, along with and a brief analysis of football's importance from a historical and social perspective.

Similarly, this study sheds light on other factors that also affect the participation of players with migration background in the NFT, including (a) Germany's own understanding of nationhood and belonging through history, notions which in turn have affected DFB's (German Football Federation) attitudes toward, and interest in, players with migration background; (b) immigrants' lack of integration and class differences between them and the majority; (c) the discrimination they experience on a daily basis; (d) immigrants' own national identity and the notion of belonging; and finally (e) Germany's lack of experience with immigrants from non-western countries which I suggest can be attributed to its non-colonial history. These are the main themes analyzed in this work.

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Introduction

Empirical background for the present study

At the time of the most recent Football World Cup tournament, celebrated in South Africa in 2010, a debate arose among commentators in the media about whether there was any relation between the ethnic composition of certain European national football teams¹ and the success or failure of the respective countries' integration policies and strategies. The hypothesis was based on the idea of the national football teams (from now on referred to as NFT)² as a *real reflection* of a state's integration policies and efforts, as well as the degree of the social, cultural and economic participation shown by the members of the immigrant groups. Consequently, if a NFT includes a number of players with a different ethnic background from that of the majority population in that country, then it could also be said that this heterogeneity is the reflection of that country's diversity, as well as a reflection of the degree to which people from ethnic minorities both participate and get included in the national project. The fact that players with a migration background have been chosen to represent the country alongside members of what we can call the *majority*, or native population, could therefore be seen as proof that the country has embraced its diversity. Equally significant is the fact that players with a migration background choose to represent their 'new' country, despite not sharing the same degree of cultural belonging as the majority population.

On the other hand, the absence of players of a migration background in the NFT of an otherwise ethnically diverse country could be indicative of poor integration of minorities in that society.

The Norwegian journalist and writer Aslak Nore took up this debate in a newspaper opinion piece, in which he pointed to the lack of minority players in the Danish national football team that year as a reflection of both the Danish government's position on immigration issues and of the negative attitudes towards immigrants that he felt permeated the public sphere in that country. According to Nore's article, published in the Norwegian newspaper VG³ on 13 June 2010, Denmark's World Cup team was the "symbol of a

¹ More specifically the national teams of Denmark, France and Germany have often been referred as examples of multicultural success or failure.

² This study focuses on the men's national football teams (NFTs) and this term will in the following refer exclusively to the men's category unless otherwise specified.

³ VG is the most read tabloid newspaper in Norway, and its name is an abbreviation for *Verdens Gang*, which literally means "The Way Of The World".

xenophobic country that does not exploit the potential of its immigrant population.”⁴ (VG.no, 2010: 2). Nore argued that in contrast to Denmark, countries such as Germany, Sweden and Norway were far better at integrating football players with a migration background. He justified part of his statement by presenting some statistics comparing the number of footballers with a migration background playing for the different age-based national teams of Denmark, Sweden and Norway, i.e. those playing in the teams under 17, 19 and 21 years old.⁵ Denmark’s national teams – across the different age categories – included on average only 6 percent of the so-called ‘new Danish’ players, while Sweden included around 28 percent, and Norway about 40 percent (ibid.). Nore consequently connects the absence of players with a migration background in the Danish football team to right-wing, anti-immigrant tendencies dominating the Danish political and public spheres, which is exemplified, he says, by a widely held belief that “Muslims and Arabs” are impossible to integrate (ibid.).

Research questions

This research was inspired by the idea put forward by Nore, and was initially intended to look in more detail at the facts and figures behind his hypothesis of a link between the ethnic composition of some of the NFTs in the 2010 World Cup and the integration of the population with a migration background in those countries. However, after some analysis of the different European NFTs that have played in the various editions of the football World Cup, it became clear that Nore’s hypothesis did not allow for other possible reasons for the low number of players with migration background in the Danish NFT – to use his example, although it could be any other NFT – compared to the NFTs of France or even Germany. Furthermore, after this research began to focus on the German NFT, it became evident that Nore’s hypothesis would not last as the main research question. Nonetheless, Nore’s hypothesis raised an interesting suggestion of the relationship between the ethnic composition of a NFT and the participation of persons with migration background at all levels in any country – i.e. their integration in society –, but particularly of the relationship that exists between the way the majority population sees and treats the members of the minorities, and the fact that whether they regard them as part of the community or not will have a direct effect on the way a person with migration background will relate to his/her own identity as a

⁴ My translation.

⁵ These categories are also referred to as the U-17, U-19 or U-21, depending on the maximum age allowed in a tournament by football’s governing body FIFA.

member of this community. In the case of football, the relationship between these two dimensions is especially relevant because a player's own sense of identity and belonging in a country may have a direct impact on the ethnic composition of the NFT because it influences whether they decide to play for that country, or another country they feel a stronger attachment to. At the same time, the recruiting system within football is equally relevant, i.e. whether players of migration background are systematically being ignored or discriminated against by those in charge of recruiting to a NFT.

As a result of this clarification, we have two dimensions: firstly, we have the players with migration background who decide to play for a given NFT due to their sense of national belonging and sentimental attachment, as well as others who make that decision out of their interests as professional football players, that is they decide to play for a given NFT because it could benefit their footballing careers. Secondly, we have a football team which has been conceived to represent a whole country in international matches and competitions, and whose directors and managers aim to 'arm' with those 'national specimens' that best fulfil certain criteria. Now, these criteria are usually based on sporting ability, but it also can have ideological undertones that can play an equally important role when it comes to recruiting the best football players, and that can have their starting point in the way the majority is used to seeing, treating and relating to the members of the minority groups, i.e. if the majority regards them as being part of the national community or not.

We know that there are many footballers with migration background who despite having been born and living in their 'new' country, eventually choose to represent the country of their parents, in what can be perceived as a sign of maladjustment or of de-integration.

For this reason, this research raises questions about the relationship between national identity and the composition of the NFT, as well as the relationship between national belonging – seen from the perspective of the majority – and the composition of the NFT. This seems to be especially relevant in a football context where nationalism almost 'naturally' gets nurtured and where national identities become important markers and part of both players and supporters. However, the different levels in which integration and participation occur cannot be ignored, therefore the questions must be relevant at both macro and micro level of analysis.

Consequently, the questions covered by this master thesis can be divided into two main blocks:

1. To what extent can it be said that the ethnic composition – in this case the number of football players with a different ethnic background as that of the majority – of a NFT reflects in any way a country's immigration and integration policies?
2. Taking into account that players with a migration background may hold two or even more nationalities,⁶ it is equally plausible to deduce that some of them may have multiple national identities, which sometimes converge and at other times may even oppose each other, but that in any case are an important part of players' self-identity. This research therefore intends to explore the reasons why some footballers of migration background decide to play for the NFT of the country they were born in or live in, while others choose to play for the NFT of the country of origin of their parents.
3. Given the specific nature of the national foundation and national character of the case chosen for this study, i.e. Germany, it appears relevant to ask if Germany's own historical notion of nation and its national self-understanding at both macro and micro levels, has been playing an important role in the integration of young people with migration background as well as the formation of their own national identity or self-understanding.

These questions are related through the linkage that exists between immigrants and integration, national identity and nationalism, and the way these four elements are intertwined in a football context and around the NFTs. Nonetheless, it must be taken into account that giving a more accurate answer to some of these questions would require much more than the kind of qualitative research based on secondary literature and data sources that this case study has been able to carry out.

Concerning the queries raised previously, it is important to say that there may exist many reasons for why a football player with a migration background who has the possibility to choose from two different national teams eventually chooses to play for one specific country and not for the other. In that sense, some new hypotheses can be opened such as that

⁶ The number of nationalities owned by a single person may differ depending of the country of residence, as well as of the country of birth. Moreover, while countries like Germany or Norway originally do not allow dual nationality, some exceptions to this rule may apply, e.g. when the laws of the second country do not contemplate the possibility of losing the nationality, when the state of origin demands a fee that it is unaffordable by the applicant, or when the integrity of the concerned person may be jeopardized. In other cases, nations such as the USA may allow someone to hold two or more nationalities as long as neither of the involved countries imposes any restriction.

a football player chooses to represent a specific NFT because he feels himself emotionally attached to the nation he has chosen to play for – i.e. because the emotional responses connected to his own ‘self’ are more closely linked to for example a German, French or English national identity than it is to a Turkish, Algerian or Moroccan national identity. Or that a player chooses to represent more successful NFTs such as the German, French or English teams in international tournaments because this increases his possibilities of improving his professional career – i.e. to use the NFT as a career platform to secure a better income, transcend internationally and gain greater fame, etc. Another one can be that a footballer’s decision to play for a particular NFT can be attributed to some sort of group pressure exerted from his family and/or friends and/or his milieu, or that his choice turned out in a certain way simply because he did not get the chance to choose to play for the nation in which he was born – or for the one he was ‘supposed’ to choose – due to laws governing nationality, and was therefore ‘forced’ to select differently in order to secure his participation in an international tournament.

Of course, it is expected to find that a combination of all the hypotheses made above applies, while at the same time it would not be a surprise to find many other unforeseen variables directly or indirectly affecting a footballer’s decision to play for a particular NFT and, in consequence, the ethnic composition of the team itself.

This is why these questions will remain, all the way through this dissertation, as open probable explanations for why footballers with migration backgrounds decide to represent one NFT instead of another. Through detailed analysis of secondary sources, it can be possible to come up with other plausible explanations, but for most of the analyzed players addressed in this project these would remain as mere suppositions as long as similar research projects stay unable to make in-deep interviews with the players and other relevant actors in charge of deciding and recruiting to NFTs.

Thesis structure

In the first chapter I explain the different approaches and understandings of the concepts that I use in the thesis. The explanations will be short and will not go very much into detail, but can be used as a starting point to understand the way these terms are used in the thesis. I analyze, among others, Anthony Smith, Ernest Gellner and Adrian Hastings and their approaches to the concepts of nation, nationalism and national identity. When it comes to

integration, I examine, among other Thomas H. Eriksen, Rosemarie Sackmann and Christian Joppke's understanding of this concept.

In the second chapter, the methodology chapter, I discuss the 'whys and hows' of this thesis. In it I explain why I chose to do the task in the way I did: the selection of case study as method, and the reason why I chose Germany's national football team as a case instead of another national team, such as the Norwegian or the French. At the same time, I reflect on the qualities of this case that make it a good choice for the phenomenon under study. I also mention something about case studies as a method, their application, advantages and disadvantages. In this chapter I try to be very thorough and reflective about the way I have conducted the research throughout the thesis project, especially when it comes to the way I have conducted the analysis of the collected data material.

In chapter three I focus on the 'case's historical background', i.e. an attempt to describe the German historical development that has been the base of the formation of Germany's national consciousness and sense of nationhood, which in turn has close links to the different legislative approaches and political policies within the country for addressing the question of immigration and integration of the so-called *Gastarbeiter* during the last decades. I also provide an analysis of the development of the citizenship laws and their transformation in order to reconcile the historical German concept of nationality and national belonging based on notions of ethnicity (*ius sanguini*) with the notion of nation based on territoriality (*ius soli*). To do so, the works and theoretical contribution of social researchers such as Marianne Takle, Rogers Brubaker and Mary Fulbrook, among others, will be relevant.

Chapter four is dedicated to analyzing the history and development of football in general, at the same time that details about German football specifically are given: its history and development, as well as an in-depth look at its achievements. Here, too, the role the German NFT plays in the formation of identity in Germany is addressed.

In addition, football gets studied as a social phenomenon. This means that in this chapter, several lines are traced in order to understand the value football has had in society at macro and micro levels in the creation of national unity, for which theorist Eric Hobsbawm work has been drawn on. Simultaneously, I consider the manner in which football has actively been seized on as a political tool to legitimise or to spread certain ideas, for example as the fascists in Italy consciously did with sports and football in particular. Further on, this

chapter goes through the attributes that make football a worldwide phenomenon that can bring together people, women and men, from all social strata, all ethnicities and all ages. Here philosopher Gunter Gebauer has been a central source.

In the fifth chapter, the recruitment patterns of football players for the German NFT are seen in the light of the historical continuities and changes made to the laws concerned with questions of nationality and integration (at a macro level), as well as the openness shown by the DFB directors and managers towards players with migration background. Thus, a more exhaustive analysis of the Germany's national team is made, with help of secondary texts and other types of media around the national team players from immigrant groups, such as the German players with a migration background who decided not to represent Germany in the national team, but the country where the family originally comes from. Here the focus is on questions of integration, discrimination and national identity as possible causes for why some choose as they do, but other possibilities remain open, such as the search for career opportunities, and the impact of group pressure, as that exerted by family and friends.

This part of the thesis will focus on identity seen as an integral part of the cognitive, emotional loaded part of individuals, especially when it comes to national identity. Thereby I also try to address how identity can be affected, or not, by the degree of integration reached by these sorts of players as well as the effects that discrimination may have on their sense of affiliation with their 'adopted' nation.

Therefore, in this chapter the focus is on some young players of Turkish origins such as Mesut Özil or Hamit Altintop. It is also appropriate to address the way in which the German and Turkish football associations compete against each other to secure the services of these kinds of players – that is, talented young Turkish-German players.

Final reflections

It is important to say that this thesis aims neither to provide absolute answers to deep social problems such as integration nor to reconstruct the essence of concepts such as nationalism or national identity. This dissertation intends only to be an exploratory case study meant to generate hypotheses that could bring some reflections around complicated but very relevant issues concerning both the participation of individuals with migration background in society, and equally important, their inclusion and acceptance in society at macro and micro levels.

Chapter One - Clarification of Concepts

1.1 Nation and nationalism: a question of 'when'?

The concepts of *nation*, *nationalism*, *national identity* and *integration* have proven to be difficult enough to agree on for the scholars of the main disciplines interested in this subject, such as history, philosophy, political science, sociology and anthropology. While the usage of these concepts has become 'common' or of public domain, their academic significance has somehow been harder to pin down, as it has become clearer that they are not static or unchangeable. Rather the opposite.

In the case of the concept of nation, the problem does not seem to lie in defining what it is, i.e., what it is made of in terms of the political or territorial sovereignty or social organization, but rather on the question of 'when' (Connor, 1990; Smith, 2008). It is important to state that this research has no interest in either contributing to this debate or finding an answer to the question of nation and/or nationalism, as neo-perennialist, modernists and ethno-symbolists have done. Nonetheless, it is important to address the main issues within this controversy in order to make it clearer for the reader what reasons lie behind the usage of these terms in this thesis research. For that and other reasons, in the next pages I will try to give a short but fair overview of these concepts as a means to clarify the way they are understood by the academia, but first and foremost how they are understood and used throughout this work.

1.2 The nation: an introduction

Etymologically, the word 'nation' derives from the Latin word of 'Natio' and 'Nasci', which literally means 'to be born' or 'birthplace' (Hobsbawm, 1998; Smith, 2008), but which was originally used by the Romans to refer to all other peoples with lower status, especially to members of distant barbarian tribes, and to differentiate them from themselves (Smith, 2008). According to Eric Hobsbawm, until 1884 the word was still only used to allude to "the collection of the inhabitants of a province, country or kingdom"⁷ or, as the Romans did, to refer to foreigners in general (ibid: 23). But this represents an historical anecdote about the origin of the word. As stated above, the discussion around the concept is much more profound than its mere semantic significance. However, one has to go over its philological and semantic aspect in order to unveil its meaning in language in a logical way, including its

⁷ My translation from a Spanish version.

usage through history, in order to gain knowledge about the different meanings attached to it in different periods of time and in different regions and cultures.

The discussion around the concept of nation has had different peaks throughout modern history, relating chiefly to times in which important historical events such as social or economic crisis, popular revolutions or wars, have jeopardized the stability of a region or a society, which would be consistent with some anthropological research on ethnic identity and boundary maintenance that indicate the increment of the importance attached to ethnic identities in times of flux, change or threats against these boundaries (Eriksen, 2002). The discussion around the concept of nation can thus be divided into three main streams within the social sciences: that represented by *modernism*, *neo-perennialism* and, more recently, *ethno-symbolism*. More specifically, modernist Ernest Gellner, neo-perennialist Adrian Hastings and ethno-symbolist Anthony D. Smith have been the main drivers of this debate in the last decades. However, other contributions to the understanding of nation have been relevant to these main three branches, such as Johann von Herder's contribution in the eighteenth century, wherein he stressed the importance of language as an important mean of differentiation between different human groups, dividing them into "different, discrete [and] identifiable nations." (Spencer and Wollman, 2005: 2). The following is a brief explanation of these three main sources of debate in academia.

1.3 Modernism

Modernist Ernest Gellner, together with other significant writers and researchers such as Eric Hobsbawm or John Breuilly, has maintained that nations are the result of social and political processes that could only have been triggered by modernity. His main argument to support his thesis is that what he calls "agro-literate" societies were under the rule of tiny elites that had no interest or desire in spreading their culture to the lower strata in society, a culture which he sees as entirely different from that of the peasant masses. He argues that only industrial societies have the means needed to stimulate the social mobility required in order to create specialized literate high cultures (Gellner in Smith, 2008), which Gellner apparently equals to nations. For Breuilly and Hobsbawm, it is only with the rise of the modern state – urbanization, economic growth, professionalization, specialization, etc. – that the masses can be mobilized to feel an allegiance to a wide, national community (Smith, 2008). Gellner goes even further by stating that it was nationalists who invented nations, and not vice versa.

1.4 Neo-perennialism

To understand neo-perennialism it is important to look at *perennialism*, which was a pre-war posture in Western societies that assumed that nations and nationalism were as old as human societies, i.e., that they had always been there, that they were perennial and therefore recurrent in every historical epoch, in every place and in every culture (ibid.).

Neo-perennialism, unlike perennialism, does not claim nations to be endemic to human society and therefore always existent in human history. Rather they actually can set an approximate date to their establishment, using England as a model. For example, Adrian Hastings states that England would be the “prototype of both nation and nation-state” (Hastings, 2005: 31), and in consequence dates the birth of nations as far back as the tenth century:

“(…) an English nation-state survived 1066,⁸ grew fairly steadily in the strength of its national consciousness through the later twelfth and thirteenth centuries, but emerged still more vociferously with its vernacular literary renaissance and the pressures of the Hundred Years War by the end of the fourteenth.” (Ibid.: 32).

According to Hastings, it is first when societies became fluid oral ethnicities and began using a written vernacular language that they equalled a nation. When fluid oral societies/ethnic groups introduced a written vernacular tradition, their literature production was able to fix the field of a vernacular language that defined their reading public, what Hastings calls nation. Moreover, Hastings assures this phenomenon to be endemic to Christianity as societies under its influence adopted the Old Testament’s narrative of a “monolithic model of nationhood in ancient Israel” (Smith, 2008: 4), which “fused land, people, language, and religion” (ibid.).

1.5 Ethno-symbolism

Ethno-symbolist Anthony Smith affirms that nations, while not having existed from time immemorial, as asserted by perennialists, were preceded by what he calls *ethnie*, that is “extensive groups whose members were already tied to each other through sharing a collective proper name, sharing beliefs about ancestry, sharing a particular history and operating within a common cultural framework, and with enduring association with a particular place [the ‘homeland’]” (Spencer and Wollman, 2005: 4), or as stated by Smith himself: “(…), a central theme of historical ethno-symbolism is the relationship of shared

⁸ In reference to the Norman conquest of England, led by the Norman Duke William I of Normandy, and which went into history as the last successful invasion of the British Isles by a foreign force. (Wikipedia.org).

memories to collective cultural identities: memory almost by definition, is integral to cultural identity, and the cultivation of shared memories is essential to the survival and destiny of such collective identities.” (Smith, 2005). In this case, Smith’s approach connects quite closely the concepts of ethnicity and that of nation. But he also links nation to national consciousness, and in turn the latter to a sentiment and feeling of belonging. Nonetheless, although he underlines that the sentiments attached to one’s nation may be especially relevant to nationalists, sentiments may be relevant to a larger population as well (Smith, 2007). Ethno-symbolism attaches importance to what Smith labels *La Longue Durée*, i.e., the long-term presence of nations, whose existence cannot be tied to a particular period of history, such as the process of modernization. Thus, nations have a long-term relationship between national past, present and future, which is also why all nations have an ethnic basis conformed by ethnic communities and ethnic categories. These ethnic-nations share cultural components, some of them based on ethnic myths and symbols: myths of origin and descent, and symbols of territory and community (Smith, 2005). The myths and symbols also develop a notion of common ethnic-history that forms the notions to nationhood (ibid.).

1.6 Nationalism and its many meanings

A very important aspect of the concept of nation is that it is generally closely followed by the concept and notion of *nationalism*, mainly because some scholars cannot identify one without identifying the other at the same time. Gellner, for instance, claimed that nations are the result of nationalism, or are invented by nationalists and not the other way around. In his well-known book *Nations and Nationalism*, Gellner wrote that:

“[n]ations as natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent (...) political destiny, are myths; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures; that is reality.” (Gellner in Spencer and Wollman, 2003: 34).

But as Smith says (2007), this would even mean that nationalism came to be even before nations existed, no matter when nation both as a concept and as a social and political reality first existed. On the other hand, however, there are several examples of nationalisms that occur without a nation or outside the nation-state, such as Catalan nationalism in the Spanish nation or the Flemish in the Belgian one.

It seems, however, that the only thing researchers of nation and nationalism agree on is that the latter concept is of relatively recent date, a product of modernity.

There are some relevant definitions of the term. Gellner, for instance, concluded that nationalism is an ideology based on the thought that their group should dominate a nation-state, and therefore a nation-state is a state dominated by an ethnic group whose markers of identity, such as language or religion, get institutionalised and legislated (Eriksen, 2002). Hans Kohn wrote in 1955 that nationalism is “above all, a state of mind, in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due the nation-state” (Kohn in Farner, 1994: 45). According to Smith, there are three “generic goals” (2007: 9) that characterises nationalism, and that overlap with almost all of the definitions written about it. These are: national autonomy, national unity and national identity. Hence, nationalism is “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’” (ibid.), although he would also distinguish between the ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ nationalisms, whose common features are (a) collective attachment to a homeland and (b) autonomy and citizenship for the people. For his part, Russell F. Farner (1994) describes nationalism as holding some basic “value orientations” (ibid.: 46):

“(a) blood, ‘race’, soil, language, and ethnic affinity; (b) ideology, ‘sacred’ tenets and beliefs, and moral objectives; (c) personal, symbolic heroes and leaders; and (d) attachment to civic values, roles, institutions, and political processes, laws, and principles that promote the common polis, civil society, and unity amidst diversity”. (Ibid.).

Both Benedict Anderson and Anthony Smith agree with one of the special aspects of nationalism, and that is its strong connection with *national identity* and *sentiment*, which is an extraordinary force. As an example of this, Anderson mentions the cases of people who have been and are willing to die for their nation (Eriksen, 2002). Meanwhile, Smith emphasizes the strong popular sentiments evoked by the idea of nation: “In this ideological discourse, the nation is a felt and lived community, a category of behaviour as much as imagination, and it is one that requires of the members a certain kind of action.” (Smith, 2007: 10).

That said, it is also relevant to write about the dualism of nationalism, namely the one composed of the positive and the negative sides of it. Tom Nairn suggested in an article named *The Janus Face of Nationalism*,⁹ written in 1977, that all nationalism had healthy and

⁹ Like Anderson, Nairn regards the existence of a nation as an exercise of the collective imagination, although in this case what is imagined is not only the interconnection between people who does not know each other personally, but also the sense of a shared present and the projection of a collective future. Like the two-faced god Janus in Roman mythology, able to look both backwards and forwards, a nation also has to have the ability

morbid sides intrinsic to the phenomenon. For nationalism does indeed have a unifying force that can bind people together in creative ways, strengthening societies and the links between different collectives and social groups within it, as well as the sense of solidarity. However, nationalism is always a logic that tends towards exclusion of those considered alien, the ‘others’ against which the nation is itself defined and constructed. (Spencer and Wollman, 2003).

1.7 Identity and national identity

The concept of identity is used to analyse the characteristics a person may have at many distinct levels. Hence, both psychology, anthropology and sociology have been actively engaged in addressing and researching the vast field of human identity in relation with one’s self in a cognitive approach, in relation to other individuals in an positioning and self-localization process (Sackmann, 2003), or in a social and collective identity definition that extends one or various characteristics about a group or society to a shared common feature that ‘identifies’ the members of that group and attach affiliation or membership to a big collective.

Not surprisingly, the word *identity* is related to the act of identifying. Whether it is about identifying other people or being identified by others, identity seems to be important for that to happen. The thing is that in order to identify someone or to be identified by someone, it is necessary to know who we are, and knowing who we are is a question of what and who we can relate to that actually tells us something about ourselves. It can be a quality such as gender, a place such as a town or country, a category such as being a middle class bureaucrat, a group such as one’s family or, according to Anthony D. Smith (1991), a religious or ethnic community. And it can certainly be all of them at the same time. In fact, a person normally acquires several different identities during her or his lifetime which constitute something like a blueprint, the core of how this person sees and thinks about herself and how the others around her see and think about her. A 29-year-old black American woman moving with her husband and children to Oslo to work for the oil company Statoil could identify herself as a mother at the same time as she could see herself as a young engineer working in a mainly male-dominated industry, as well as experiencing the reality of being an immigrant in an unknown culture in a supposed and therefore assumed

to look at its past while looking into its future: backwards and forwards. Thus, a nation is not only the result of an imagined community territorially, but also spatially in time. (Bishop and Jaworski, 2003: 248).

‘homogeneous’ society with a dominant white population. Simultaneously, and here is also how identity gets actively used, she could automatically be identified by the others by her gender, age, skin colour (ethnicity), her civil, professional or immigrant status. This too, the way the others identify us, is very important when self-ascribing who and what we are. It is the expectations, norms, values and traditions of those within the group we belong to that has formed our vision of ourselves, and the reason why we can think about ourselves as either German or French, socialists or members of the middle class. When it comes to immigrants like the woman described in our example above, there is another factor attached to the matter of identity of individuals who already are regarded as external elements to the notion of ‘we’ or ‘us’, and that is the factor of integration of these individuals into a “rooted structure”, as referred to by Brochmann (1997: 29):

“Immigrants are often regarded as external individuals or groups that should get integrated or integrate themselves into an already rooted structure – in what is perceived as a *complete* structure. National identity is essentially based on the ability to construct difference and uniqueness in relation to others, the uniqueness of ‘us’ compared with ‘them’. We use the notion of the other to create the image of ourselves as a nation. The significance of these images and notions may increase in times when many people experience uncertainty about the future, whether it is about the sustainability of the welfare state, rising crime or social change.”¹⁰ (ibid.).

1.8 Identifying ourselves as a means to identify the other

The more we try to define the term ‘identity’, to study it and deconstruct it in order to understand it, the more it gains complexity and ambiguity. It is therefore important to pay attention to the connotations attached to this concept, which in the eyes of Rogers Brubaker and Frederik Cooper (2000), we have ‘bought’ too easily without questioning its usage in the modern language of academia, the press, society and politics. In their article *Beyond “identity”* they write:

“‘Soft’ constructivism allows putative ‘identities’ to proliferate. But as they proliferate, the term loses its analytical purchase. If identity is everywhere, it is nowhere. If it is fluid, how can we understand the ways in which self-understandings may harden, congeal, and crystallize? If it is constructed, how can we understand the sometimes coercive force of external identifications? If it is multiple, how do we understand the terrible singularity that is often striven for – and sometimes realized – by politicians seeking to transform mere categories into unitary and exclusive groups? How can we understand the power and pathos of identity politics?” (Ibid.: 1).

¹⁰ My translation.

This might be true for any of the concepts used in this thesis, though. But it cannot be more desirable to avoid these concepts for analytical purposes just to escape the problems represented by the many meanings this concept have acquired as result of its wide usage, yet this is not what Brubaker and Cooper suggest. However, it is important to recognize that because of the multiplicity of meanings that the concept of identity has, the researcher needs to carefully emphasize the conditions under which he or she intends to use the concept. Here, a short introduction will be given, together with an equally short explanation of the origin and practice of the concept of identity. A more detailed explanation of how this concept is understood throughout this work will be addressed later in this chapter.

The concept of identity started to gain influence in academia firstly through the popularization of the work of psychologist Erik Erikson on human development and his research on childhood, youth and identity development in the late 1950s and through the 1960s, and secondly through the appropriation of the term by disciplines such as sociology and anthropology. Within sociology as well as in other social sciences, the concept of identity obtained its breakthrough thanks to the popular work of Erving Goffman.

Identity started to appear together with terms such as ‘role’ and ‘ethnicity’, and thereafter it became almost immediately divided into further categories – categories of analysis and “practice” (Bourdieu in Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 4) – such as race, nation, ethnicity, citizenship, class or community. This distinction between categories of analysis and practice is crucial because it is the latter which gives the concept of identity its practical interpretation, i.e., the interpretation given by common actors in “everyday settings to make sense of themselves, of their activities, of what they share with, or how they differ from, others”, and because “it is used by political entrepreneurs to persuade people to understand themselves, their interests, and their predicaments in a certain way, to persuade certain people that they are (for certain purposes) ‘identical’ with one another and at the same time differ from others, and to organize and justify collective action along certain lines.” (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 4-5). This is in any case a very good way to describe what identity may be, one of its many meanings, as well as how it may be used in everyday life by ordinary people.

But to explain the concept of identity, it is possible to start with an almost semantic approach by reducing identity to a sort of ‘self-reckoning’ act, a process of self-identification and self-definition by discarding what we are not. When people meet and interact they are, at the same time, exchanging information about each other and evaluating this information in order to

establish who is who and, in at least a superficial way, to understand why a person acts or looks the way he or she does. Accordingly, they all are participating in the process of identifying all their counterparts, whether it happens within the game or elsewhere (Jenkins, 2008). In the opinion of Richard Jenkins, this process involves “knowing who we are, knowing who others are, them knowing who we are, us knowing who they think we are, and so on: a multi-dimensional classification or mapping of the human world and our places in it, as individuals and members of collectivities.” (Jenkins, 2008: 5).

Thus, it is once our identity is established, i.e. after we have been identified and sorted into an already existing category – associated with a group, an ethnicity, a locality, an accent, a dress code, a country, an ideology or all of them simultaneously – that our essence, or what seems to be our essence, becomes important and relevant to all the interacting persons, although not exclusively. In that matter, and transferring this to the sporting arena, the identity of a football player can be reflected in many ways both inside and outside the football field. The ‘inside’ identity would be the one perceived by those immediately close to that player, who at the same time has the ability to exert some influence over the manner his identity is perceived by those near him; and the second, the ‘outside’ one, would be that which reaches the spectators sitting in the stadiums or the audiences watching the game from their homes. This audience’s perception of the player’s identity will be dependent on the image and news coverage of him presented by the mass media. The player will in turn have very little control over the way his identity is being projected. External agents affect a footballer’s identity, which is often left at the mercy of media and commercial interests created around the player, the team and football as a sport.

It is indeed quite complicated to claim anything about the national identity of any football player in particular, who has the opportunity to represent his country in an international match or, even more significantly, in an international tournament. Identity, although something we all have and can relate to in several ways and in different situations, is often a very personal thing and also often something very closely related to a sentiment, a feeling that gives meaning to our existence by signalling our belonging to a category or to a group (Smith, 1991; Ismer, 2011)

1.9 The concept of integration

Wherever one sees reference to the concept of integration, it is not unusual to find it accompanied by another term, namely marginalization. In the words of Grete Brochmann:

“[i]ntegration as a human process deals with how socialization, through norms and formation of expectations, contributes to creating social cohesion and societal stability. In other words, how social order is created and maintained. Integration – in the sociological sense – entails the learning of, and adjustment to, society’s values – processes that bind the individual to society (economically and socially), creating belonging and loyalty. The opposite of integration is generally considered to be *marginalization* or exclusion when it comes to individuals, and disintegration or “anomia” when it comes to entire societies. Marginalization involves the undermining of social and symbolic bonds between individual and society, and results in ineffectual participation and a lack of belonging and influence. Marginalization is consequently not merely a risk to the individual, but a threat to society as a whole. (...)” (2003: 4).

On the one hand, these concepts – integration versus its counterpart, marginalization – have been criticised for having a homogenizing effect (Sackmann, 2003) or for being too little reflected upon because they are normally used based on the “premise of an already integrated, bounded society, which faces the risk of disintegration and unbinding due to immigration” (Joppke and Morawska, 2003: 3). The main problem for the social researcher who attempts to use the concept of integration may lie in its daily use, or its ‘popularization’ to be more precise, which has in certain ways stripped its many significances and assigned it a homogenizing attribute that juxtaposes two opposing groups, wherein the first one is composed simply by a society of domestic individuals or groups which are integrated, and the other one purely of immigrants (ibid.)

However, for analytical purposes it is necessary to define the different levels of integration with which we can operate to understand certain social phenomena. For that reason, several distinctions have been made, in order to ease the methodological work. Anthony Giddens has suggested one of these distinctions. In 1979 he divided integration into what he denominated *systemic* and *social* integration. This division has the purpose of placing emphasis on two different types of integration that occur within a society, namely one at macro level and one at micro level. The first one refers to the degree of integration and the stability and the capacity for self-maintenance of the social institutions in a society. The second addresses the operative network, the social ties or ‘social capital’ of individuals in a society. However it is important to say that these two can happen independently of each other (Eriksen, 2010). Thomas Eriksen goes even further by making another distinction, this time regarding the kind of relations a person is able to establish according to his or her amount of social capital: formal and informal relations (ibid.). Finally, another level of differentiation is needed, and to give this concept a more rounded shape it is important to differentiate between social integration and cultural integration.

Furthermore, other scholars have stressed other dimensions of integration, as is the case with Godfried Engbersen (2003), who talks about ‘spheres’ of integration such as the spheres of work, culture, housing, education, politics and law, which in turn are part of the social integration of immigrants. This, somehow, puts integration on an equal footing as questions of denizenship, citizenship and nationality.

Nonetheless, social and cultural integration remains the key element, as tensions due to immigration and immigrants’ assumed inability to become integrated have gained attention in the media and politics in Western societies during the last decade. Consequently, Eriksen (2010) illustrates the different grades of cultural similarity and social integration in a society by saying that a person is integrated according to a scale that goes from 0 to 100, where 0 is applied to a person who stops when a traffic light turns red, and 100 is applied to a person who belongs to the same religious group, likes the same type of music, votes for the same political party and has the same point of view regarding sex and marriage as we do. On the other hand, social integration’s scale starts also at 0, which applies to a person who simply greets another person in the street, and up to 100, which refers to the point when immigrants marry outside their own social group.

For analytical purposes however, the concept of integration needs to be ‘fragmented’ in order to be operative for the researcher. It is necessary to separate its layers and divide it into well-structured and visible dimensions, in order to calculate or, in a better way to say it, understand what it means to be integrated or not from an academic perspective. But how do we measure this? A commonly used method measures the degree of integration of minorities¹¹ by focusing on two main clusters: the first group would be the one referring to the ‘structural dimension’, i.e., the economic and social equality between the minority and the majority groups. Here the interpretation given to this standard is that the smaller the economic and social differences between both groups are, the better integrated a minority group will be (Noll and Weick, 2011). Or to put it another way, the more access immigrants have to resources such as education, training, labour market participation, housing, healthcare, welfare programmes, political activity, income and quality of life in comparison with the native population, i.e., persons with no immigrant background, the more integrated the members of this group are considered to be. Of course, looking at this alone can be misleading, or not complete enough to tell something about the degree of integration immigrants have achieved in a host society. For this reason, a second measurement is used

¹¹ In this case, the usage of the term ‘minority’ applies to both national ethnic minorities or the cluster of minorities represented by the immigrants and their descendant in host societies.

which focuses on a cultural, interactive and identificative dimension (ibid.), which actually means studying the degree of identification – or distance – shown by the members of the minority groups with the members of the host society. The indicators used to measure integration in this understanding are the skills dealing with the local language, the social contacts with native residents, the intention to live permanently in the host country, and the adoption of that country's citizenship.

1.0.1 How are these concepts understood in this thesis?

As has been shown, it is complicated to operate with concepts that are so loaded with different interpretations and meanings at a theoretical and empirical level, both in the academic and in the social fields. The main task then is to narrow down these different interpretations into practical, applicable terms that give sense to the researchers' work. For analytical purposes, I have found it necessary to deliberately opt out of some of the interpretations given to nationalism, identity and integration to make them of practical use for this work.

1.0.1.1 Nation

As already stated at the beginning of this chapter, this thesis is not intended to address any of the controversies around the concept of nation, especially when it comes to the date or place where this concept became a living part of the societies that use it; whether it arose from a modernization process or has been present in human beings' consciousness from time immemorial; or ultimately if it responds more to a sentiment rooted in ethnic origins or mythical genetic or geographic provenance. As a matter of fact, reference to the historical debate among scholars around the definition, meaning and creation of the nation plays a simple descriptive role in this thesis. For that reason it should be sufficient to say that the concept of nation used here is the most widely used interpretation, as normally used by ordinary people and within football's social context, and therefore nation as a political and geographical entity does not get problematized. It is important however to point out that this is not because nation per se is completely unproblematic in a football context. On the contrary, the concept and notions of nation are quite frequently used in a football setting. What draws my attention, however, is not if *nation* is understood as something perennial or modern by scholars or by common people, but the way nation is connected to a person's identity and self-understanding, as well as the way nation is invoked to either include or exclude individuals, to demand adherence to a certain group as a result of a particular sense

of national identity or belonging, or to measure a whole group's degree of integration in a host society by testing their loyalty to a single given nation. This latter example is highlighted in the context of football by the example of Turkish-German players, who by being eligible for both the German and the Turkish NFTs – or any other NFT than the German – are seen to have their loyalty tested and how this choice is judged by football fans and sports commentators.

1.0.1.2 Nationalism

Having said that, this work puts more emphasis on the notion of *nationalism* that emerges from the idea of the ethnic nation, as it is the case of the notion of nation among Germans; and the notion of 'original nation' formed in the minds of the descendants of the first and second generation of immigrants born in Germany, as is the case for many Turkish-Germans in particular, to mention just a single example, but also many others with a migration background. In this way, the main focus lies on the national identity of those referred to in this research, rather than on the concept of nation as a whole.

1.0.1.3 Identity

Regarding the concept of identity itself, this research focuses principally, as previously stated, on identity related to national belonging. This is done with full awareness that all individuals possess and share with others multiple identities developed throughout their lives, and also that identities may not be fixed, but may overlap and sometimes slide from one form of identity to another within ourselves. However, due to the nature of the research questions that have motivated this thesis, maintaining focus on national identity is very important because in many cases it seems to relate directly to a footballer's decision to play for one particular country over another. I also write this fully aware that the latter might only be a presumption that in many cases cannot be verified. Nevertheless it is one quite plausible reason, among many others, why some players with a migration background choose to represent a nation in which their status as citizens is often questioned, or that debates and/or casts doubts upon their integration, assimilation, adaptability, participation, loyalty, inclusion and segregation, etc.

Chapter Two - Methodology

2.1 Choice of case and method: background and justification

Because of its enormous global appeal and because national football teams are of the focus of strong national sentiments among football supporters and enthusiasts, football is an excellent example to illustrate the relation between sport and other social structures such as economy, culture, politics and the media. According to Gabriele Klein and Michael Meuser, “[f]ootball is a microscope of the complex interdependencies of the social”¹² (2008: 7), and because of its at once local and global character, football illustrates this interaction at both macro and micro level. “Football is system and situation, structure and action, representation and performance – and because of its intellectual, social and cultural scientific facets, it is for many a ‘Reality Model’.”¹³ (Ibid.).

However, during the development of this MA thesis I have been asked to explain my decision to focus specifically on the German NFT when studying the effects of nationalism on identity and integration. I have been living in Norway for the past ten years and the implication is that it would have been more natural to apply the study to Norwegian football and society, since sources would be more easily accessible and I would be more familiar with Norwegian culture and society.

This observation is correct: I do know Norwegian society much better than I know German society. I am more familiar with the Norwegian cultural codes and language than I am with the German codes and language. But my principal motivation has not been the accessibility of research sources, but the attributes of the main subjects of study in this research, namely the sense of national belonging (the notion of nation) and national identity and their relationship with the integration of persons with a migration background that characterize Germany and that differentiate it from any other country in Europe and probably the world.

At the same time, applying the research to the German NFT and German society rather than to Norway is advantageous because it helps me avoid being biased by my own knowledge of Norwegian society – especially of the relationship between ethnic Norwegians and immigrants – and by the prejudices I may have developed through my experience as an immigrant in this society. In fact, studying Germany and its NFT has made me able to get a

¹² My translation.

¹³ My translation.

better ‘position’ to study nationalism and its interaction with identity (specifically national identity) and the integration of minorities or, better said, the supposed integration of persons with migration background via sports in general and football in particular.

Although this thesis does not draw any lines or comparisons between Germany and Norway, I do feel it is relevant to briefly explore and compare the two countries’ experience with immigration in order to reveal the differences that explain my choice of case. When doing so, these differences become quite evident. For example, historically the two countries have had distinct ways to relate to their own national consciousness and have dealt differently with questions of nationalism during their own nation-building periods. There are also differences in the type of immigration these two nations have experienced during the past 30 years, which has been strongly related to the different ways their own national economy and labour markets have developed since immigration became restricted in most European countries in the mid-1970s (Brochmann, 1997).

With respect to national identity and nationality laws, both countries have had a notion of nationhood close to the *ius sanguini* concept, as well as an ethno-cultural understanding of national belonging, which has shaped both nations’ nationality and citizenship laws in a similar way. However, some important and relevant differences between the two countries have arisen in the past two decades. Historically, Germany has clearly had a “*Volk*-centered and differentialist” notion of nation-state building and sovereignty, strongly linked to the idea of “an organic cultural, linguistic, or racial community”, as stated by Rogers Brubaker in his famous and extensive analysis on Germany and France (1992: 1), and the Norwegian approach to the notion of nationality and citizenship has tended to match the German model. In recent years, due to the changing pattern of international migration and developments in the political climate, several modifications to these laws have been made in order to ‘modernize’ and adapt them to the social reality in both countries. However, while the political parties in the German Parliament decided in 1999 to adopt a more ‘balanced’ citizenship law by mixing, for the first time, the territorial and descent principles of nationality (Marianne Takle, 2006) – *ius soli* and *ius sanguini* – and thus making it easier for foreigners to acquire German citizenship, this did not happen in Norway. Instead, the Norwegian Parliament approved a new citizenship law in 2005 that remained based on the same traditional principle of descent as the previous citizenship law of 1950 (ibid.). This, according to Takle (2006), has given Norwegian law a more restrictive direction compared to other citizenship laws in Europe, because it does not mix the concepts of *ius sanguini* and *ius soli*. In summary, while a child born in Norway of two legal foreign residents is automatically

regarded as a foreigner by the Norwegian authorities, a child born in Germany of two legal foreign residents may automatically acquire German citizenship.¹⁴ Evidently, this distinction has significant implications for how people of a migration background perceive themselves and are perceived by society in respectively Norway and Germany, and this is of relevance for this study, especially in a football context.

Equally important are the historical differences between both countries when it comes to the historical development of notions of nationhood and national belonging during the last 100 years. The best way to illustrate this is the German Nazism and its global consequences before, during and after the Second World War. It is Germany's Nazi past, which has reshaped Germany's notions of nationhood and national belonging radically after the war, banishing any public demonstration of nationalism, and conflicting Germans' relationship to their own nation and national pride. This is not the case in Norway, whose relationship to its own national pride even improved after the war.

Another relevant distinction between Norway and Germany with regards to football and immigration is the differing degree to which immigrant groups relate to the sport. Norway's largest non-Western minority group is Pakistani, with strong cultural ties to that country. Football has traditionally not been a significant sport in Pakistan, and this group is underrepresented in football clubs or associations in Norway compared to other groups with a migration background, with no players of Pakistani descent playing for the NFT. In Germany, on the other hand, the largest immigrant group is composed of people of Turkish descent. Football is considered a national sport in Turkey, and Turkish immigrants have been very active within football clubs and football associations in Germany.

The differences between German and Norwegian football are also relevant to the choice of case. The local leagues, the Norwegian *Tippeligaen* and the German *Bundesliga*, differ greatly in the size of their memberships and their national and international reach, but also in the number of sporting achievements throughout their history. Germany's *Bundesliga*, or Federal League, is considered among the best in the world because of its high level of competitiveness, with several teams participating in the UEFA Champions League and UEFA Europa League every year,¹⁵ whilst the German NFT is regarded as the second most

¹⁴ In Germany, for a child born of two foreign citizens to automatically obtain the German citizenship the parents one of the parents need to have lived at least eight years legally and lawfully, as well as possessing an unlimited settlement permit and full financial autonomy, i.e. not being receiving help from social security services.

¹⁵ Both tournaments are arranged and promoted by the UEFA (Union of European Football Associations), with the Champions League the most prestigious tournament at club level, and one of the most watched sports event in the world, together with American Football final known as the Super Bowl. BBC News. (2010, January 31).

successful national football team in the history of the football World Cup,¹⁶ and the most successful in the history of the UEFA European Football Championship.

A final consideration regarding the choice of case has been the accessibility of sources, as stated previously. Of course, it would have been easier to get direct access to relevant people within the football world in Norway for the purpose of research, such as players, coaches, journalists and social researchers, than is the case when studying German football, and I partially agree with this argument. However, the fact that German football and the German NFT holds great international appeal and is the subject of extensive analysis and comments both in Germany and internationally, it has been possible to access a great deal of secondary sources such as books, newspapers, internet coverage and other printed and electronic media. And although it has not been possible to contact directly some of the most relevant actors in this thesis, such as the footballers Mesut Özil or Hamit Altintop or the ex-president of the German Football Association (*Deutscher Fußball-Bund* or DFB) Theo Zwanziger, it has been possible to find interviews with these personalities, made by credible journalists and published in well-regarded newspapers, which to some degree have given me some access to their thoughts and motivations on subjects relevant to this study. When it comes to relevant researchers on the subject being studied, such as historians or sociologists, it has been relatively easy to get access to their work both in book form or through journal articles. In some cases it has even been possible to talk to some of them, as is the case with sociologist Sven Ismer from the *Freie Universität Berlin*, which I had the opportunity to personally talk to in Berlin in August 2011.

2.2 'Migration' or 'minority' background?

During the first phase of writing this thesis the use of the term *minority* was indiscriminate and therefore little reflected upon. However I started to question the use of the term after I was asked to take part in a survey about integration in Norway. The consultant carrying out the survey wanted to know how I coped with student life given my – and this was emphasized – *minority* background. I realized at once that there was something that did not appeal to me about this term, not because I did not have any opinion about my condition as an immigrant student in Norway, but because I could not relate my personal life experience to that of a person with a minority background. My main argument was that in the country I was

Sport - Football. Retrieved on October the 5th, 2011 from BBC News:

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/europe/8490351.stm>.

¹⁶ For more detailed statistics and chart positions, see <http://www.dfb.de/index.php?id=11843>, “Die ‘Ewige’ WM-Tabelle”, elaborated by the German Football Federation (Deutsche Fußball-Bund or DFB).

born and raised in, I was regarded as a member of the majority, and for that reason my life experiences as a friend, as a son and brother, as a citizen and as an individual could not relate to the life experiences of a person who has being regarded – and treated accordingly socially and institutionally – as a member of a minority group. Being one of the few Mexicans living in Norway makes me without doubt member of a minority in this country, however my *background* as such is that of a person that belongs to a majority group. And though my personal experience and case as an immigrant cannot be transferred to other immigrants in any society, it was for me pretty obvious that labelling other immigrants as members of a minority could not always be adequate. Nevertheless, this does not just say something about me as an individual and my personal experience as an immigrant, but also about the ‘type’ of immigrant I am, which refers to my characteristics and ‘qualities’ as a person, e.g. my academic achievements and other cultural capital I possess, which positively affect my status as an individual and that automatically influence the way I am regarded by society, especially when compared to the average immigrant to Norway who is escaping poverty and/or war and may have little or no education at all, and who therefore may lack the essential social tools to cope and function in a highly developed society such as Norway.

However, this thesis does not pretended to say that the individuals who can be considered to have a migration background, according to the criteria given later on in this chapter, are not at the same time part of a minority group in the host societies. But it is also important to note that there are minorities who cannot be classified as immigrants, either because they have always lived in the same geographical area, such as the Sami in Norway, or because their presence dates back to the time before the formal establishment of the state in its current form took place, as is the case with the ethnic German minorities living in Russia, known as *Aussiedler* or *Spätaussiedler* (expatriates and repatriates, respectively) in Germany, depending on certain characteristics which I will address later in this work. For this reason, this research refers to non-native Germany players as *players with migration background*, thereby leaving aside the term of minority and the controversies that the term minority could have caused.

2.3 What is meant with the term ‘Player with a Migration Background’?

To define which football players are considered to have a migration background and distinguish them from those who do not, this research work will apply the definition used by the German Statistical Federal Office (*Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland*) for its regular conduction of the *Mikrozensus* (micro-census) that provides official representative statistics

of the population and the labour market in Germany (*Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland*, 2011). Based on this definition, this thesis considers that a person has a migration background if he/she was born abroad and immigrated to Germany after 1949, or if he/she was born in Germany as a foreigner, or if he/she has at least one parent who has immigrated to Germany after 1949 or that was born in Germany as a foreigner (*ibid.*). Thus, and following the example of Noll and Weick (2011), the present research equally takes into consideration if the football players on whom data has been gathered have German citizenship or any other citizenship, if they are born and raised in Germany or if they immigrated before the age of seven, and if they grew up in Germany or not. The idea behind these criteria is the expectation that a person who has attended school in Germany as a child has greater possibilities of successful integration in society through socialization with other class and schoolmates than those who have immigrated later and did not begin to attend school in Germany until they had become teenagers or young adults. Thus, the degree of integration in society is taken into account.

With regard to the criteria described above, it can be stated that almost all the players analyzed throughout this thesis have a migration background, are either born or raised in Germany, have attended school in Germany from the lowest levels and upwards in the school system, have built social ties and networks between themselves and persons with no migration background, have built up their careers as professional footballers in Germany, live in or have family in Germany, and have or have had German nationality.

It is also relevant to mention that this thesis does not make the distinction between players with migration background who have a migration experience of their own and those who have not, unlike some of the analyzed studies and reports from which this work has drawn much of its information. This means that during this work the term ‘migration background’ will only be used when referring to a player or person who fits into the above explained category (i.e., the criteria used for this thesis, based on the criteria developed by the German Statistical Federal Office), independently of whether the person referred to has had a migration experience himself – i.e., if he has migrated from a country to another (in this case Germany from any other country) – or if the migration into Germany has been experienced by at least one of his parents, according to the description of the German Statistical Office addressed above.

2.4 Advantages and disadvantages of this research methodology and approach

Of course, I am aware of the implications and consequences of researching a society that is alien to me instead of taking advantage of my existing knowledge and mastery of Norwegian society. And I am certainly also aware of the possibility that I will mistakenly be looking for things or determined phenomena that may be typical for the Norwegian case – based on my experience in Norway – but which may not be applicable in the case of Germany. It is also a disadvantage not to be able to include primary sources such as carrying out field work at German football clubs, attending international matches, – especially those between Germany and Turkey – or interviewing footballers, managers and fans, to mention just a few of the potentially interesting and important sources of information. However, these problems are the result more of the choice of case than the methodology used to address it.

Having chosen this approach and method has also given me the opportunity to get closer to the phenomena of nationalism, national identity and integration in a specific area, exploring it in what John W. Creswell calls a bounded system (2007). Despite the already mentioned challenges that this research has faced, it has been possible to deal with it by exploiting the very essence of the case study methodology, which is exploring multiple sources of information over time and through detailed in-depth data collection (ibid). However, and as noticed by Creswell, another of the challenges that the researcher has to face when selecting the case study methodology is that it becomes difficult to identify and thus choose the correct case. Creswell writes that “[t]he case study researcher must decide which bounded system to study, recognizing that several might be possible candidates for this selection and realizing that either the case itself or an issue, which case or cases are selected to illustrate, is worthy of study.” (ibid.: 75-76). Choosing to study more than one case at once tends to lead to a problem of ‘depth’, i.e., the more cases the researcher wants to cover simultaneously, the less he or she is going to be able to cover in a deep manner. With regard to this thesis, it has been difficult to reduce the recollection of data to a simple area, principally because the encounter with too much relevant information to the research that would have required the expansion of the thesis from only one case to two or more, has pretty much been the norm.

Additionally, one of the main problems I have had to deal with has been to set clear boundaries for what is researchable and what it is desirable to research in order to answer the questions raised in the introduction chapter. While on one hand the central theme of this thesis has appeared more or less clear, on the other hand it has been difficult not to divert into too many parallel bounded systems of information which, although interesting and somehow

connected to the main questions, at the same time would have removed attention from the main topic of study. The deviation from the main theme has thus been a potential danger throughout this research.

Other important moments of the research that can be tracked back to the chosen research methodology are both the collection of information – and due to the nature of the researched case, mostly written sources of information –, developing an in-depth description and understanding of the case, and the analysis of the recollected data material.

2.5 Ethical considerations and reflections

In both qualitative and quantitative research there are certain ethical guidelines made to safeguard the integrity of those participating in the research project, as well as of those the research is about. When it comes to qualitative research special emphasis is placed on issues such as mandatory reporting for projects that involve personal data processed by electronic means, or the obligation every researcher has to obtain the written consent of all participants in the research, where they acknowledge to have been informed about the objectives and main characteristics of the project, about the possible consequences of their participation, and about their right to withdraw from the project at any time. Confidentiality is also considered to be very important, especially when the collected data involves sensitive or compromising information that may endanger the informants in the project in any way, in which case the researcher is obliged to guarantee the anonymity of the informant.

Although not all research projects face the same ethical challenges, all research projects must undergo a serious self-assessment that considers the potential ethical dilemmas that the project might raise, and this research represents no exception.

Accordingly, the choice of case and methodology in this research can be seen to raise some ethical considerations. Tove Thagaard (2003) warns of the ethical implications that can arise from studying certain groups in society. Undoubtedly, and depending on the approach selected, the study of immigrants may imply certain complications for the members of these groups. As already known, these kinds of groups – e.g. immigrants or other ethnic minorities – may be especially vulnerable because they may be in a disadvantaged position compared members of the majority.

First and foremost, this research has as its main subjects German football players with a migration background. All these players are public figures with celebrity status which anyone can get information about, what makes access to their lives relatively easy. At the

same time, and unfortunately more often than wished, because of their migration background and minority status, these personalities have been the targets of negative scrutiny, harassment and even racist demonstrations of rejection by fans and/or right-wing extremists for ideological reasons. For those reasons this research cannot ignore the fact that this selected group of people also can be regarded as ‘vulnerable’ in a certain way, and these are facts that the researcher has had to take into account along the way. One consequence is that the information that can be found in the research field about these players may not always be reliable, and some other times not only unreliable, but even defamatory as well. I have therefore sought to carefully control and analyze the sources collected throughout this research in order to separate the trustworthy from the untrustworthy ones, and have stressed objectivity when it comes to the information given from these sources and the way this has been handled. The same criteria also apply to collected data-material that involves persons that belong to the majority group in society, such as the directors of the German Football Association (DFB) or the managers of the German NFT.

Beyond the evaluations made to avoid ethical dilemmas in this work, some other reflections around other possible ethical questions have been made. Following on from Thagaard’s reasoning, here are some of the questions made to address some of the possible ethical issues that this research may raise: how are the main actors been represented in the analysis of texts and documents relating to them or about them? How obvious or prominent is the informant’s voice in the analysis? How is the information been forwarded? Is it especially influenced by the researcher’s own convictions and in consequence biased, or is the analysis and interpretation the result of an academically grounded evaluation? In this sense, how can this become a burden on the research’s essence from an ethical perspective?

With regards to this particular thesis, some of the ethical dilemmas described above are not as relevant. A reason for this may be the nature of the chosen case study, in which all the information is based entirely on secondary sources, which at the same time is about public figures in the world of football and politics. This means that all the gathered information is of public domain, accessible to everyone, and for that reason not especially revealing, i.e., all the information here has already been published and discussed in several public arenas, as well as not being especially sensitive either, since none of the informants have required anonymity. In fact, the lack of anonymous sources could be seen to increase the credibility of the information used in this thesis, and therefore represent a strength.

Chapter Three - The German Notion of Nationhood

3.1 Citizens in the age of denizens

It was a warm summer day in 2010, and I was enjoying my holidays visiting my family in Mexico, when I received the good news: the Norwegian state had granted me full citizenship after a year of conducting bureaucratic proceedings and an investigation into me, including any existing records on my personal legal status and behaviour throughout the eight years I had been living in the country. However, after a short while, my excitement and joy began to turn into reflection. Suddenly I started to think about my nationality and how this was related to my own identity, what it meant to me to be Mexican, and what it meant to acquire a new citizenship. This was something I had never reflected on before, because one is not expected to reflect on things one takes for granted – being born in Mexico and the ‘whole cultural package’ that followed from this fact was as natural and obvious as the certainty that I breathed and existed. Was there something to be happy about?

The rights conferred upon me when I became a legal permanent resident in Norway were no longer the logical consequence of my nationality, as was the case for every person in every state a few decades ago. Instead, these newly acquired rights were the consequence of a globalized world in which it was necessary to apply these citizenship and national laws to individuals in constant movement, basing their legal status on their place of residence rather than on national origin (Brochmann, 2010). In this context, what is important about acquiring citizenship?

From a legal point of view, the mere fact of having acquired a new nationality had changed my status in my adopted country, which could only be a positive thing. After all, from that day on, I would not have to justify my presence and stay in Norway to the authorities every certain number of months, filling application forms and presenting diverse documentation in order to gain permission to prolong my residence and businesses there. From that day on, I had not only acquired a new passport, but also the ultimate protection against deportation, as well as all the rights that accompanied full citizenship. Yet in order to be entitled to this new legal status, the notions of citizenship connected with those of nation had to be reconceived, reflected upon and eventually readapted.

The civil, social and political rights that used to be exclusively for native citizens, and which symbolized the highest degree of their membership to a national-state, are now commonly

shared by everyone possessing legal immigrant status in a foreign country, once certain conditions have been fulfilled. As noted by Grete Brochmann (2010), by extending the protective range of national laws to non-citizens, foreigners receive new status, which is based on their place of residence rather than on their nationality. For many countries, among them Germany, this meant making a transition from a differentialist and descent-based conception of nation to a territory-based notion. In the case of Germany, this transition took a long time and is still in progress. Nevertheless, such a transition eventually occurred as a response by almost all political parties in the country to the necessity of incorporating and including its vast community of what the Germans refer to as *ausländische Mitbürger*, or “foreign fellow citizens” (Brubaker, 2001), in order to integrate its *denizens*, or descendants from the first and second generation of the worker immigrants, or *Gastarbeiter*, the majority of them of Turkish origin who arrived in Germany in the 1960s (Takle, 2007).

In this political attempt to reconcile the different civic, social and political roles that exist between citizens and denizens, an interest in clarifying the duties and rights of each of their existing legal statuses develops. Further, the debates about the importance of nationality and citizenship among scientists and politicians since the second half of the 20th century originate in this kind of political attempt at reconciling these roles between the rights given to citizens and denizens. This has been a debate about the concept of citizenship versus that of denizenship, and how these two stand in relation to each other when it comes to the rights and duties that a citizen is entitled to from birth – or her/his naturalization – and the rights and duties an immigrant automatically acquires as long as her/his residency in the host country has met the required legal conditions. Nonetheless, due to the limitations set by the subject of research in this thesis, this debate will not be addressed. However, it seems relevant to briefly clarify the main features of these two concepts.

The concept of denizen came into use already at the dawn of the nation-state in Europe, but, according to Kees Groenendijk (2006), it had already been used in powerful European cities to designate the status of those who had come from other cities or states, but were not counted as citizens. The concept of denizen had already been used in England’s legislation in the 18th century, and was used to describe naturalised foreigners who were still excluded from appointment to certain public offices (ibid.). Yet it was Thomas Hammar who first used this term to refer to the status of immigrants who had come to Western Europe in the ‘60s and the ‘70s for temporary employment or protection, but still lived in the host country after 10 to 20 years. Denizenship status refers to these third country citizens’ rights, which are (1) free

access to labour market, (2) access to the social security system on equal terms with native citizens, (3) protection against sudden expulsion from the country, and (4) the right to participate in local elections, at least in some countries. Groenendijk summarizes the latter by saying that “[f]rom a legal perspective, these immigrants were still aliens – non-citizens. From a social or political perspective, they had obtained a status equal or similar to that of a citizen. The term *denizen* elegantly described their status halfway between the ‘real’ non-citizen and the citizen.” (Ibid.: 4).

Some scholars have argued that this international praxis – of acknowledging the very existence of denizen status – has deteriorated the significance of citizenship (Brochmann, 2010; Joppke, 1999; Soysal, 1994). Their argument questions the importance of citizenship as a legal figure: if every legal foreign citizen has the opportunity to be granted social, economic and certain political rights even before they are qualified to attain full citizenship, what then is the purpose of keeping the legal figure of citizenship as a goal for integration in the first place?

This work has no intention of denying the fact that the legal status of citizenship – and especially citizenships from certain countries, such as those that are members of the EEA zone, the European Union or other Western societies – is still very attractive to citizens from outside these geopolitical regions, because it may offer specific social and economic benefits within their welfare regimes. Such benefits may ensure immigrant’s access to institutions created for the expressed purpose of granting people’s well-being through unemployment benefits, a universal healthcare system, free education, public housing and labour market participation which the immigrant’s country of origin is unable to provide to the same degree. At the same time, citizenship provides protection against the State’s quintessential legal tool detrimental to illegal or undesired foreigners, which is deportation. Of course this can, and has been, contested before, since citizenship in modern democratic European states is not the only way for foreigners to reside permanently in a country and achieve the diverse social, civic and political¹⁷ rights it offers, as we already have seen.

Still, my brand-new nationality presented me with other questions about myself. At first, I wondered if Norwegian citizenship would make me more Norwegian. Would it be

¹⁷ Although this statement actually goes against Marshall’s typology of rights, in which denizens are not entitled with full rights by the state, the fact that many countries have given foreign legal residents the right to vote in local elections, albeit in a restricted manner, can be seen as a political right. Here, foreign legal residents get the chance to contribute to the formation and implementation of laws and policies that affect everybody in the country with their vote, as well as participate in the democratic processes in the same manner as native citizens do.

possible to spot that I had become a little more alike the rest? Did I feel more similar to Norwegians, generally speaking? If so, what kind of Norwegian had I become?

In my case, my reflection about the fact that I had been granted a new citizenship and my own national sentiment of belonging was based on confusing two quite different categories, namely national affiliation and national identity. This mistake, however, did not strike me right away at all.

“Citizenship is not only a legal status but also an identity”, Christian Joppke has stated (1999: 6). Maybe Joppke’s words apply for my case as well, but I have difficulties in pointing out exactly what features of my identity could be closely and solely related to my new citizenship, and not to my experience as an immigrant as a whole. But Christian Joppke was probably thinking about the native population when he wrote this. In that case, the reason why I feel Mexican is also the very same reason for why I cannot feel Norwegian in the same way as a native Norwegian does. This may then be a question of belonging and the personal emotions attached to it, whether it is belonging to a group of people, or to an entire nation. At the same time, my identity cannot solely depend on how I view myself or how I act, but also on who I am in terms of how the others see me: I am not viewed as being a Norwegian, ergo I am not Norwegian. In being receptive to other people’s responses to my identity, I have questioned whether I will be fully accepted as an equal by mainstream Norwegian society due to my citizenship status, or, even better, despite my citizenship status. What I may perceive as being an unequivocal sign of my acquired Norwegianness in terms of cultural and social characteristics may not be viewed as such by native Norwegians. It is here that a delicate balance between inclusion and exclusion, ‘in’ and ‘out’, ‘us’ and ‘them’ may lie. Further, it is in this delicate balance that the German case (as a nation) represents probably the most extreme example of a notion of national belonging when it comes to granting a third country citizen German citizenship. We will come to the development of Germany in this area in the following pages.

For many scholars, a sense of belonging is an essential part of what constitutes and holds a nation together, as well as being an important part of a nation’s core (Smith, 1991; Brubaker, 2000). With regard to citizenship, we find that notions of national belonging are what characterise the ideology and thus the creation of a nation, and the policies and laws that regulate most access and affiliation to the nation, as well as the acquisition of the citizenship for foreign residents, as we will see.

3.2 Blood ties and ancestry: the proof of true 'Germanness'

As mentioned above, Germany represents a splendid example of a nation that still faces troubles of self-definition and self-identity – or national identity – (Fulbrook, 1999), as well as continuing to struggle to find its rightful position as a proud nation in the international context. In a time when nationalism seems to be gaining ground in most Western countries, Germany is a country that, after Auschwitz cannot allow itself any trace of nationalism. This is why of all Western societies in modern times, Germany may be the one with the most interesting understandings of nationhood, which has led to cultural, social and, ultimately, political difficulties in adapting its notion of nationhood to any other model than the one solely related to the idea of descent and ethnicity, as well as adapting its conception of national belonging to another model than that one based on what Germans call *Deutschtum* or 'Germanness', a term closely connected to the concept of *Volkszugehörigkeit* or 'belonging to the people'¹⁸, i.e., who can and cannot be regarded as German, and therefore who can be included in the German nation or excluded from it. This has become an issue of hectic discussion in both public and political arenas with regard to integration and immigration policies during the last two decades, especially due to the forces that have tried to reconcile the political, institutional and popular understandings of Germanness with the immigrant population during this period of time.

However, in order to comprehend these conceptions and their relevance in the making of the German nation, culture and social life, it is necessary to go back to the period in which Germany was founded as a nation-state, because it is in this time when the criteria and premises for today's notions of nationhood were laid down.

According to John Breuilly (1992), the unitary nation-state period of 1871-1945 should serve as the point of reference for understanding all modern German history, probably because its particular history of this period provides a very good example of the process of the European transition from city-states, bishoprics, archbishoprics, petty principedoms and even large multi-national dynasties to the rise of the modern nation-state.¹⁹ It was during this epoch that all of the political units that constituted the Holy Roman Empire were eliminated by the Prussian state in the rise of the territorial state, a process that was completed when the

¹⁸ My translation.

¹⁹ With Breuilly being one of the modernist historians behind some of the theories of the formation or invention of nations, his claim that "the history of modern Europe is seen as the history of the rise of the nation-state" (Breuilly, 1992: 1) has been contested several times by other historians such as Anthony Smith and Adrian Hastings, as we have already seen in chapter one.

Prussians expelled the multi-national Habsburg dynasty from Germany to build the nation-state (ibid.).

On the other hand, according to Brubaker (1992), Germany was already a nation that was apolitically in search of a state, and therefore was not linked to “the abstract idea of citizenship” (ibid.: 1). For these reasons, it can be said that, during that time, Germany became constituted as the exact opposite of the ideal of “being the bearer of universal political values” (ibid.), as was the case in post-revolutionary France. Rather, the German nation was an “organic, cultural, linguistic or racial community”. The following are Brubaker’s own words:

“If the French understanding of nationhood has been state-centered and assimilationist, the German understanding has been Volk-centered and differentialist. Since national feeling developed before the nation-state, the German idea of the nation was not originally political, nor was it linked to the abstract idea of citizenship. This pre-political German nation, this nation in search of a state, was conceived not as bearer of universal political values, but as an organic cultural, linguistic, or racial community – as an irreducibly particular *Volksgemeinschaft*. On this understanding, nationhood is an ethno-cultural, not a political fact.” (Brubaker, 1992: 1).

In this way, Brubaker not only highlighted the most salient characteristics of the ethnic-based and republican notions of nationhood that flourished in Germany and France in the middle of the 18th century, respectively, but he also brought focus on the peculiarity of the construction of nationhood in Germany after its foundation, and to the fact that this construction notably still influences policy-making in Germany today.

As claimed by some scholars (Fulbrook, 1999; Flam, 2007; Froböse, 2007; Takle, 2007), the debate about what is supposed to constitute the German nation, as well as who can be regarded as German, has lasted for about 200 years. The first German intellectuals to address these questions, around the year 1800, linked the idea of *Deutschtum* to the collectivity that surged from the sharing of a common culture and language, irrespective of where the members of this community lived. At a later time, German historian Friedrich Meinecke introduced the concept of *Kulturnation* in order to differentiate it from what he called *Staatsnation*, which is the opposite definition of community (Smith, 1991; Takle, 2011). Marianne Takle explains the difference in Meinecke’s distinction, in which a *Kulturnation* is a community that exists because its members share a common language, religion, tradition and history, while *Staatsnation* can make everybody into citizens regardless of cultural

background (Takle, 2011). On the other hand, Anthony Smith (1991) writes about Meinecke's definitions in the following way:

“We may dissent from his use of these terms, indeed from the terms themselves; but the distinction itself is valid and relevant. Politically, there was no ‘nation’ in ancient Greece, only a collection of city-states, each jealous of its sovereignty. Culturally, however, there existed an ancient Greek community, Hellas, that could be invoked, for example by Pericles, in the political realm – usually for Athenian purposes. In other words we can speak of a Greek cultural and ethnic community but not of an ancient Greek ‘nation’.” (Smith, 1991: 8-9).

In addition, according to Brubaker (1992), it is the historically established notions of the German nation as a community of descent, as well as a lack of confidence in the effectiveness of an assimilation policy towards foreigners, that still substantially determine the restrictive criteria of membership, and the strict conditions for the acquisition of the citizenship. Brubaker's thesis is that the past, i.e., the basis on which the German national-state was constructed, forged the German way of dealing with questions of belonging and citizenship. This is because, unlike France, the German notion of belonging (*Zugehörigkeit*) and nationality (*Staatsangehörigkeit*) was never based on a territorial conception (*ius soli*), but on one of descent (*ius sanguini*). Now, it must be said that Germany has politically moved away from these conceptions, and changed its citizenship and nationality laws since Rogers Brubaker published his analysis about the German nation-state in 1992. In fact, these laws have been ‘modernized’ since 1999, and underwent a new revision and adjustment in 2005, in order to incorporate the concept of *ius sanguini* into the concept of *ius soli*, and thus open up the possibility for non-ethnic German immigrants to acquire the citizenship more easily, and thereby stimulate their integration in society. This is what Marianne Takle (2007) refers to this as a transition from “ethnos to demos” to describe this plan in German politics, a change whose characteristics will be more closely discussed later in this thesis.

In sum, both the historical and empirical evidence seem to point at two different spheres: the political sphere, which has moved from an ethnic approach to nationhood to a more territorial understanding of it, and the social sphere, wherein the conception of national belonging is still pretty much influenced by the national consciousness that characterized most of the 18th century, and in many ways was the driving force that eventually brought together the remains of the Holy Roman Empire into a great German nation after its dissolution in 1806. This is a

national consciousness that eventually evolved into a ferocious nationalism, which reached its peak with the extreme nationalist actions promoted and implemented by the Nazis.

It is important to say that this research has no data to conclude that the Germans in general have still nationalist attitudes, as those expressed by Nazism, as a measure to engage with the rest of the world or as a way to decide whether immigrants are to be included or excluded from the national project. Equally, this research has no way of stating that the so-called integration between ethnic or native Germans and immigrants from outside the German cultural sphere of influence is not happening due to or despite nationalism. Saying so would be severely wrong for this thesis. Furthermore, some social researchers (see Miller-Idriss, 2009)²⁰ believe with good reason that, for the majority of Germans, the depictions of Germany's future (e.g. as an aging nation being taken over by Muslim immigrants), as well as their positions on nationality, national identity and national pride issues are not as 'white and black' as those expressed by the anti-foreigner right and the anti-nationalist left; but rather are dynamic and a complicated combination of both, (plus other variations).

On the other hand, it is equally relevant to point out that it would be naive to suppose that this long-standing German tradition of regarding the national community (*das Volk*) as a 'cultural community' and 'cultural nation', whose members are deeply connected to each other by a common language, religion, traditions and history regardless of state boundaries, has not played an important role in the way many Germans understand, experience and feel national belonging both socially and politically – what is regarded or viewed as being German and *for* the Germans –, as well as the way in which they relate to the 'otherness' represented by the immigrant population in the country.

Marianne Takle's words can summarize the forgoing:

"The acknowledgment of a unique German culture and ancestry united previously disparate communities and helped to forge the perception of a common national identity. According to Habermas [1994], *this particularism has forever marked Germany's self understanding.*"²¹ (Takle, 2007: 82-83).

Or, as stated by Nora R  thzel, the German conception of nationhood "lies in the fact that it is constructed biologically. German nationals are defined by their origin: one can only be born German." (R  thzel, 1990: 41).

²⁰ Cinthia Miller-Idriss (2009). *Blood and Culture. Youth, Right-Wing Extremism, and National Belonging in Contemporary Germany.* Duke University Press, Durham.

²¹ My italics.

In the case of this research specifically, the main subject of interest falls on the manner in which the majority perceives young German football players who have a migration background. Are these old German traditional notions of *Deutschtum* and *Volkszugehörigkeit* an obstacle when these players have to decide whether to play for the German NFT, or to represent the country of their parents and/or grandparents?

3.3 Defining Germany and the Germans

Although it may seem a new phenomena due to the huge attention paid by the media in our days, Germany has experienced immigration in great numbers at least since the 17th century. However, over the past century, mass immigration to Germany has occurred mainly in three phases.

Ethnic Germans and German citizens (*Vertriebene*) who had to flee from the Soviet Army after the German defeat in 1945, or who were expelled from former occupied countries such as Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Russia (former Soviet Union), represented the first wave of immigrants. These were immigrants who either had lived in Eastern Europe for centuries or that had been relocated by the Nazi authorities during the war as part of the Third Reich's *Lebensraum* policy.

The second wave of immigration, and the one that has aroused the most interest, began in 1955, and was result of the German economic boom, also known as *Wirtschaftswunder*,²² which prompted the creation of jobs for which there were not enough workers. This fact motivated the authorities to sign recruitment agreements with Italy in 1955, Spain and Greece in 1960, Turkey in 1961, Morocco in 1963, Portugal in 1964, Tunisia in 1965 and finally Yugoslavia in 1968 (*Bundesministerium des Innern*, 2010). The idea was to open the labour market to workers from these countries on a short-term basis (these groups of immigrants would later be known as *Gastarbeiter*), allowing the market to regulate their recruitment depending on the existing need for them within the different sectors of the economy. Yet what originally was intended to be temporary turned out to become permanent, as an increasing number of workers decided to stay and started bringing their families to join them in their newly adopted land.

Finally, the third wave started around 1990 with the reunification of both German States, followed by the fall of the Iron Curtain and ultimately the decisive collapse of the

²² 'Economic Miracle' is a term used to describe the unexpectedly rapid and sustainable economic development in the Federal Republic of Germany after WWII, and which began in 1948 with the currency reform that replaced the *Reichsmark* with the *Deutsche Mark*.

Soviet Union, which was a historic event that drove hundreds of thousands of the so-called *Spätaussiedler*, or ethnic German repatriates – a concept better explained later in this chapter – to emigrate to Germany once the borders were opened and travel restrictions revoked.

From all these three immigration waves described above, the second is the one that has challenged the German notions of belonging and nationhood the most, both politically and socially. One of the reasons for this, aside from the fact that using the concept of *ius sanguini* as the basis for granting citizenship became obsolete, is that a group of new immigrants emerged from this second of immigration, most of them born and raised in Germany. However, none of these individuals born in Germany could get German citizenship due to the national origin of their parents, which was not the case for the *Spätaussiedler*, or for any other children born in Germany to German parents, who would naturally be automatically entitled to such citizenship.

Nevertheless, it is in the combination of having both non-German immigrants and those referred to as *Spätaussiedler* present in the country that much of the German self-understanding comes to light. This happens so because it is especially in the governmental policies made to tackle the presence of non-German immigrants and those regarded as German by ethnic origin, and in the people's attitudes toward immigrants, that it becomes strikingly evident how robust and deeply rooted the notions of nationhood and national belonging really are in Germany. Further, although there has been a constant debate and examination of the immigration and citizenship laws in Germany during the last twenty years, as pointed out previously, this country's notion of national belonging and national identity – *Deutschtum* – has somehow remained pretty much influenced by the original descent-based notions of nationhood. This influence can be traced back to the days of its foundation as a nation-state, and becomes very visible when the social and cultural premises that served as the basis for that event during that particular time are taken into account. In concluding this reasoning, this influence becomes even more evident when we study the way in which Germany's immigration and citizenship laws have treated those who are regarded as *Volkszugehöriger* or *Volksdeutsche* – 'members of the German people'²³, in comparison with those who are not regarded as such by the law (Finkelstein, 2006). The best examples within this category are undoubtedly the *Aussiedler* or *Spätaussiedler* – depending on the period in which these ethnic German repatriates immigrated to Germany (Takle, 2007) – which are persons who have returned to Germany from German ethno-cultural enclaves in Eastern

²³ My translation.

Europe since the end of the Second World War, principally from countries such as Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Czech Republic or Russia. Furthermore, because of their German ethnic and cultural roots, they have been regarded as *Volkszugehöriger* – or ‘belonging to the people’ – by the German authorities, and have thereby been granted German nationality by law from day one.

Some historical events have to be taken into account to understand the existence of the special immigrant status of these German repatriates. At the end of the war, the arrival of the first expelled Germans (*Vertriebene*) who had made it back to Germany just prior to the solidification of the final boundaries between the formerly hostile states (1945-1949) did not stop the flow of Germans immigrating from the east. This situation required a “quick solution to identify the around 8-million German deportees (*Volkszugehörige*) ‘as though’ they were *Staatsangehörige*.” (Takle, 2007: 117). To grant access and refuge to these Germans, the authorities went on to define what it meant to be a German by law, which was specified in Article 116 of the Basic Law. Takle gives a translation of the definition written in the Basic Law as follows:

“[Germans] are people with German citizenship (*Staatsangehörigkeit*) as well as refugees or deportees belonging to the German people (*Volkszugehörigkeit*), their spouses and children, who resided on German territory as it was demarcated on 31 December 1937.” (Ibid.).

The (*Spät*)*Aussiedler*²⁴ are the descendants of Germans who emigrated to Eastern Europe during different epochs at least since the 12th century,²⁵ but who, for a variety reasons, have found it necessary to return to their ancestor’s land of origin. According to the Basic Law, and because of their status as ‘*Volkszugehörige*’, these (*Spät*)*Aussiedler* are identified as *Staatsangehörige*, or, in other words, ‘German citizens’ by the German authorities (ibid.). Takle writes further that this law was intended to clarify the status of the refugees and deportees who either did not have German citizenship or who could not give proof of having

²⁴ This is a term borrowed from Marianne Takle (2007) to refer to both waves of German resettlers that made their way to Germany from either 1950 to 1992 (*Aussiedler*) and after 1993 (*Spätaussiedler*). As for those immigrants with German ancestry who immigrated between 1945 and 1949, the term *Vertriebene* or ‘expellees’ was used.

²⁵ According to Marianne Takle (2006, 2007, 2011), the emigration of Germans to eastern Europe started already in the 16th century, but she dates the mass emigration a little forward in time when Catherine the Great invited the Germans to settle and farm uncultivated land in Russia in 1763. However, other historians speak of 1000 years of history of Germans in Eastern Europe. They appoint the Roman-German Emperor Otto I, who gave large parts of Silesia as a fief to the Polish Prince Mieszko I. in 963 as the first documented relation of migration between Germans and Poles (*Der Spiegel*, 2011).

it. “However”, she continues, “this distinction between German citizens and those belonging to the German people can still be found in contemporary legislation.” (Ibid.).

It is important to underline that this indeed is a matter of definition: what does it mean to be German? This definition is highly relevant because it ensures one kind of treatment to those refugees or immigrants who are regarded as being Germans versus other immigrant groups who are treated differently by the law because of their ethno-cultural background. In line with Takle, Kerstin Finkelstein (2006) writes that the (*Spät*)*Aussiedler*’s advantage has been their inclusion into the political definition of ethnic affiliation as ‘Germans’, which was created by the Federal Republic already in 1953, when the systems and their borders were still closed. At this time, the notion of ethnicity was clarified in the following way: “A German national (*Volkszugehöriger*) is he/she who in his/her homeland has become known with the German nature and character”²⁶ (ibid.: 28), which in German reads as follows: “*Deutscher Volkszugehöriger ist, wer sich in seiner Heimat zum Deutschtum bekannt hat*” (ibid.). Additionally, the Federal Law on Expellees of 1953 expresses it thusly: “Members of the German people are those who have committed themselves in their homelands to German *Volkstum* – i.e. Germanness –, in as far as this commitment is confirmed by certain facts such as descent, language, upbringing, culture.” (Takle, 2011: 164).

Another reference to the importance that the condition of descent has played in the German notion of belonging, and for the formation of citizenship laws throughout German history, is to be found in the language itself. In this sense, it might be interesting to note that the degree to which a person belongs to the nation is not only differentiated in the laws of naturalization or citizenship, but is also already embedded in the German language as well. One example might be the fact that the concept of citizen – which in the English language can refer to a person who has been naturalized after living in a determined nation-state for a determined number of years, and to a indigenous person, i.e., someone born and raised in a given nation-state – acquires a different dimension in German when it comes to establishing both what it means to be part of the nation in a civic, social and political sense, and what it means to belong to the nation in terms of ethnicity and descent, as well cultural heritage such as customs, traditions, values, religion, and history. Together, these constitute a central part of the collectivity’s national identity and national consciousness (the sense of nationhood).

²⁶ My translation.

It is important to note that the German language has actively been used to demarcate the differences between *Volksdeutsche* and people with other nationalities and languages, and it has also been important in conceiving of and expressing the notion of nationhood. Thus, ‘necessary distinctions’ between the diverse forms of attachment to the German nation, the German people and the German state have been produced. For example, in Germany, there are special terms to distinguish between persons living in the country according to their degree of attachment. In this regard, Germans distinguish between *Aussiedler* (immigrants with ethnic German heritage mostly from Eastern Europe), *Volksdeutsche* (ethnic Germans), *Spätaussiedler* (late repatriates), *Übersiedler* (former East Germans who had emigrated to West Germany), *Ausländer* (foreigners), *Mitbürger ausländische Herkunft* (fellow-citizens of foreign ethnic heritage) and even *einheimische Ausländer* (native foreigners) (Miller-Idriss, 2009). Other examples, including terms like *Staatsangehörigkeit*, *Volkszugehörigkeit*, *Staatsbürgerschaft*, and *Nationalität*, probably define more accurately the differences that exist between the different forms of attachment to the nation in both a legal and cultural manner, in a way that the English or French languages do not. Here, we have a set of concepts that can be divided into two general blocks: the first one would be composed by the words *Staatsangehörigkeit* – which in English gets translated into ‘nationality’ or ‘citizenship’ – and *Staatsbürgerschaft* – which gets translated into ‘citizenship’. Both refer to the formal attachment an individual has to the State as a political entity, which has been issued by the official authorities of the State. Additionally, *Staatsbürgerschaft* refers more to participatory citizenship (Brubaker, 1992). In the second block, attachment to an ethno-cultural group – in this case, the German ethno-cultural group – is defined particularly by the terms *Volkszugehörigkeit* and *Nationalität*. These two terms denote an individual’s belonging to an ethnic group based on blood ties, descent and kinship, or, in other words, *ius sanguini*, with *Volkszugehörigkeit* being the term that signifies the highest degree of belonging to the German people. And though the concept of *Nationalität* has lost the significance it once had, i.e., before most civil, political and social rights,²⁷ which were once exclusively available to the members of the political community, got transferred to other immigration statuses such as the status of *denizenship* (see Soysal, 1994; Brochmann, 2003 and 2010; Midtbøen, 2008), it still has a connotation linked directly to the idea of national belonging. More specifically, nationality still has much more to do with a shared and common feeling, something beyond

²⁷ Paraphrasing T.H. Marshall’s analysis of citizenship’s development throughout history, in which people were entitled with civil, political and social rights, assigned during the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth century respectively (Marshall in Midtbøen, 2008).

the prevailing nationality law, and that seems to be ‘closer to the heart’. This is a sentiment that is strongly related to a person’s own sense of self-image (Smith, 1991; Elias, 1994; Ismer, 2010).

We know from psychology that our self-understanding – self identity – is also created not only by the feeling of sharing a vast number of cultural and social assets, like traditions, a shared history and especially a shared language, but also personal features that to some degree make us into who we are and how we are seen, such as the country or city we are from, or the profession we practice (Hogg and Vaughan, 2005). Therefore, it is logical to think that these semantic distinctions are not coincidental, but rather a part of the development of the Germans’ way of understanding their own origin and getting along with other ethnic groups and minorities in a historical context, whether these groups live outside German boundaries or inside German territory.

Nonetheless, the development of the language has also worked in the other direction, as pointed out by Cynthia Miller-Idriss (2009). In the course of less than a decade, she writes, other terms have emerged to refer to, for example, ‘foreigners’ in Germany: “Instead of the term *Ausländer*, which implies belonging to another land, many Germans increasingly use the term *ausländische Mitbürger* – foreign co-citizen – to refer to second- and third-generation immigrants.” (2009: 12). The shift of the term *Fremdarbeiter* (foreign workers) to *Gastarbeiter* (guest workers), or the term *Ausländer* to the more political correct *Migranten* (immigrants) also help to illustrate this point.

3.4 From ‘ethnos’ to ‘demos’: rethinking citizenship or belonging?

It is important to notice that there has been a very relevant discussion around the defining the German nation taking place – what the German nation is and what constitutes it as such. This has been a discussion that dates back to the period before the foundation of a unified German state at the end of the 19th century. Nevertheless, since its final unification as a nation-state in 1871, the definitions of what a *Volksdeutsche* person is, as well as what is needed to determine who can be allowed to acquire German citizenship and why, had not been challenged until relatively recently in German history. Fortunately for Germany’s immigrant population, some major and significant changes in German legislation have been made.

Christian Joppke (1999) accused Rogers Brubaker of viewing Germany solely as an anchored state that bases citizenship on an ethno-cultural interpretation of nationhood, when in fact Germany certainly has begun to legislate towards a more civic-territorial concept of

citizenship, thus seeking to better integrate its second and third- generation immigrants. However, I would like to defend Brubaker's stance by using Walker Connor's idea of self-awareness. According to Anthony D. Smith, Connor portrayed nations as the result of "self-aware ethnic groups" (Smith, 2008: 3). For him, these self-aware ethnic groups are constituted on the basis of the conviction that their members are ancestrally related to each other. Here, it is very relevant to note that what matters is not whether these group members are indeed ancestrally related to each other or not, or whether they actually stem from a variety of ethnicities. What matters is not the factual history, but the "felt history" (ibid.) when it comes to the making of nations, and that certainly is also strongly related to self identity and a sense of national belonging as the result of an emotional impulse. Following Benedict Anderson's (1991) reasoning, there is an emotional link that a person must create in order to maintain a connection to all of the people that live in and constitute his/her nation, but for obvious reasons he/she is never going to meet. This means that the individual must also imagine the presence and connection with his/her fellow countrymen, anchored in the belief of shared arenas and nationally shared features such as history, culture, language, traditions, customs, etc.: the 'imagined community'. To add another strong argument to my case, I will refer to Norbert Elias, for whom the image an individual has of his nation is at the same time the image he has of himself. For this reason, Elias regards it as problematic that both sociology and social psychology have approached this phenomenon as two separate cases by making the connection between them only through the concept of *identification*, as if the individual and the nation existed solely in two different spatially separated variables, independent from each other. He argues that an individual possesses not only an ideal for 'I' and an image of his own 'I', but also an ideal for 'we' and a 'we-image'.

Elias further considers argues that the identity construction of an individual cannot occur separately from the construction of a nation's ethos, because every nation is created and shaped by its individuals, and because the national ethos touches the individual's feeling of solidarity and responsibility directed towards a sovereign collective, consisting of thousands or millions.

"This nationalism is conveyed through special symbols, often even people. Strong positive feelings of the kind we usually denote with 'love' relates to these symbols and the collective they stand for. [Collectivity] is more exalted and holy than individuals, and its symbols are correspondingly cultivated. Collectives that produce a nationalist ethos are oriented in a way that individuals understand them, or better, the emotionally charged symbols as representatives of themselves. Love to one's own nation is never only love to humans and human groups that one refers to as 'them'. It

always involves love to a collective that is addressed with 'we'. Whatever this may mean, it is also a form of egocentric love.

The image individuals have of their nation is therefore a part of their own self image."²⁸ (Elias, 1994: 29-30).

Thus, even if the immigration, nationality and citizenship laws have recently become increasingly similar to those of the EU, as described by Joppke, the reality remains more sober than such development would indicate. This is mainly because although it has become easier to get naturalized for those who have been living legally in the country for at least eight years, it has at the same time turned out to be harder for immigrants from outside the EU to gain access to German territory (ibid.).

It seems that Connor's felt-history theory, as the basis of the national sense of unity and belonging, gets confirmed when we analyse the different surveys used in several European countries for learning more about the attitudes among people towards immigrants and their offspring – and scepticism is gaining ground in practically every EU member state.

Yet despite the fact that Germany's understanding of nationhood and national belonging has been questioned and under examination since its constitution as a nation, it had never been done in such a conscious way at a political level, or to the degree to it was done since the end of the Second World War, when the very ethno-cultural tradition of nationality was utterly challenged as the consequence of the disastrous experience with the Third Reich, by the civic and liberal understanding of community imposed on Germany by the three democratic occupation forces (Takle, 2007). On top of this historical catastrophe, the entrance of a new global era, characterized by modern communication systems, a global economic market and mass migration have stressed Germany institutionally and socially, among other things, and have once more, since the end of WWII, forced this country to analyse its conceptions of belonging and nationhood.

However, the examination of the German understanding of *Volkszugehörigkeit* that started after the creation of the German Federal Republic (GFR) in 1949 did not automatically lead to palpable changes in the nationality and citizenship laws for two reasons. Firstly, this is because the newly created German Federal Republic decided to base its nationality law upon that of 1913 (*Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz*), which practically meant that the nationality law that had been valid from the time of the German Empire and through the Third Reich also remained valid during the period of the Federal Republic

²⁸ My translation.

(Hailbronner, 2010),²⁹ and secondly, from 1960 to 1990, the GFR was more concerned about the separation of Germany (ibid.).

It was not until the nationality laws of East Germany were abolished after the reunification that Germany seriously began to focus on revising its nationality and citizenship laws. In 1999, after a series of debates and compromises between the political parties in Parliament, several changes on these laws were agreed upon in order to adapt the country to its new demographic face (Takle, 2007). This was especially because of the juncture between the large immigrant population constituted by the foreigner *Gastarbeiter*, as has already been addressed, and the massive arrival of thousands of refugees of German origin, who emigrated from the former Soviet republics after the end of the Cold War.

This exceptional conjuncture, which eventually led to important changes in nationality and immigrant laws in an attempt to combine the concept of *ius sanguini* with that of *ius soli*, was the result of mainly two factors: first, a country that suddenly – after decades of official denial – had to cope with the fact that many of the temporary *Gastarbeiter* who had arrived from 1955 to 1973 no longer were considering returning to their home countries. What was meant to be provisional became permanent and, despite the reluctance of the conservative political and social elite, Germany had gradually developed into a ‘multicultural’ country. This is a country that, until today, several politicians from the conservative wing still define as a ‘non-immigration country’, as if by defining it as such would magically erase the fact that there are about 7.2 million foreigners living in Germany, which constitutes circa 8.8 percent of the total population, from a total of 8.75 million,³⁰ according to population projections made by the *Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland* in 2010 (2011). In 2003, Simon Green identified the same paradox between Germany’s factual demography and its authorities’ position:

“[F]or decades, government edicts failed to acknowledge the permanence of its immigration, as reflected in the now infamous leitmotif that Germany was ‘not a country of immigration’. Even though Germany has had the largest non-national population in the EU for around 20 years now, numbering 7,318,000 in 2001 (8.9 per cent of the total population), this fallacy has pervaded all areas of policy.” (Green, 2003: 228).

²⁹ The Allied Powers made some changes and regulation to the law from 1945-1949. Additionally, three concrete amendments were made in 1955, 56 and 57. However, none were significant enough to affect the basis of descent in the main body of the nationality law inherited from that of 1913 (Hailbronner, 2010).

³⁰ The German Federal Bureau of Statistics operates with two different numbers. The first one is an estimate of the total foreign population based on population projections, and the second one is the factual number of foreigners living in Germany registered in the *Ausländerzentralregister*. – ‘Central Register of Foreigners’. My translation.

Second, the necessity of regulating the status of all of the *Spätaussiedler* who, contrary to their ancestors who had returned to Germany in the '50s and the beginning of the '60s – and the beginning of the '90s –, had started to fall from the grace with some politicians who now, due to determinant cultural aspects rather than ethnical ones,³¹ were questioning this group's degree of 'Germanness'. Consequently, some political parties no longer wanted to grant them automatic German citizenship.

In sum, on the one hand Germany had to figure out how to deal with its several million immigrants, many of them born and raised in Germany, but who could not become German citizens due to a descent-based understanding of and legislation on nationality. Yet on the other hand, it also had to contend with an increasing group of *Spätaussiedler* to whom the German citizenship was still automatically granted, but who apparently already had lost its cultural attachment to Germany.

Consequently, very important and significant changes in the nationality law occurred. On one hand, for the first time in German history since its foundation back in 1871, the State incorporated the concept of *ius soli* – citizenship through birthplace – to grant the German citizenship, at the same time that it made the acquisition of the German citizenship through naturalization easier in order to facilitate the inclusion of a very large community of 'German born foreigners' and their parents, some of them members of the first and/or second generation of immigrants, to the German state. On the other hand, in 1993 the government issued some important restrictions to the law that allowed *Spätaussiedler* to enter and reside in Germany in a political negotiation known as the Asylum Compromise, in which Social Democrats accepted the introduction of new restrictions of entry to the country for asylum seekers, while the Conservatives agreed to restrict the immigration of *Spätaussiedler* into Germany³² (Takle, 2011) and by making language – in 1997 – a central criterion as a precondition to get access to citizenship and territory (ibid.).

³¹ E.g. it was alleged that these *Spätaussiedler* had lost their cultural attachment to Germany because most of them did not speak German or because they had cultural elements that tied them closer to Russia than to Germany (Takle, 2007).

³² The first restriction was that the concept of *Aussiedler* – written into the law on expellees of 1953 – was replaced by that of *Spätaussiedler*, which meant that this newly arriving group of ethnic Germans could no longer be regarded as refugees due to expulsion like the *Aussiedler* could. Consequently, the ethnic descent of everyone born after 1923 was not longer sufficient as proof of belonging to the German people – *Volkszugehöriger*. Thus, other criteria had to be fulfilled such as language, upbringing and culture. The second restriction was that the number of *Spätaussiedlers* allowed to immigrate was limited to 225,000 annually. And

In this way, Germany revised and issued a new citizenship law in 1999 that took effect on January 1, 2000. In this new law, and as written before, birthright citizenship was integrated into the legislation for the first time. This meant that any child of foreign parents born in German territory would be granted citizenship provided that at least one of his or her parents has lived legally in Germany for eight years, or has held an unlimited residence permit for at least three years (Takle, 2007; Anil, 2007) – *unbefristete Aufenthaltserlaubnis*, later on renamed *unbefristete Niederlassungserlaubnis* (Takle, 2007).

However, these changes to the citizenship law have not occurred without problems. While many European States allow immigrants to hold two citizenships as a strategy for facilitating immigrants in their integration into society (Brochmann, 2010) the German state in principle does not accept this practice. According to some researchers,³³ not allowing double citizenship could be a barrier against the full integration of citizens from other countries, because restrictive citizenship legislations segregate many people by leaving them on the outside of society and without access to equal rights, which, as stated by sociologist Katrine Fangen (2010), “is disadvantageous from both a state’s and the immigrants’ perspectives” (Fangen in Khazaleh, 2010). By allowing for double citizenship, the liberal States are seeking to increase immigrant participation in national affairs at all levels, which again is a policy that stands for the idea of multiculturalism as a solution to the challenges presented by a globalized and interconnected world, in which individuals juggle with different kind of identities and loyalties. In this sense, it is worth noting two things about Germany’s approach to the matter of dual citizenship. One is that although Germany has joined other European countries in making it ‘easier’ for immigrants to keep their original nationality as part of the country’s strategy to integrate its immigrant population, its approach – despite being more liberal than ever before – has remained a rather moderate version of its European counterparts.

However, there are some exceptions that make Germany a peculiar case, including the existence of a citizenship regime with three different categories, which Rainer Bauböck strongly criticizes (2006): (1) those who have dual citizenship inherited by parents with different nationalities can keep both forever; (2) those who acquired the German citizenship through the *ius soli* principle, but at the age of 23 have to decide between German citizenship

the third most important restriction was that those coming from the former Soviet Union were collectively accepted (Takle, 2011).

³³ For example, the EUROMARGINS research project financed by the European Union, which focuses on the inclusion and exclusion of young adult immigrants in seven European countries.

and the citizenship of their parents; and (3) those who have been naturalized but are having difficulties or are even being denied a release from citizenship by their state of origin.

This descent-based manner of understanding nationality and nationhood is by no means unique to Germany, and it has to be emphasised that every nation-state has defined the terms and conditions that every individual has to fulfil in order to be regarded and included as a citizen in the state. Therefore, in order to understand the way in which this notion has been operating not only politically and legally, but also socially during the last 60 years in Germany, and how it has been interacting with this country's recent history of immigration, which entails understanding the manner in which it affects or influences the social actors within this case study, it was necessary to go back in time to the roots of immigration policy as a means to unveil some of the reasons for the present quandaries over integration. These have been challenges caused by a high immigration rate on the one hand, and an ambiguous position and sceptical attitudes towards its immigrant population on the other.

Chapter Four - The German National Football Team

4.1 Short history of football's development in society

In this chapter it will be considered in more detail the case study this research has focused on, namely the German NFT and its players. This is where the gathered data gets analyzed and thoroughly examined in order to try to give some answers to the research questions that were posed in the opening chapter of this thesis.

But in order to understand a little better the importance of football not only in Germany, but in many other societies as well, and why this particular sport represents some important features of our society in a micro-scale – though in a theatrical or exaggerated way, as sport philosopher Gunter Gebauer points out (2010) – it is a good idea to address its historical development. I refer more specifically to the time since its formalization and institutionalization about a hundred years ago into what we now know as FIFA, the main international football governing body, and particularly that of the German Football Association or DFB (*Deutscher Fußball-Bund*), which is the focus of this research.

It might be a coincidence, but it can be noted that in many cases, the football associations in the countries where football was practised from an early stage only started emerging once these countries had been constituted as nation states – in some cases their formation even occurred in parallel. This could lead us to suppose that the creation of the football associations as we know them today is a direct consequence of the political, demographical and geographical organization arising from the establishment of the national states during the late end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th. This is because it was only when governments, authorities or regimes were able to gather and unite the habitants of a whole region into the single concept of 'nation' that representation across vast regions became legitimate. And as these kingdoms, principalities and duchies began to reinvent themselves into national states, the creation of 'assembling' institutions became necessary. In one of his most famous works, *The Invention of Tradition* (1996), Eric Hobsbawm depicted some of the mechanisms employed in the second half of the 19th century by the young nascent countries in Europe in order to assemble their populations around the idea of a shared origin and/or a common destiny which could contribute to consolidate the legitimacy of the system and their authorities.

As we saw in Chapter Three, where the creation of the German national state was addressed, the traditional authority model in Europe was either based on allegedly divine authority or on the high virtues represented by the European monarchies and noble families, which in turn also could happen because the hierarchy-system was very well established within the societies of that time and rarely challenged. When the old monarchical system disappeared, the new authorities were forced to increase the intrusive and regulative relations with their citizens, which undermined their loyalty. And according to Hobsbawm, the authorities sought to inspire loyalty and allegiance within the nation state by introducing traditions or establishing national symbols such as flags and hymns; creating commemorative dates to celebrate historical events accounted as heroic or decisive for the formation of the nascent nation; venerating the persons regarded as the founding fathers of those nations; developing a “secular equivalent of the church” (ibid.: 209) such as a primary education permeated with certain virtues (for example the republican principles of democracy or secularity); or building monuments and erecting statues. As a part of this, existing traditions or popular public events were often adopted by these regimes and presented as part of the ‘new’ tradition. Sport, in particular, was seen by many governments as a very effective tool to inspire social adherence to them and the nation. As Hobsbawm notes, referring to English football:

“The adoption of sports, and particularly football, as a mass proletarian cult is equally obscure, but without doubt equally rapid. [...] Between the middle 1870s, at the earliest, and the middle of the 1880s football acquired all the institutional and ritual characteristics with which we are still familiar: professionalism, the League, the Cup, with its annual pilgrimage of the faithful for demonstrations of proletarian triumph in the capital, the regular attendance at the Saturday match, the ‘supporters’ and their culture, the ritual rivalry, normally between moieties of an industrial city or conurbation (Manchester City and United, Notts County and Forest, Liverpool and Everton).” (Ibid.: 288).

Following the Marxist tradition that characterizes his work, Hobsbawm identifies football’s institutional development as a way in which the state tried to ‘build the character’ of the children and youth through public schools consequence of this. Eventually, football stopped being an amateur sport exclusively for middle-class players, to become first proletarianised and subsequently professionalised. This transformation marked football turning it into part of a ‘class struggle’ between the middle and the working classes, or between those clubs whose football supporters regarded their rivals as representatives of their opposite social class. To illustrate this I can mention the example of the Argentinean clubs River Plate and Boca

Juniors (both from Buenos Aires), the former having a reputation as a club for rich *bonaerenses* (natives of Buenos Aires), while Boca is considered to be a club of the working classes. These two football teams have through the years competed fiercely against each other and the rivalry among its players and fans, both on and off the pitch, has at least in part been informed by the alleged differing social origins and compositions of the clubs.

Of course, social class difference is only one cause of football rivalry. Other reasons including regional economic competitiveness, chauvinistic attitudes or ideological allegiances have triggered tough rivalries among football clubs and their fans. Indeed, some of the most famous rivalries in football can be tracked back hundreds of years, as it is the case of the rivalries between the cities of Manchester and Liverpool in northwest England, whose roots stretch back to the industrial revolution, when the two cities competed for economic supremacy in the region. (Rohrer, 2007).³⁴

An example of chauvinism in football is the case of the Mexican football club Guadalajara – from the second largest city in Mexico and probably the most popular football club in the country – which has distinguished itself by hiring only Mexico-born players, a characteristic unashamedly used by its fans as an argument to disqualify or devalue any sporting achievements of their opponents, accusing them of being ‘unpatriotic’ or *malinchistas*,³⁵ that is favouring foreigners rather than native-born persons.

Regarding the ideological reason for rivalry, it is very interesting to mention the case of the Italian clubs Lazio, based in Rome, and Livorno, based in Tuscany. Although the sporting rivalry between these clubs can be felt every time they clash on the field, the fiercest enmity is expressed by the fans off the field. Lazio defined itself early in its history as a club associated with fascism, after fascist leader Benito Mussolini enrolled himself in the club in the 1920s, spreading the ideology within its ranks. This fascist heritage is jealously protected to this day by a violent right-wing phalanx of supporters called the *Irriducibili* (the ‘diehards’)³⁶. On the other hand, Livorno is characterized by its equally violent left-wing group of supporters or *tifosi* called *Brigate Autonome Livornese 99*, inspired by Livorno’s

³⁴ From BBC News, Finlo Rohrer, “Scouse v Manc”, published the 21st of August 2007, retrieved the 9th of February 2012.

³⁵ The Mexican term *malinchista* derives from the name of the indigenous woman who served as a translator for the Spanish conquistador Hernán Cortés when the Spanish army arrived in the capital of the Aztec Empire Tenochtitlan (today Mexico City) named *La Malinche* or *Malintzin*. When the Spaniards eventually conquered the city, Malintzin married Cortés and went down in history as a traitor who preferred to help the invader rather than her own people.

³⁶ My translation.

status as the city that gave birth to Italian communism in 1921. Both groups of fans have taken their rivalry to an ideological level beyond sport in and outside the football stadiums.

However, in spite of rivalries, Hobsbawm continues, after football became a sport for the masses, it also started to provide a sense of unity among football enthusiasts regardless of their local origin. “[U]nlike other sports football did not have exclusively local ties among its supporters as rugby or cricket did, but operated both on a local and on a national scale.” (1996: 289). Hobsbawm takes his statement further by saying that weekend matches would provide perfect ground for conversation between two male workers whether they were English or Scottish (ibid.), both united by their enthusiasm for football. Indeed, this is still something many of us can experience, when a visit to a pub to watch a football match ends up in a vivid and enthusiastic conversation with a total stranger about the viewed match in particular, or about the ‘beautiful game’ in general.

The popular enthusiasm for football led to the game’s professionalisation, which was rapidly followed by its commercialization. Football’s growing popularity attracted the attention of larger commercial organizations and sponsors who saw the potential to invest and make profit from the sport. At the same time, the proletariat could aspire to social mobility through football by focusing on becoming full-time players, which could give them the chance to climb up in the social hierarchy and thus escape from the working class fate. As result, a gate for social mobility opened, and all of those poor and young factory workers could now dream about higher wage-rates and fame and a future far away from the burdens of their class.

In reality, the popularity of football not only opened the path for capitalism, but also for politics. As we have seen, the mass appeal of the game and the strong sense of allegiance it generated among fans attracted also the attention of regimes’ leaders, politicians and political parties who saw the opportunity to expand their influence or consolidate their power through football by disseminating notions of nationhood – ‘inventing’ the nation, as Hobsbawm states – and/or fomenting the cult to certain national virtues and/or values. This is especially visible in countries with absolutist political systems, which clearly have taken advantage of the scope of football to enforce their own political agendas, expressing and propagating their ideologies, praising themselves in an attempt to legitimize or consolidate their regimes.

4.2 Football and its political value

There are many examples of how the success of a national football team has been used by the ruling regime as part of its propaganda and indoctrination. For example, the victory of the Italian NFT in the 1934 World Cup final (2-1 over Czechoslovakia) was portrayed by the fascist regime of Benito Mussolini not only as a sports achievement, but a success of the fascist ideology, as the victory reflected the superiority of Italian culture and of Italians as human beings, showing them to be direct and legitimate descendants of the Roman Empire, destined to follow the Romans' footsteps in order to regain world supremacy (Gordon & London, 2006). But Italian fascists did not just use the NFT for propaganda: it was actively used as an ideological weapon too. The national teams in all sports were deployed to promote Italy's glories abroad, as a sort of "diplomacy arm" (ibid.: 43) and to continue to whip up the ancient rivalry between Italy and the other European countries. In 1936 Mussolini ordered the Italian cycling team out of the *Tour de France*, and in 1937 the NFT was pulled out of a football match that was supposed to take place in France. According to Gordon and London, Mussolini did this to indicate his enmity to the French government of Léon Blum. Then in 1939, just some weeks before the outbreak of the war, England played against Italy in Milan and the English team made the fascist salute before the game started. This act was perceived as a "key propaganda coup" (ibid.) for Mussolini by public opinion in England.

Another interesting case is the controversial victory of the Argentinean NFT during the second round of the 1978 World Cup, when Argentina desperately needed to beat Peru by a score of at least four goals³⁷ in order to go through to the final of the tournament (which they subsequently won). Although never conclusively proven, it has long been alleged that Argentina's surprise 6-0 victory over Peru was the result of a fix, after a deal was struck between the Argentinean dictator Jorge Videla and his Peruvian counterpart Francisco Morales Bermúdez. Videla is alleged to have wanted to engineer a World Cup win for his country in order to strengthen his regime's legitimacy at home, but especially abroad, by giving the illusion that things were going well in Argentina despite the systematic human rights violations of the opponents of the regime, the lack of democratic practices at institutional level, and the strength of censorship and control exercised against the regime's critics and the population in general (Rebossio, 2012).

³⁷ In the second round stage, Argentina had scored only two goals and received none while Brazil had scored six and received one, that made a goal difference of +2 for Argentina and +6 for Brazil. If Argentina did not have beaten Peru with more than four goals, the goal difference would have been favorable to Brazil who had accessed the final against the Netherlands. However, Argentina not only scored four but six goals against Peru, which granted them the pass to the final of the tournament.

However, the most extreme case in which football has been used as a medium to achieve a political goal is that of the so-called ‘Football War’ – or ‘Soccer War’ – between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969, which caused the death of between 2000 and 6000 people³⁸ (Marcos, 2009) between the 14th and 18th of July of that year. In this event, a long-running border and immigration³⁹ dispute between the two countries came to a head during the qualifying rounds for the 1970 Mexico World Cup, when the already tense situation – fanned by inflammatory press reports on both sides – was exacerbated by the fevered atmosphere at the football games. According to the Polish journalist Ryszard Kapuscinski – to whom this war’s name is attributed – the trigger for the football tension was the death of 18-year-old Salvadoran football fan Amelia Bolaños, who shot herself after Honduras defeated El Salvador’s NFT (1-0) in the first match of the eliminatory round, played in Tegucigalpa.⁴⁰ This led to even greater tension in the second leg, held one week later and won by El Salvador 3-0. Visiting Honduran fans were attacked and there were skirmishes along the border between the two countries. By the time the playoff was held on 26th June, El Salvador had severed ties with Honduras. On 14th July, El Salvador launched an air and ground attack on Honduras, an act answered by the Honduran authorities by mass detention of Salvadorans in concentration camps across the country, among other things. Since the armed hostilities began just few days after the hotly contested football matches, the conflict was quickly labelled by the foreign press as the ‘Soccer War’ (Durham, 1979). But while football itself obviously wasn’t the cause of the war, it could be said that the heightened mood surrounding the games created a context where an attack by the Salvadoran regime became ‘legitimate’.

But this interference from the world of politics in the world of sports is not unique to totalitarian regimes. Political parties or politicians in modern, democratic and pluralistic countries also try to gain by associating themselves with sport. An example is in American baseball, where each season opens with the US president throwing a symbolic first ball pitch. By thus showing his interest in the popular game – and consequently his interest in the

³⁸ The amount of casualties varies depending on the source.

³⁹ Some of the reasons behind the conflict was the disastrous economy and the demographic explosion in El Salvador, which in the course of several decades had forced about 300 thousand Salvadorians to emigrate to Honduras, where they were not welcomed. In 1962 Honduras had undertaken a significative land reform that stripped Salvadorians of their territories (most of them taken illegally) and redistributed them to native-born Hondurans (Durham, 1979; Marcos, 2009) but who due to a land reform made in Honduras were stripped of their illegally taken land in that country (ibid.).

⁴⁰ This story may be more of an urban legend as there are some sources (e.g. Maule in *Sports Illustrated*, June 1970) that state Bolaños death occurred a year later when El Salvador lost its group match against Mexico during the 1970 World Cup played in Mexico City. However, it has been difficult for me to verify the validity of the sources.

majority of the Americans who follow this sport –, he can be seen to be moving away from the elite circles where he usually works and lives, and becoming closer to ordinary people and potential voters. The same behaviour can be found among European political leaders. A common image is that of the head of a state sitting in the loge in a stadium ready to watch a match in an international competition in which the NFT of his or her country is participating. In Europe there is practically no prime minister or president who has not attended an important football game, or who has not witnessed in person the opening or closing ceremony of any high-level sports event, and this behaviour pattern among politicians and social elites can be observed in almost every country in the world. For example, German Chancellor Angela Merkel attended the last two games played by Germany in the 2010 World Cup in South Africa – in which Germany first defeated Argentina (4-0), but were later eliminated in the semi-final by Spain after losing the match 0-1 – and watched, together with the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the qualification game for the UEFA Euro 2012 between Germany and Turkey played in Berlin in 2011.⁴¹ On this occasion she even unexpectedly went down from her loge to meet, unannounced, the German players in their dressing room after their 3-0 victory against Turkey.

While these examples seem harmless compared to the actions of Mussolini or Videla, they are clear example of how politicians use sport for political ends beyond the mere posing for the press, but with concrete electoral or political purposes.

4.3 The German national football team: the beginnings

The German national football team,⁴² in Germany often referred to as *Die Mannschaft* or simply *Die Elf* or *Nationalelf* (“The Team”, “The Eleven” or “National eleven”) is one of the most successful NFTs in the history of football.

The German NFT is governed by the German Football Association (DFB), which was established in 1900, and although the German team unofficially played its first match in 1899,⁴³ it was not until 1908 that the Germany had its first recognised official international match representing the German Empire, in a game played in Basel against Switzerland,

⁴¹ Her appearance in the dressing room after the match caused controversy and unrest among the members of the DFB, who had not given their consent in advance. Her decision was very criticized as it was not clear why she had decided to visit the players.

⁴² When using “German national football team”, I will exclusively be referring to the major national football team for men, unless otherwise specified. At the same time, I make use of the British term ‘football’ instead of the American term ‘soccer’.

⁴³ These matches are also known as the ‘*Ur-Länderspiele*’, or ‘Primeval International Matches’, because they were played before any official NFT was formed with the support and recognition of a national sport’s authority, such as the DFB or the FIFA.

which they lost 3-5.⁴⁴ Historically, however, there have been some problems dating the formation and consolidation of the German NFT, and there are some good reasons for that, which I will address

Hardy Grüne (2008) writes that the history of the German NFT can be traced back to 1899, when a selection of German and English players disputed a series of matches in Berlin and Karlsruhe. However, the formation of the first official German national team was not achieved until 1908, the same year the DFB was founded. However at that time the DFB did not have enough local football associations as members to be representative for the whole country, and there were obvious conflicts of interest between the different football associations that made up the DFB, for example over how to decide which players should be called to form the first national team, as well as disagreements about the recruiting method to be used for the selection of those players. Thus, Grüne links the official birth of the German NFT to the foundation of the DFB and its role selecting the coach and players, and arranging the international football matches under the auspices of FIFA (*Fédération Internationale de Football Association*), created in 1904.

On the other hand, Wolfram Pyta states that until 1914 football was still a “minority sport in society” (Pyta, 2006: 3), which was mostly played by middle-class men with “enough leisure and money to play football on Sundays” (ibid.). The breakthrough, he continues, came with the end of the First World War and the homecoming of the soldiers in 1918, who had become familiar with the game through matches arranged on the Western Front to raise the moral of the troops by relieving the monotony of military life (ibid.). In other words, Pyta relates the surge of football in Germany to the ‘de-gentrification’ of the sport, i.e., when it went from being a sport for the leisured few to become a cultural phenomenon and a sport played by the masses.

4.4 The ‘many’ German NFTs

The lack of consensus between historians about when to date the birth of German football can be attributed to the historical circumstances that have surrounded Germany since the consolidation of the German national state, which succeeded in 1871 with the foundation of an unifying German Empire under Otto von Bismarck’s leadership (Langewiesche, 1995). From that day and all the way through the dissolution of the monarchy that resulted in the proclamation of the Weimar Republic in 1919 in the aftermath of the First World War, to the

⁴⁴ Wikipedia. (2011, September 9). *Deutsche Fußballnationalmannschaft*. Read September 13, 2011 from Wikipedia.org.

abolition of the Republic in 1933 followed by the nationalist dictatorship of the Nazis, to the creation of the two German states in 1949 as result of the lost war that divided the country, and finally to its reunification in 1990, the world has seen six German NFTs representing six different political and social phases in the last 140 years of German history. Therefore, when we analyze the history of the German NFT it is not possible to see the German team that achieved third place in the 2010 World Cup in South Africa as a continuum of the teams that played back at the beginning of the 20th century.

While this may be true of almost every national football team in the world, the case of German NFT has a more intricate nature due to the peculiar historical transitions which Germany has been involved in since the days when German nationalism lead to the formation of the German Empire (Wehler, 1995), and all the way to the current united Federal German Republic. As mentioned above, we are talking about six German NFTs: the first one representing the German Empire back in the early days of the DFB; the second one representing a defeated Empire, symbolized by an unstable and fragile infant Weimar Republic; a third one representing the ultranationalist vision of the '*Übermensch*' (Superhuman person) pursued by the Nazis; a fourth and a fifth NFT representing a twice-defeated, destroyed and divided country, consolidated into the two politically and socially dissimilar states of West and East Germany, resulting from the ideological confrontation that unfolded into the Cold War; and finally a sixth national team, which has been representing Germany since its reunification in 1990 until today.

One of the problems we find when describing the historical trajectory of the German NFT in this manner is that it may appear to only have represented the elites or authorities that defined and shaped Germany's different periods, as if those periods had not been the consequence of popular agency. That is to say that, for example, the German NFT that existed and played from 1933 to 1945 was only representing the Nazis and not all the different groups that made up the population of Germany during that period. However, it has been difficult to date accurately when the official German NFT began to represent an official German nation, namely because of the special characteristics of Germany since its consolidation as a united entity.

4.5 A history of success

Germany's NFT has a very impressive track record: the German team has played a World Cup final seven times since 1945 – first as West Germany from 1954 to 1990, and then only as Germany. Germany won the World Cup three times, in 1954, 1974 and 1990, and been

runner-up four times, in 1966, 1982, 1986 and 2002. Additionally, the *Mannschaft* has obtained four third places, in the World Cups of 1934, 1970 2006 and 2010, plus a fourth place in the World Cup of 1958.

Germany has reached the World Cup semi-finals in 12 out of all the tournaments it has participated in. In other words, it has been among the first four best teams 12 times. Only Brazil and Italy have a better record of titles won, Brazil with five titles, followed by Italy with four. However, Germany's constancy particularly in this competition is better than Brazil's if we take into account that Germany has fewer participations in World Cup tournaments (17) than Brazil (19)⁴⁵, and has a better record than Italy – which also has had 17 participations in this tournament – if we take into account that Germany has reached semi-finals 12 times against 8 times by the Italian NFT. It could be said that Germany's efficiency in World Cups has been outstanding, and that only Brazil and Italy surpass Germany due to the amount of titles won. This is also the case when compared to the other World Cup winners in history such as Argentina, Uruguay, England, France and Spain.

When it comes to the UEFA European Football Championship, Germany is undoubtedly the most successful team, being the one with most titles since the creation of the tournament in 1960 and achieving seven semi-finals out of 10 participations in this competition. Thus, Germany has obtained three first places in 1972, 1980 and 1996; three second places in 1976, 1992 and 2008; and one third place in 1988.

As a last example of Germany's NFT excellence it is relevant to remark on Germany's path to the UEFA European Cup 2012, being the first NFT to achieve its qualification to the tournament, winning all its 10 games in the eliminatory round, making 30 out of 30 possible points, thus becoming one of the favourites to win the competition, along with the current European and World Champions Spain.

But probably the most important success of the German NFT is not to be found solely in its sportive achievements, but in the psychological impact these triumphs have had on the German psyche, especially after 1945, and which according to Gunter Gebauer (in Crolley & Hand, 2006) played a very important role in reshaping Germany's relation to its own sense of national pride and to regain confidence in its own self-image. Gebauer refers to the historical triumph of 1954 (the *Wunder von Bern*) as the turning point emotionally for German fans who from that day on were allowed to celebrate their heroes once more without the shadow

⁴⁵ Brazil has participated in all 19 World Cups so far, however, due to the fact that Brazil will be the host of the next World Cup in 2014, its NFT has already secured its participation for the 20th time.

of nationalism or Nazism hanging over them. Germany's victory over the favourite and technically superior Hungarian team (which until that match had remained undefeated for over four years) stirred internalized emotions of nationalism among the German fans that had not being expressed publicly since the end of the Second World War. This was demonstrated by the fact that the fans began to sing the 'banned' first stanza of the German national anthem (known as *Das Deutschland Lied*) '*Deutschland, Deutschland über alles*'⁴⁶ – literally, 'Germany, Germany above all' –, while, according to Crolley and Hand (2006), the headline 'We Are Great Again' published by the German tabloid *Bild* after the victory reminded that the "ghosts of the hero worship of the 1930s and 1940s were laid to rest not by abandoning the concept altogether but by applying it to a sporting context in a relatively acceptable manner" (ibid.: 70). The name given to the German triumph in 1954, *Wunder von Bern* or 'Miracle of Bern', was a sort of extension to the term *Wirtschaftswunder*, referring to the economic boom period of the '50s. The victory got quickly associated with those myths of superiority nurtured in the 30's and '40s, and the German NFT was depicted as a sort of David against Goliath, a team that had overcome a defeat against the Hungarians during the first round (a disastrous 8-3) and that worked hard and never gave up the fight, in the best German style and tradition, to win the final match against all odds 2-3, even after having been down 2-0. As Crolley and Hand (ibid.) put it, "it was the Miracle of Bern, not the Nuremberg Trials or the establishment of the Federal Republic in 1949, that represented emotionally and psychologically the end of the Second World War." (Ibid.: 70).

Gunter Gebauer believes the next important period for the German NFT was in the '70s, especially with players such as Franz Beckenbauer and Gunter Netzer, and culminating with the second World Cup triumph in 1974. In his opinion, this was a period marked by the more open and inclusive policies promoted by Chancellor Willy Brandt, aiming to create a new approach to Eastern Europe (*Ostpolitik*), as well as to move Germany away from its Nazi past (ibid.). In a way, Gebauer claims, Germany's football team of this era represented this spirit, which with its mixture of "intelligence, artistry and industry" (ibid.: 71) appealed to the hippy generation born in the post-war Germany. The reference here is not only to the World Cup victory over the Netherlands in 1974, but also to the most "elegant, stylish and

⁴⁶ After 1945, the allies banned this anthem, as well as other official Nazi symbols. When *Das Deutschland Lied* became the official national anthem of West Germany in 1952, this first stanza got 'removed' due to its nationalistic content, which claims for the German unity from the river Meusen in France in the west, to the river Nemen in Lithuania on the east; as well as from the strait in Denmark known as the Little Belt, in the north, to the Adige in Italy in the south, and which used to be the delimitation of the German speaking people in the middle of the 19th century, the time when August Heinrich Hoffmann wrote the lyrics to the anthem in 1841. (Malzahn, 2006; Wikipedia.org, 2012).

adventurous football” (ibid.) played by the NFT in the so-called ‘match of the century’ in the semi-final against Italy in the 1970 World Cup celebrated in Mexico.

Many others feel that another important success for the German NFT was that reached during the 2006 World Cup in Germany, not exactly on the pitch, but in the kind of ‘liberation’ that it represented for many Germans, especially the youngest generation, to feel proud of their nationality once again without being burdened by the country’s past. However here there are divided opinions among analysts, with some of them rejecting this ‘liberation’ effect, and considering it a transitory example of what some have called ‘party patriotism’ (Passig, 2006) displayed by the fans exclusively during the month of the competition.

In any case, it appears that the German NFT has had a relevant impact on Germany since it became the representative of the nation in 1954, if we ought to stay with Gebauer’s analysis, and this might well be considered the German NFT’s greatest historical triumph.

4.6 German fandom and identity

However, despite its impressive sporting track record, the German NFT has not always aroused the same fervent passion among football fans in Germany as the NFTs of countries like for example Brazil, Argentina or England do. The relationship between the *Mannschaft* and the fans has been a conflicted one since the end of the Second World War, with the sporting triumphs of the team at times met with little enthusiasm by German fans, at least until very recently. One probable explanation is found in the close relation between a country’s NFT and the national and/or patriotic feelings connected to it, as well as the existing attachment between the NFT and the construction of the national identity among football enthusiasts, both of which have been problematic in Germany. According to several researchers (Dauncy & Hare, 1999; Marks, 1999; Horne & Manzenreiter, 2004; Marievoet, 2006; Ismer, 2010 and 2011), there are many examples of how hosting the World Cup has contributed to the development of a feeling of a common identity among the citizens of the hosting country. These examples come from research carried out in connection with the World Cups celebrated in France in 1998, Korea-Japan in 2002, and in Germany in 2006, as well as the UEFA European Football Championship in Portugal in 2004. Equally, the same development of national sentiment or feeling of belonging, or attachment to an ‘imagined’ community (Anderson, 1991) is enthusiastically encouraged by the representation of the NFT in any international match made by the media and the sports industry – through advertisement and world wide marketing –, whether it takes place in a tournament such as a World Cup or in a friendly match (Inthorn, 2006). This close relation between the event and

the phenomenon may bring many football fans in Germany to a crossroad because for many of them, and for Germans in general, there is a direct link connecting their national football team to feelings of patriotism and even to negative forms of nationalism.

The wartime legacy of the Nazis has since 1945 made any expression of nationalism or national pride or the nurturing of national symbols in Germany difficult and controversial, and has shaped the way in which both the authorities and the public have reacted to international footballing success in the post-war era. The jubilant popular reaction to the 1954 World Cup contrasted with the much more muted mood after the 1974 win (Ismer, 2011). Meanwhile the celebrations in 2006 took place in different circumstances.

According to Sven Ismer (2011) the particularity mentioned above can be noticed in the responses given by the German public in other World Cups in which the German NFT achieved extraordinarily good results, as it is the case of the World Cups celebrated in Germany in 1974. However, this apparently changed 32 years later, and during the World Cup celebrated in Germany 2006 new forms of pride and fandom towards the German NFT seem to have come out to the surface in what many have considered to be the reestablishment of a more normal relation between Germans' concepts of national belonging and national pride. In order to find more about this, Ismer made a comparison of the media coverage of both FIFA championships to uncover the similarities or dissimilarities of the media's covering, the players' responses and behaviour to the nationalist stimuli between both competitions, as well as to compare the public's affection or disaffection towards the NFT, in order to grasp the main differences between these two competitions when it comes to the manifestations of patriotism and/or nationalism demonstrated by the main actors during these two historical moments.

What he found is very interesting indeed. According to his analysis, there are evident differences between the ways the people, the players and the media have reacted to the forces of patriotism, nationalism and national identity that follow the NFTs in these kind of competitions and its many rituals. For example, while in 2006 the German players quite openly show their national pride and feelings by singing the national anthem before every match while embracing each other in a chain-like line, the picture is a quite different one by the German players 32 years before, during the final match in 1974 against The Netherlands. Then, says Ismer, the players appeared kind of embarrassed, some of them even looking downwards or gesticulating with their mouths in what could be interpreted as a sign of uneasiness or maybe embarrassment. At the same time, nobody sings the national anthem and there are no signs of any collective arousal neither in the players nor the public nor in the

German TV commentators of that game. Another interesting moment shown by Ismer analysis take the role of the media, in this case the TV commentators, who also had very different approaches to the NFT during its presentation before every game. The comparison is made between two games played by the German NFT, the first one is an analysis of the TV broadcast of the final of 1974, just before the game against the Netherlands started, and the second one the quarterfinal game in 2006 against Argentina, also before the kick off. Ismer points out in these two cases the manner in which the TV channel (the ARD in both cases)⁴⁷ and commentators presented and referred to the NFT before each match. During the first one, the very final of the 1974 World Cup, the TV channel ARD showed a full shot of the German half field, that is a distanced from-the-air perspective in which the faces of the players were not shown, at the same time that the commentators avoided to make a ‘big deal’ out of the presentation of each player, focusing only in reading the names of the players in a “news reporter (dry, unemotional) voice” (Ibid.: 556), as well as they read the formation of the Dutch NFT in the same way they read the name of the German players, which was only by their last names, thus avoiding to “emotionalize the occasion, neither on the visual structure of the video footage nor in the comment” (ibid.). On the other side, the form in which the TV video footage and the comments made when the ARD team presented the NFT contrasted strongly with that of their colleagues 32 years before them. According to Ismer’s analysis, the TV presentation made before the quarterfinal match against Argentina began showing the close-up photographs of all the line-up players who were to start that match, at the same time that the commentator loudly, almost screaming, read the first name of the player while the audience watching the game from the public plazas shouted the last name. It is also important to notice that the authorities in almost every city of the country intervened to assure the massive participation of the fans by using the public places as sports venues, which again contrasts drastically with the involvement of the authorities in 1974 and 1954.

Dietrich Schulze-Marmeling’s analysis (2006) of the German NFT in history shows the exuberant atmosphere after Germany won the World Cup in Switzerland in 1954, when the players of the NFT experienced a really natural and authentic demonstration of affection and enthusiasm from fans, with thousands of people turning up at Munich’s main train station to receive the victorious team returning home to celebrate the event that would go into history

⁴⁷ The ARD Stands for *Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundes Republik Deutschland*, which in English can be translated into Association of Public Broadcasting Corporations in the Federal Republic of Germany. (ARD.de).

as the ‘Miracle of Bern’.⁴⁸ The public response emerged spontaneously, without any involvement from the authorities, who neither at local nor at federal level had done any appeal to congregate the masses to receive the World Champions. And even in a time when communication systems were not as sophisticated as today, the crowds gathered autonomously to cheer their homecoming heroes. According to Schulze-Marmeling (ibid.), the German authorities reacted with astonishment to the public response. Moreover, Schulze-Marmeling writes that the authorities, or what he calls the “official Bonn” in reference to West Germany’s government (ibid.: 8), took note of the political and social implications of their disregard for that symbolic occasion with considerable delay and, eventually, displeasure. Schulze-Marmeling adds that the authorities reaction was due to the “massive political instrumentalization of sports made by the Nazis”⁴⁹ (ibid.), which they were attempting to avoid. Likewise, Wolfram Pyta confirms this by asserting that because the Nazis had overused nationalism as the main cultural supplier, eventually leaving Germany in ruins in 1945, the authorities of the “Federal Republic of Germany, established in 1949, took care to avoid anything in its profile that could offer even the slightest nationalistic echo” (Pyta, 2006: 8).

However, the German fans were devoted to celebrate their champions on their way back home, which contrasts quite sharply with the rather grey images among German fans and even the German football players and German authorities – as stated by Sven Ismer (2011) – broadcasted during the 1974 final. And although the enthusiasm shown by the fans in 1954 somehow appears to be similar to that shown by the fans throughout the World Cup in 2006, and especially during the final phases, it can be suspected that the reasons for the exaltation come probably from quite different sources. Here I will suggest, like others have done before me (Pyta, 2006; Ismer, 2010) that the enthusiasm shown by the public at the end of the 1954 World Cup and during the World Cup in 2006 can indeed be tracked back to the historic moments behind both manifestations of joy. Ismer explains such exaltation as follows:

“[I]n 1954, after Germans for years had grappled with their shame over the crimes of the fascists during WWII, Germany’s World Cup victory provided their first real

⁴⁸ In the World Cup in Switzerland in 1954, Germany played against Hungary two times, the first one during the preliminary round, with a result favourable to Hungary with an impressive 2-8 victory. The second time was during the final in Bern. The Hungarians were the clear favourites because of their brilliant football display and because they had won the first match against Germany so convincingly. The final match opened with a 0-2 to Hungary, which did not promise any good ending for the Germans. However, the *Mannschaft* managed to turn the match and win 3-2. This event went down in football history as ‘The Miracle of Bern’.

⁴⁹ My translation.

opportunity for linking national identity again with positive emotions. In the following decades football was the only societal context that allowed for the safe expression of intense feelings of nationhood. In most other contexts this was still frowned upon.” (Ismer, 2010).

While in turn Wolfram Pyta completes Ismer’s reasoning:

“Germany is probably the only country in Europe where football has managed to gain symbolic qualities in such great measure. The reason for this is the exceptional situation after the Second World War that left Germany in a situation of such symbolic devastation that football could fill the gap.” (Pyta, 2006: 2).

For Schulze-Marmeling the victory of 1954 constituted an important moment to relieve the identity crisis created by Germany’s defeat and unconditional surrender in May 1945, and the occupation years that followed after the war’s end, which were for years used by the Allies to counteract the nationalistic indoctrination implemented by the Nazis for more than a decade.

“Indeed, the success of the national team could not erase Stalingrad or Auschwitz from memory. But after years of subjectively perceived depression and futile search for identity, the Herberger-team⁵⁰ seemed to be successful in giving the Germans, at least temporarily, a spontaneous sense of ‘us’. In addition to the merits of Ludwig Erhard and Konrad Adenauer to the economic and political consolidation of the Federal Republic was that, for the first time, there was a touch of national pride visible that was not primarily based on boots and uniforms.” (2004: 121).⁵¹

Ismer’s explanation makes sense if we take into account that by the time the German NFT won its first World Cup in 1954, only nine years had gone since Germany’s unconditional capitulation to the Allied forces was signed in Berlin in May 1945. The memory of the War was still very present in most of the German citizens, who might have seen the victory of their NFT as a good opportunity to let their emotions go, and release some of the pressure accumulated especially right after the war was over, as previously quoted. After all, at that time Germany was still an occupied territory divided into two States⁵² by the four victorious countries. The first years after the war could not have been an easy period for the Germans, who previously in history had enjoyed a high self-esteem about their ethnic and national origins, and who for years had tried to re-establish their confidence as a nation after the

⁵⁰ Sepp Herberger was the national football trainer of the NFT of the Federal Republic of Germany that won the 1954 title in Bern, Switzerland.

⁵¹ My translation.

⁵² The German Democratic Republic (*Deutsche Demokratische Republik* or *DDR* by its acronym in German) was officially founded in October the 7th 1949, a day which later on constituted the East Germany national day (*Tag der Republik*). Wikipedia. (2011, September 6).

humiliation suffered after the First World War and the treaty of Versailles, followed by the nationalistic and racial indoctrination years under Hitler's regime. The Germans had to cope with the reality of having been defeated, occupied, divided and shamed by those who they had been told were far inferior; they had to realize that the acts carried out by the Nazis had marked them out to world opinion as a racist and xenophobic nation, a breeder of genocidal war criminals that had to be kept under constant control and surveillance. Indeed, this notion was so strong that it prevailed right through to the late 1980s, with the British prime minister Margaret Thatcher and the French president François Mitterrand expressed concern about the German re-unification in 1989-1990, claiming that a reunited Germany would become a dominant European superpower with possible intentions of regaining the territories lost after the war (Salmon, Hamilton, Twigge, 2010).

As stated here, Schulze-Marmeling's description of the mood among the German fans in 1954 was not matched twenty years later when the West Germany NFT played and won the final match of 1974 World Cup against the Netherlands in Munich, when the "jubilant atmosphere [...] was rather modest" (Sven Ismer, 2011: 555). According to Schulze-Marmeling, this was in part due to the historical and economic moment West Germany was going through: the country had enjoyed an economic boom and was now indulging in wealth, and patriotism was seen as outmoded (ibid.). This may be part of the reason why the public, the authorities' and the players' response to patriotic or national feelings were not the same as those manifested after the 'Miracle of Bern' in 1954. Other possible causes are based on other important political and social events that involved not only Germany, but many other countries as well. The world was undergoing a dramatic period of uncertainty in the wake of the '68 student and workers' protest movement that eventually unfolded into the uprising and brutal suppression of Czechoslovakia's reform movement – internationally known as the 'Prague Spring' –, the killing and imprisonment of hundreds of students in Mexico City, just a few days before the inauguration of the '68 Olympic Games, the protests against the Vietnam War in the US or that of the Civil Rights Movement headed by Martin Luther King, the student's protest in Paris, West Berlin, Rome, London and other main cities, etc. The World Cup of 1974 may have still been marked by these events, which had heightened the Cold War tension, which for Germans in general was a very vivid and quotidian experience due to the existence of two German States and the divided city of Berlin.

Nevertheless, although the mood could have been affected by the above events and circumstances – Germany's wealth and the political and social mood worldwide – there is

also the fact that the DFB representatives and members of the organizing committee for the World Cup in 1974 had laid down specific plans to underplay any symbolism that could be related in any way to nationalistic emotions. The main idea, as stated by historian Arne Ismer (as quoted in S. Ismer, 2011), was to demonstrate to the international community that Germany had finally left behind its Nazi past, as well as having become a full democracy that represented no danger to anyone no more. “West Germany’s self-identification in the ’70s [was of] a state whose representation was only little ‘theatricalized’ and was purposefully kept ‘poor in symbols’.” (Ibid.: 555).

This again contrasts drastically with the participation and involvement of the German sports’ authorities before and during the World Cup of 2006, whose efforts were aimed to enhance the positive collective emotions towards the German NFT. Thus, while the sports authorities back in 1974 tried to prove the world that Germany had become a democratic nation that had moved away from its Nazi history for good, the same football organism in charge of arranging the World Cup in 2006 wanted to nurture Germany’s relationship to its NFT by associating sentiments of national pride to positive symbols and emotions through a massive publicity campaigns such as the one called “11+1”, or the €30 million campaign created by Bertelsmann AG⁵³ called “*Du bist Deutschland*” (you are Germany), or that other campaign sponsored by Deutsche Telekom named “*Sei Teil im größten Nationalteam aller Zeiten*” (be part of the largest national team in history) trying to propagate a self-confident understanding of German collective identity that would eventually lead to mass participation by the public.

For that reason, I would not say that the popularity of the German NFT among German fans is necessarily a recent and previously unknown event. Although it is certainly true that this popularity has unfolded with incredible speed after the successful World Cup celebrated in 2006, it can be said that the German fans were able to demonstrate enthusiasm when West Germany won the World Cup in Switzerland, only nine years after the Second World War was over. However, the manner in which the joy and pride for the German NFT unfolded among the fans in 2006 cannot be directly compared to the events in 1954 because different circumstances come into play. As we have already seen, it can be assumed that a good explanation for why the German people behaved the way they did back in 1954 was because football in that occasion may have acted as an release valve that helped the people to

⁵³ A major multinational media corporation founded in Germany in 1835 (Bertelsmann, 2010).

relieve some of the pressure after the shame of the atrocities committed by the Nazis, defeat and subsequent occupation.

In 2006, on the other hand, we had a very different situation: Germany had finally become a united and completely autonomous nation, with a large population of younger people who could no longer directly relate to the horrors of the war, simply because they never experienced it; members of the post-war generation, these new Germans had begun to come to terms with their nation's past, apparently eager to normalize their relationship to matters of national pride, patriotism and sense of national belonging in the same way other European nations could: positively and without shame. At the same time, football as a sport had become a mass media phenomenon, subject to the laws of the market, with the teams and the players presented through a relentless and aggressive marketing campaigns not just on commercial TV but also on the Internet, thus making football and football players and their 'holy auras' into merchandise available to anyone who can afford it.

4.7 Fascination football

Certainly, one thing is striking about the power of football as a global social phenomenon. Not many days ago, I took my two children to a public pool in Oslo for the afternoon. While we were swimming around, I noticed that the eldest of the two, an eight-year-old boy who profoundly admires both Barcelona's striker Lionel Messi and Real Madrid's goalkeeper Iker Casillas, had turned his head to a middle-aged man who was beside him in the pool, and without more preamble asked him directly if he liked Barcelona FC. The man, at first a little surprised, answered affirmatively and asked the same of my son. In a matter of seconds, the two of them, a child and an adult, were exchanging impressions about Barcelona being catalogued as the best football team ever, Messi winning for the third time in a row the world's best football player award *Ballon D'Or*, or if Barcelona's Xavi Hernández, Madrid's Casillas and Cristiano Ronaldo, and Manchester United's Wayne Rooney⁵⁴ should 'actually' be playing together in the same team, and so on. Their conversation lasted several minutes, and I was impressed by the fact that two persons with a completely different social and

⁵⁴ For the readers who may not be familiarized with nowadays football heroes I would like to say that all the footballers mentioned in this sentence are top stars in their clubs, and were chosen into the *Onze d'Or*, which is a FIFA selection of the best eleven players in the world of the last season. The 2011's selection was composed by Cristiano Ronaldo (Real Madrid), Wayne Rooney (Manchester United), Lionel Messi (Barcelona), Andrés Iniesta (Barcelona), Xavi Hernández (Barcelona), Xabi Alonso (Real Madrid), Sergio Ramos (Real Madrid), Gerard Piqué (Barcelona), Nemanja Vidic (Manchester United), Dany Alves (Barcelona) and Iker Casillas (Real Madrid). (FIFA.com, 2012).

cultural backgrounds,⁵⁵ age, education and life experience could find in football the mutual reference tools to carry on such a detailed conversation and exchange opinions and information. Amazing!

So, when we ask why football is such a popular sport among old and young, educated and illiterate, rich and poor, Muslims and Christians, and in many ways can transform into a common cultural item that unites rather than separates people with totally different backgrounds, we can of course relate to Hobsbawm's explanation addressed before in this work, in which he uses different uniting symbols and events as a sort of 'instrument' consciously exploited by the ruling classes or elites of a nascent nation in order to form consensus around their legitimacy and the 'manifest destiny' of their nation. Nonetheless, this explanation does not take into account something very important that constitutes the essence of football, which is the fascination that exists for this game, and the mass participation it produces. In that sense, one of the problems I find with this understanding of football (and other uniting symbols and customs/traditions) is that football's popularity cannot without further analysis be related merely to the creation of a nation, because it would be conditioned by people's naivety, as if individuals were not being actively participating in the formation and transformation of the myths and successes and aspirations that surround football as a sport and spectacle for the masses. It might have been used by elites and/or authorities as a vehicle to gather the people of a territory around the idea of a nation based on a common ancestry and/or destination, but nowadays, the arrival of modernity with all its communication tools has prompted people's involvement and participation in many arenas, especially those of sport, together with the profit-oriented media industry and thus setting aside those 'original purposes' of 'inventing a nation', as Hobsbawm might have said.

For Sanna Inthorn (2006), there is a necessity of creating parallels between 'our' qualities as a community and as a nation, and the qualities that characterize the performances of those who represent us internationally, as a NFT does. In this matter, if the German NFT is hardworking and disciplined, it is then expected that the same attributes correspond to the Germans as a nation, although it can also be formulated otherwise, so if the Germans are a hardworking and disciplined people, then it is logical to expect the same from the German NFT, but this can be tricky, since there is no correlation between a peoples' attributes as a nation and the performances of the sports teams that represent them in international sports

⁵⁵ In this case, I assume that my son may be regarded, for statistically proposes, as a person with a migration background due to the fact that his father is not born and raised in Norway.

events. As an example it can be said that although the Germans are known for being hardworking and disciplined for the rest of the world, it does not necessarily mean that their sports teams will automatically deliver the same results as those delivered by the German industry and economy. All sports organizations and clubs may be very well organized in the 'German way', but that itself does not guarantee the presence of talent needed to succeed in individual or collective sports. But since football is the most popular sport in Germany and the world, it may therefore be important that the good performances, results and achievements can immediately be tracked back to the general attributes and characteristics of the nation and its people. In that sense, the Brazilian NFT plays joyfully and passionately and 'colourfully' because it represents the sentiment and character of the Brazilian people. And it happens to be that the Brazilian players of the NFT are also very talented, so here it is logical to suppose that this combination could not be any better, in terms of sport. Inthorn's analysis then has similarities with the work of sports philosopher Gunter Gebauer, for whom there are relevant issues about football that make it special for the general building of attachment, and that can also be directly linked to the construction of national identity and a sense of belonging. When we think about football we are also thinking of it as an extension of our reality in a idealist manner, because although football has characteristics that remind us of the structures in our society, however, the similarities that allegedly exist between football and the structures of our society are misleading, because the basic principles of our society are somehow dramatized in football exposed to everyone who is watching the game. According to Gunter Gebauer (2010), the phenomenon of football occurs only in what he calls the 'cultural life' and not in the real life, i.e. what happens in- and outside the field in football is never realized in the real life. To strengthen his point, he asks where in real life do we have an actually existing battle for the ball or a teamwork that in fact can be observed by 80,000 spectators in public? Or where does a person who has committed a foul and has got a red card indeed flee from the field, and where does this person stay/go when he/she get blocked from the game?

Gebauer's main topic here is that structure, ideas and game get converted – melted – and personified in a dramatized, physical performance. In addition, football happens to have a strong working character, because it is played with the feet and not with the hands, which makes the game harder to play. Contrary to basketball or handball, football has to be played with the parts of the body that are not designed to make the game smooth, easier or more fluid (ibid.). The argument is that normally it cannot be expected that anyone can use the chest to stop a ball that falls at high speed in a simple and butter-soft-like manner without

using his/her hands to gain control over it. Or that someone shoots with the foot a ball into the goal corner, leaving the goalkeeper without chances of stopping the ball. When somebody actually can do such things, it is of course wonderful. These are somehow inspired moments when something that cannot be expected to succeed – or that is even regarded as improbable – does succeed. The probability that a shot will majestically end in the corner of the goal is reduced, but when this indeed happens, it reminds us of the hard-working characteristics that are implicit in football, as well of the dedication and discipline needed to dominate the body to so high a degree that such an accomplishment can be achieved.

Gebauer views a second reason for why football enjoys of huge popularity, and that is because, according to him, a NFT always embodies the myth that a nation gladly wants to give to itself. Each nation perceives itself as having certain characteristics or properties. “The Germans”, says Gebauer, “see themselves as hard-working and honest. You can see it now, again and again in an embarrassing way, how it gets highlighted how good we are [referring to the current financial crisis] in contrast to the Greeks”⁵⁶ (Gebauer in interview with *Drehscheibe Magazin*, 2010).

“The image that a nation builds of itself, which in turn is based on the image of some men, is something that occurs with football right now: namely straightforward, sober, promising or successful play; hard stick-like defense, [...], the right exploitation of the opportunities, efficiency, intelligent management, etc. [...]. These are qualities with which a person would like to identify himself. The French identify themselves in a different way. They are also hard working. This is essential in France too, but that is not all. A degree of playfulness, the desire to play the ball is added. It all must be a little bit elegant. The French game looks more elegant, and that itself has a value, which is passed to the children in the football academies, as it is the case in the German academies, where they teach the children that they should not carry the ball themselves under any circumstances, or that it is absolutely forbidden to dribble or make any self-centered play.”⁵⁷ (Ibid.).

Thus, to explain football’s popularity Gebauer points to two main facts: firstly the dramatization of social structures and real life through football, where victories and joy, or defeats and anger obtain a theatrical form through the physical performances of athletes that indeed can be observed and judged and admired; and secondly the identity-forming force that follows football, especially the NFT within a nation and in an international context as it happens during an international competition such as a World Cup. Because while in Germany, as stated by Gebauer, the children learn to play collectively only, in other countries

⁵⁶ My translation.

⁵⁷ My translation.

other characteristics get more attention and become nurtured in the children already in the school structures. In that sense if a German footballer plays in a straightforward, sober, cold, but successful manner, he/she is only reproducing the qualities of the mentality that characterizes a whole structure, but also the qualities that characterize the German NFT as a representative of the nation, i.e. the characteristics of an entire population. In that way the image of a particular 'community' is created, and this is desirable by those members of the community.

And there is a third important reason why millions of people like football, namely the idealizing power that emerges from the unique combination between team-work and the individual performance. Indeed, the collective effort is the most important essence in football, and therefore it is teamwork which always gets emphasized and prioritized in every football team. But there is also always a leader that is capable of reading and controlling and guiding the game for the benefit of the team, sometimes in a decisive way. According to Gebauer it is also this characteristic, which makes football very attractive, namely the figure of a player – sometimes even two in the same team – who can take the hero role, who knows exactly what to do and when to do it: the player who draws the magic wand at the right moment, and who decides the outcome of a match just when it all seems lost. The player who indicates the speed of the game, who takes the team to the winning track, who can and knows how to strike and who, when needed, even scores the winning goal.

Chapter Five - Minorities in the German National Football

Team

5.1 Germany, integration and the NFT

Throughout this thesis, we have analyzed different aspects of Germany's historical notion of nationhood and national belonging during its development initially from a group of duchies, principalities and kingdoms in its way to its unification as a nation-state in the second half of the 19th century. Afterwards we have seen how Germany's self-understanding of nationhood reached a nationalistic outburst through the phases it underwent, first as dying monarchy during the Great War to come out of it as a nascent republic in the novel days of the Republic of Weimar, and all the way through its painful transition through the economic, political and social crises that opened the path to its transformation from a republic into a dictatorship. It is during this transition that the notions of nationhood not only became very similar to those held during the formation of the German national-state, but became even more corrupted due to the form the Nazis exploited them and abused them during their time in power. Later in this thesis, we will see how these notions of nationhood and national belonging, which at first glance appeared to be practically immobile, were challenged by the quick transformations that took place following the war. These notions were challenged essentially through the presence of the allied forces, who introduced a policy of *denazification*, which among other things implied the abolishment of all nationalistic symbols. The years that followed the creation of the German Federal Republic in 1949 were also the silent witnesses of one of the most incredible economic recoveries in Western history, when the German economy went from being the economy of a defeated and ruined country to one of the most prosperous in the European continent. This 'Economic Miracle' (or *Wirtschaftswunder*) brought about the necessity of skilled as well as unskilled workers from other regions due to the fact that Germany was unable to produce enough workers itself. The recruitment agreements between Germany and other countries – Italy (1955), Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968) (Flam, 2007) –, which were only supposed to be a temporary solution to this need for labour, soon became the ultimate challenge to the notions of nationhood that have constituted the basis of Germany's identity since it became a nation-state more than a century ago. Under the historical circumstances, the new countrymen and women could not be included under the German notions of nationhood. The first *Gastarbeiter* from the '50s and '60s turn gradually

into the second and third generation of immigrants, to whom the country had no place within the national understanding of 'we' and 'us', rather they quickly became the symbols of otherness, the opposite 'them' within the national boundaries. The members of these generations, born and raised in Germany were outsiders both socially, culturally, economically, politically and legally as they could not aspire to get the German nationality, and most of them held a foreign passport and foreign nationality. As we have seen in chapter three, this became a challenge to the integration of those who no longer were thinking about 'going back home', but who, for many reasons, had decided to stay in Germany and have a life there. Thus, the German parties, especially the progressivists and left oriented ones, had to acknowledge the fact that Germany had to solve the problems of integration of the immigrants by modifying Germany's nationality and citizenship laws in 1999. However and regardless of the fact that in 2007 Germany had the third-highest percentage of international migrants worldwide – about 5 per cent or 10 million of all 191 million migrants according to the United Nations Populations Fund's finds in its annual rapport of 2006 (*UNFPA Rapport 2006* in Donovan, 2007) – and that about 18 per cent of Germany's population would classify as migrants in 2005 – about 15 million people (Donovan, 2007) – the German authorities represented by the current Christian Democratic Union party (CDU) government headed by Chancellor Merkel, still refuse to define Germany as an *Einwanderungsland* (immigration country), as the Bavarian state minister Horst Seehofer did during a speech given at an event organized by the youth wing of the CDU party (The Guardian, 2010), even when, as stated by Holger Kolb (2008), it is not difficult to supply enough empirical evidence that speaks against his statement.

Now that we have gone through this chain of events, it is time to go back to the initial questions raised in the introductory chapter of this thesis. To what extend it can be stated that the ethnic composition of the NFT – in this case the German NFT – relates directly to Germany's immigration and integration policies? This explorative question, as taken from Aslak Nore in the opening chapter, automatically submits us inevitably to answer it in a straight way: yes, it is true that, at least in the case of Germany, the modification to the nationality and citizenship laws passed in 1999 may have influenced the number of players with a migration background playing for the NFT just by making the German citizenship available for more people than ever before. Nevertheless, it is also reasonable to say that there are other causalities that have been present to make their inclusion in the NFT possible, which strips Nore's hypothesis of its explanatory power for being a very simplistic answer to very profound phenomena. Additionally, Nore's hypothesis could, at a first glance, make the

connection between integration and immigration policies with the number of players with a migration background in the NFT seem obvious, and would magically explain some of the tendencies when it comes to the recruitment of young footballers with migration background to the NFTs, especially if one chooses to see countries as Denmark – as Nore did – and its allegedly ‘all-white’ national team in relation to the hardening of the immigration and asylum policies introduced in that country during the Conservative-Liberal coalition that was on power from 2001 to 2011. But as it has been stated here, there is no a simple answer to such a question, because the question itself is not adequate enough unless one complements it with questions that could open for other possible causes to why there are footballers with a migration background who choose to represent a nation in which they may not be totally included, or in which their group or community constantly becomes stigmatized, relegated or marginalized by the members of the majority, as well as why there are other footballers who do not follow this pattern. In my opinion, there is a mixture of causalities that move from the macro to micro spectres of society and vice versa, which ultimately affect not only who can be called up to the NFT, but who wants to be called as well.

At a macro level there is the political party system and the state’s institutions which indirectly can determine who can legally play for the NFT due to his/her nationality. At the same time there are some social limits administrated by the institutions such as the education system or working market that constrain the participation of people with migration background in equal conditions in the society, which correspondingly do not help the members of the minorities to deal with their problems of integration and adaptation to society, and which in some cases make this enterprise even more complicated. As we will see, this plays a very important role when it comes to the recruitment of players with migration background in German football at all levels.

At a micro level there is the directly involvement of those who are responsible for the recruitment of these sorts of players, those who eventually decide over the destiny of a team, and those who sometimes, consciously or not, discriminate these players. On the other hand, there are the footballers themselves who eventually play a key role in this process with their decision. Hereto, there is on one hand a question of if the person/persons responsible for the recruitment of players from the immigrant communities are biased or influenced by any prejudice or ideology when it comes to form a football national representation, or if there are only these players’ football skills which play the most relevant role for their recruitment. On the other hand, there is the question of how determinant is the degree of national identity or national belonging felt by the footballer himself when it comes for him to decide whether to

represent the German NFT or any another one, or if there are other interests which influence a player's decision such as career, adherence to the social network and loyalty to the family. Of course, all the options above are in reality intertwined and it's not possible to point to only one among the factors mentioned, nor it is to point at only one combination of these factors either. It must be said though, that there is no possible for this research to give a conclusive answer to the questions made above other than a depiction of some general tendencies by analyzing the course of history through the different periods that the German NFT has experienced the last 20 years.

5.2 Football as an expression of the national

We have now seen that important nation-wide events may have the power to increase a feeling of national belonging and to emphasize the sense of national unity among the people living in the actual country. Yet this assumption can be tricky, because this sense of national unity does not necessarily encompass everyone living in that country by default. In order to become 'impregnated' with enthusiasm about this positive collective patriotism, it is important that one's own identity matches that of the entire nation, on the one hand, and that one's own nationality and especially loyalty to the nation never comes into question or faces doubt under any circumstances, on the other. An analysis of the German NFT, which has been one of the most successful NFTs in football history, while also representing a nation with one of the most troubled self-understandings of nationhood and national belonging (due to a disastrous nationalistic past), represents a very good way of approaching this phenomenon. Such an analysis is conducted by looking at the history of both its achievements, as well as its staff composition, and the degree of attachment and/or enthusiasm generated among German football fans, though I am completely aware of the difficulties of measuring the latter in any accurate way other than looking at the newspapers and other electronic sources that have documented the different responses demonstrated by fans and other relevant contemporary witnesses at different times.

Studying the national football team as it becomes a national project can also be reduced to the days any given football event, e.g., a World Cup or similar competition, actually lasts. There is certainly an arousal of nationalistic and patriotic feelings among football fans, and the public in general, during a World Cup in which one's own national football team is taking part. This has been verified by many researchers (Daucy & Hare, 1998; Crolley & Hand, 2006; Ismer, 2010) at different times, both during and after different World Cups. As we have seen, a very ambitious attempt to appeal directly to the followers of

the German NFT, and the public in general, was made during the 2006 World Cup, which was celebrated in Germany under the slogan of “You Are Germany!” (*Du bist Deutschland!*). This was a propagandistic approach generated by the authorities in order to inspire some sort of atmosphere of reflection around the ideas of national belonging and national pride, at the same time that other private sponsors of the NFT (Bertelsmann Group, Mercedes, Adidas) similarly appealed to nationalistic sentiments and a sense of national belonging to promote themselves. Thus, as addressed in chapter four, where the fascination for football was analysed, the German case also serves as a way of understanding how a NFT can and has become a sort of a national project at a political and social level, even when the NFT is not taking part in any tournament, and how a group of players representing a nation also can be transformed into products for mass consumption.

In the case of Germany, and similarly in other countries, the NFT has actively been used to have an important role in shaping the notion of nationhood by focusing on the perceptions that the Germans have had of their nation as a member of the international community during the last years, as well as becoming an important unifying symbol in the construction of the notion of Germanness and what it means to be German today. In considering the latter and in relation to this research’s questions, it is quite relevant not only to reflect on a possible answer to the question of *what* is Germany, but *who* is Germany. Can a person with a migration background be regarded as German enough to represent the nation? Can the concept of nation only be associated with the majority? And given the current anti-Muslim atmosphere that prevails in Germany and in much of Europe, it is suitable to rethink these questions as follows: does the concept of immigrant fit in with the notion of nation? The concepts used here contradict each other: immigrants are regarded as such because they are not regarded as nationals, and because only national citizens can constitute a nation. But this is exactly why it is important to formulate these questions, because as long as a significant percent of the population is still considered to be alien, which is the same as considering them as not being part of the nation, false expectations are created as many natives may erroneously believe that these people might eventually pack up their belongings and go home, wherever this ‘home’ of theirs may be. At the same time, this constant label stitched onto the identity of all of those individuals with migration backgrounds continually makes their ‘otherness’ and status of ‘not belonging’ evident to them, which indirectly forces them to continue maintaining their own customs and cultural traditions, thereby making their integration more complex.

Further, these questions are also relevant because they are asked indirectly at all levels of society every time an athlete with migration background is anointed with the responsibility to represent his/her country at any international competition. Thus, when a football player with migration background is selected to join the senior NFT, the decision of his inclusion does not only occur at a managerial level within the NFT, that is, it is not about the current coach of the German NFT, Joachim Löw, 'integrating' a player with migration background into society by recruiting him for the team. Rather, it is also about a system that exists within the football structures of all academies and clubs, including the DFB, which has become both more receptive and more observant, and more eager to keep and invest in the talented players produced within the immigrant communities. This system has pretty much been forced to do this due to the fierce competition that exists in securing the services of the new 'diaspora football talents'⁵⁸ among the national football associations in a globalized and very competitive sports world. In that regard, the sudden awareness and eagerness the DFB has recently shown in discovering, retaining and/or securing new talents with migration background could also be explained by this fact, which, in the case of Germany, refers especially to the duel between DFB and the Turkish Football Federation (TFF), but we'll come back to this point later in this work. But this is no reason alone. The current demographic situation of the country forces the DFB to think differently about these sorts of players and the resource they represent for German football in general.

Accordingly, the decision to enrol a particular player from the minority groups is then made at lower levels in the football clubs, more specifically, with regard to the way these sorts of players are being trained and how their development is followed from childhood to adulthood. Later, these decisions involve how the players are being detected, valued and picked up by the football academies and sport clubs within the already given football structure, all the way up to the senior NFT through the DFB. It is in these instances that young players with migration backgrounds and their families encounter the first complications for their advancement within the system, all the way up to the top clubs of the *Bundesliga*.

Despite Germany's high number of persons with migration background, the NFTs do not seem to be profiting from these communities in the manner it should. The proportion of

⁵⁸ When I use the word *Diaspora*, I do so to refer to the group of players who are eligible to play for the NFT that represents the country of their parents, which normally is a country in which most of these kinds of footballers have never lived or played. In addition, most of these players developed professionally outside their parents' countries, yet still can be 'repatriated' by the football association of those countries in order to use or exploit their skills as footballers due to their nationality statuses and their cultural attachments.

players called up to the NFT does not correspond to the percentage of people with migration background of all generations.

At this point, we know two things. The first is that empirical data have shown that it is normally easier for football clubs to recruit players from the same environments the scout or the trainer is familiar with than it is to recruit them from other social spheres or communities (Kuper & Szymanski, 2009). The second thing is that, despite the segregation or discrimination of certain groups in society, reality has shown that the German senior NFT has increased the number of players with migration background recruited to the team the last years.

It is now appropriate to go through certain facts in order to support the previous two statements. First of all, we shall see that according to Kuper and Szymanski (2009), football clubs at the lower levels tend to hire players from certain social stratum, e.g. football clubs' scouts will look after players that originally have a working-class background and recruit them. At higher levels, that is, professional football clubs, Kuper and Szymanski found that when it comes to hiring football players from another nation, there are certain countries whose players are considered to be better than others based solely on their country of origin, which makes for example players from Brazil much more highly sought after when compared with players from, say, Mexico.⁵⁹ This tendency is valid irrespective of social class and ethnic origin.

More astonishing is that Kuper and Szymanski have also found evidence that indicates that even the looks of a player can be decisive when it comes to recommending a new player for the club, which, according to them, occurs because the clubs' scouts can have a tendency to better remember those players who stand out, like a blond player normally would do among 21 other similar-looking players on a football pitch, in what they call "sight-based prejudice" (ibid.: 53).

Secondly, Kuper and Szymanski's analysis displays football as being a game of probability not only when it comes to the results of the matches, but also when it comes to the performances of the teams in accordance with their ethnic and social composition. As such, they conclude that excluding players from certain groups can have a detriment effect not only

⁵⁹ Kuper and Szymanski reproduce an amusing interview conducted by the German journalist, Christoph Biermann, with American goalkeeper Kasey Keller, in which Keller says football clubs would pay more for a "fashionable" soccer country. In this interview Keller says: "Giovanni van Bronckhorst is the best example. He went from Rangers to Arsenal, failed there, and then where did he go? To Barcelona! You have to be a Dutchman to do that. An American would have been sent straight back to DC United." (Kuper & Szymanski, 2009: 52).

on a particular club, but also at a national level in the long term. In other words, in the opinion of these two authors, excluding for example players from the middle class or those with migration background damages a club or a country's chances to have more competitive teams in the local league and in international competitions.

“The Romans built their empire with an army drawn from every part of society. Only when the militia became an elite profession open just to particular families did the empire start to decline. When you limit your talent pool, you limit the development of skills. The bigger the group of people you draw from, the more new ideas there are likely to bubble up. That's why large networks such as City of London or Silicon Valley, which draw talent from around the world, are so creative.” (Ibid.: 18).

During the last 20 years or so, Germany has had a big pool of players with different backgrounds and from different parts of society to choose from. However, it was not until relatively recently that players from the country's ethnic minorities have started to receive attention from those responsible for the management of the national teams. Nevertheless, it must be said that it is not quite clear whether Kuper and Szymanski's hypotheses about the correlation between the performance of a national team and the number of players with different social or ethnic background drawn to that team is satisfactory or convincing enough. In the case of the German NFT, it can be said that its best results were all achieved before players with migration backgrounds had begun to be drawn into the NFT, although no correlation between these two facts can be claimed. However, it is also true that it was also during this 'immigrant-free' period that Germany fell into one of its biggest crisis ever.

Germany won its last World Cup in 1990. The twelve years from this date up until the year they again were runners up in 2002 have been catalogued as the most decadent in the history of German football, despite winning the UEFA Euro in 1996. To great disappointment for its fans, Germany lost the final to Brazil (0-2), but it reached the semifinals again in both 2006 and 2010, ending third in both competitions. When it comes to the UEFA Euro Championship, Germany won its last title in 1996, got eliminated in the preliminary round in both 2000 and 2004, and reached the final again in 2008, losing to Spain at 0-1. Before that Germany had won the FIFA World Cup in 1974 and in 1954. In the same competition, it reached the final again in 1986, 1982 and 1966. In the UEFA Euro, Germany won the title in 1980 and 1972, and was runner-up in 1992 and 1976.

At first glance, it may seem clear that Germany's performance has somehow 'decreased' since it won its last most important international competition; nevertheless, Germany's last good results in these tournaments (2002 – 2nd, 2006 – 3rd, 2008 – 2nd and

2010 – 3rd) and in the ranking list of FIFA (after World Cup 2010 and to the end of 2011, Germany has been pending between the 4th and 3rd position, but since April 11th 2012 it has climbed to the 2nd position behind Spain), still positions this country as one of the best in the world. This short analysis may help us realize that, despite Kuper and Szymanski's assumptions, Germany's results have been more dependent on other factors and not principally on the inclusion or exclusion of players with certain backgrounds in the NFT. At least these factors had not been regarded as a problem until now.

Since we must acknowledge the fact that Germany does not play against itself in every competition, but against a variety of opponents of all quality classes, and that other unintended or unforeseen developments, such as player injuries or suspensions often happen, we must also accept that there are a number of other factors involved in the results that Germany's performances have produced throughout history. At the same time, it is certainly difficult to compare between performances in different competitions from different epochs. It is not possible to say anything about how Germany NFT's performance would have been in 1954 with a multicultural team, in a time when migration from other cultures into Western Europe had not yet become a social phenomenon. Equally, it would be an exaggeration to state that Germany's performance would inevitably be below its own average if all the players of the NFT were still purely white, ethnic Germans, something that probably never was the case.

In any circumstance, sports history is full of examples that indicate that no matter what results a national team achieves, there will always be something or someone to be blamed or praised for its successes and failures.

To illustrate this last point, I will refer to the great discussion that Brazil's defeat to Uruguay in Maracana Stadium during the World Cup final of 1950 sparked about the role that black footballers had played in that fiasco, as an attempt to find someone to blame (Schulze-Marmeling, 2006). Since the black population in Brazil was totally excluded from all sports until the late '20s, a policy that was kept until the '50s by some of the biggest football clubs in the country, such as Fluminense, Botafogo, Gremio and Palmeiras, the presence of black players in the *Seleção* caused a lot of disturbances within the football and sports' world in Brazil. Things did not get any better when, four years later, Brazil got eliminated during the World Cup in Switzerland, which again forced a discussion on this issue. 'Fortunately', Brazil's coach pinpointed the "Race-mix" (ibid.: 8) as the cause of that failure: "The evil lies deeper than just the tactical area, it goes back to the genes" (ibid.). However, since this

example may not be enough, we will move forward in time to a much more recent episode, and refer to the French NFT. During the first round of the World Cup 2010, the French team got involved in a series of conflicts within the team, which resulted in some of the best-selling headlines in the sports media in France and the rest of the world throughout that tournament. As reported by the press, everything began after striker Nicolas Anelka, one of France's football stars, insulted coach Raymond Domenech during halftime in the game against Mexico, which led to his expulsion from the team, being sent home early as a disciplinary measure taken by the French Football Federation (FFF). Two days after that, a group of players headed by Patrice Evra rebelled against their coach and the FFF's decision, and refused to continue their training session of that day, which was considered a mutiny by the press (Hytner, 2010) and even got the attention of the French government. As a result, President Nicolas Sarkozy ordered his sports minister, Roselyne Bachelot, to open an investigation. The quick exit of France's NFT from that World Cup in the qualifying round, finishing last in its group, unleashed a chain of reactions with no precedent in French football history. According to Kim Willsher of the English newspaper, *The Guardian* (2010), Sarkozy even "called a crisis meeting of ministers over the debacle in South Africa" (ibid.) and summoned France's star striker Thierry Henry to question him about the World Cup fiasco. All sorts of accusations were quickly raised, although not only against particular players or France's coaching staff, but about the very ethnic composition of the national team in a way that was similar to what took place in Brazil 60 years earlier. Yet the accusations that dwelled upon the guilt of certain kinds of players due to their lack of true commitment to France became concrete actions planned at the very heart of the FFF, as news website *Mediapart* unveiled in a report published in April 2011, wherein members of the FFF's National Technical Board (*Direction Technique Nationale* or DTN for its acronym in French), including the then newly-appointed (and current) team coach Laurent Blanc, had "secretly approved a quota selection process to reduce the number of young black players, and those of North African origin, emerging from the country's youth training centers as potential candidates for the national team." (Arf, F. a., 2011). The proposal, which came from a top directive within the FFF, François Blaquart,⁶⁰ was to put a 30 percent cap on the selection of players with migration background, with the excuse that teams should favour technical skills above physical power, thus implying that black players were the ones who contributed with 'physical power', while white players were the 'technical' ones, which was based on the

⁶⁰ Blaquart was head of the DTN, but was suspended from his charge after his plans got exposed to the public (Mediapart, 2011).

racialist idea that the skin colour or religious affiliation of a person implies a specific set of physical qualities and attributes genetically predetermined and unavoidable, and that denote a specific type of human solely capable of certain tasks due to his/her ethnicity or cultural background. At the same time, the *quota plan* also tried to aim at those players with migration backgrounds who, according to these FFF board members, were susceptible to playing for a nation other than France by obtaining dual citizenship once their training in the French football academies was completed. One of the flaws of this plan, however, is that the majority of the players who do later choose to play for another NFT make the decision after failing to be selected for the French team, and this is logical too. As previously in this thesis, under FIFA regulations, it is stipulated that players with dual nationality are authorized to be selected for either one of the countries' teams on the condition that they have not already played for the A-team (senior team) of the other. As result, this plan also suggests that the loyalty to the country of a player who falls under this category can be questioned. Again, one's ethnic origin or cultural background is a significant enough factor to be judged as unreliable, and this alone was used to explain the failure of the French NFT in the last World Cup.

As I have showed, this is a phenomenon that has somehow become a recognisable pattern of behaviour across the globe, and which, in the case of France, is quite interesting when this 'plot' to limit the number of players with African and Maghrebian origins gets compared with the joyful reactions that arose among journalists, politicians and other relevant public figures in France and the world after their triumph in the 1998 World Cup. In this case, such figures praised the multicultural character of '*Les Bleus*', the apotheosis of an integrated and multicultural France, or, as written by José Luis Barbería in the Spanish newspaper *El País* (1998), a French NFT that had given the world a "lesson in unity by the hand of Algerian Zidane, the Breton Guivarch, the Guadeloupian Thuram, the Pyrenean Barthez, the Kanak Karembeu, the Basque Lizarazu, the African Desailly, the Armenian Djorkaeff." (Ibid.). In a similar vein, the conservative newspaper *Le Figaro* stated that "France [was] multiracial and [would] remain that way" (ibid.). Even more astonishing were the declarations made to *Le Monde* by French politician Charles Pasqual, "the man of the iron fist" (as quoted in *El País*, 1998), and who was behind the toughest immigration law passed in France at that time when he was Interior Minister, when he claimed in favour of the legalization of all identified illegal immigrants (ibid.), saying, "[I]look at the French NFT, champion of the world, look to the youth of our suburbs who came from our former colonies (...) The World Cup has shown that integration has been achieved by 90% of our country. At

a time when France is strong, it can be generous, it can make a kind gesture”⁶¹ (ibid.), and without missing the appropriate invocation of the great French hero: “De Gaulle would have probably done it.”⁶² (Ibid.). And even the public opinion, which according to a survey published by *Le Journal de Dimanche* (in *El País*, 1998), showed that over 50 percent of the population was in favour of regularising the situation of the illegal immigrants. All this effervescence and love for the “tricoloured and multicoloured” French NFT, as the then President Jaques Chirac had called the team (Barbería, 1998), disappeared on the eve of failure in South Africa 12 years later.

5.3 Fortress German NFT

As written before, one of the hypotheses this research has pursued was that by directing focus toward the national football team, it may be possible to draw some connecting links between the ethnic composition of the German NFT and the country’s integration policies. At the same time, it may also be possible to connect this link with the notions of nationhood and identity that may be needed for the integration of immigrants in a broader social and historical context. One of the reasons behind these assumptions lies in the fact that although Germany has had a significant amount of immigrants arriving to the country since the middle of the ‘50s, it is only a very recent development that football players with different ethnic backgrounds have made themselves noticeable internationally as representatives of the German nation.

During the development of this thesis, the possibility that integration policies have had an impact on the number of players with migration backgrounds in the NFT has been addressed. It has also been recognized that this has indeed had an effect, mostly because it is necessary to be a German citizen in order to play for any national team in any sports discipline, and this option has already been made more flexible since both the Foreigners Act of 1990 and the Citizenship Law were modified in 1999, which has led to a mixture of the principles of *ius sanguini* and *ius soli* for the acquisition of citizenship. This has consequently made it easier for non-Germans to become citizens, or to acquire citizenship by birth. However, and despite the fact that this modification became effective 12 years ago, the number of players with migrant backgrounds within the A-team does not correspond with the total number of individuals naturalized, nor does it correspond with the number of persons with migration

⁶¹ My translation.

⁶² My translation.

background living in Germany. It is true that there has been a positive evolution, but, as stated before, this has not been enough to be *representative*.

Thus, even a German NFT with its Klose, Podolski, Gomez, Özil, Khedira, Aogo and Cacau is still not representative of the Turkish minority, which is the biggest proportion of people with migration background in the country, with about 2.5 million out of a total of circa 15 million. In order to find out some of the causes behind this phenomenon, this research will address some other possible explanations as they have become available during the data collection. First of all, the causes that I have identified so far are listed as follows:

1. A lack of interest within the DFB in players with migration background until very recently.
2. Immigrants' lack of integration and class inequality.
3. Discrimination.
4. National identity.
5. Germany's non-colonial history.

After the collection and analysis of a large amount of data addressing these topics, the present research has tried to elucidate some possible reasons for this outcome.

5.3.1 DFB's back side

The history of the German Football Association, or DFB, cannot be ignored or dismissed as being a powerful cause behind the low numbers of players with migration background playing in the senior NFT. Although it does not make much sense to refer to the days in which mass immigration from outside Europe was not an issue or a social problem, it may help to set the stage from which part of the story of this phenomenon has evolved. In particular, due to its magnitude, it is not quite possible today to measure the negative impact that the DFB's records had on the integration of the minorities in the NFT. According to Schulze-Marmeling (2008), the operation of the DFB after the war was practically left in the hands of former Nazi functionaries, as they were never removed from their positions in the DFB by the new government. Thus, they exerted their influence probably up until recent times, if we take into account the presidency period of the CDU politician Gerhard Meyer-Vorfelder, who headed the DFB until 2006, and whose presidency period was full of controversies and scandals due to his nationalistic declarations and affiliation to right-extremist groups in Germany. One of those Nazi functionaries referred to by Schulze-Marmeling was Guido von Mengden, who was already a sports functionary in the days of the

Weimar Republic. Under Nazi rule, Von Mengden was the chief editor of a sports magazine called 'NS-Sport' and General Secretary of the *Reichssportsführers* (Reichs Sports Leader), where he degraded himself and his athletes as being "recruits of the great corporal Adolf Hitler" (*Der Spiegel*, April 1971). Schulze-Marmeling writes that Von Mengden was "a rabid anti-Semite" (2008), and, after 1945, he went into hiding and changed his name to Till van Ryn. However, he managed to go back to sport as a functionary, and, in the '50s he continued his duties as chief executive of the German Sports Federation (or DSB - *Deutscher Sport-Bund*), despite his contribution to the Nazi regime and his Nazi affiliation. He and other prominent sport functionaries of the German Federal Republic were exposed several years later, in 1971, as result of an investigation into the sports history in Germany, which was undertaken by some critical writers on the occasion of the Olympic Games in Munich in 1972. Ironically, among those functionaries exposed was Karl Ritter von Halt, who was a member of the committee that had arranged the Olympic Games in Berlin in 1936, and who also was working on the Munich 1972 Olympic Committee. Thus, Hitler's last sports chief led the West German delegation through the first negotiations with the DDR on an all-German Olympic representation (*Der Spiegel*, 1971).

The influence of the old Nazi functionaries that were 'adopted' by the DFB after the war could also be felt under the first DFB president after the war, Peter Joseph Bauwens, an old national socialist enthusiast who, two days after the *Wunder von Bern* in 1954, held a party in the emblematic *Löwenbräukeller*,⁶³ where he exclaimed that "with the victory the German debt was finally been paid off" and that "no one in the world should ever foul the German people again" (Heinrich, 2006). Afterward, he thanked the old Germanic war god Wotan for protecting the team during the tournament, and praised the world champions as representatives of "*besten Deutschtum*" (Rühle, 2002) – or best Germanness –, which owed its success to the practice of what he called "*Führerprinzip*" (ibid.) – the Führer's principle, alluding to no other than Adolf Hitler. It was also during his period as president of the organisation that the DFB decided to prohibit women football, with arguments such as that in the battle for the ball the feminine grace disappeared, the body and the soul suffered from inevitable damage and the body was displayed without decorum and decency (*DFB-Jahrbuch*, 1955). President Bauwens added, "Football is no women's sport. We will never deal with this matter seriously" (Bulla, 2009: 26).

⁶³ It was in this basement where the Nazis used to hold their celebrations. Even Hitler's birthday got celebrated in this basement during the war.

Twenty-four years later, DFB president Hermann Neuberger started a new scandal during the World Cup in Argentina, when a highly decorated Nazi pilot was invited to the German headquarters in Ascochinga. While the French delegation used its stay in Argentina to advocate for the release of political prisoners and to elucidate the fate of about 20 missing critics of the dictatorial regime, Neuberger invited former Nazi-pilot Hans-Ulrich Rudel⁶⁴ to give a speech to the NFT players. When the news became known in Germany, Neuberger's reaction was to say that Rudel was a German citizen who had the same rights as the protesters, and he added that he really hoped they would not try to reproach him for his activities as a fighter pilot during the Second World War, because "those who oppose Rudel's visit to the German NFT insult all German soldiers"⁶⁵ (Rühle, 2002). According to Schulze-Marmeling, Rudel had already appeared once before in the German headquarters in 1958, as he visited the then coach Sepp Herberger to congratulate him for defeating the Argentinean NFT, and with whom he shared "decades of friendship" (ibid.).

The last, but not least polemic DFB leader was the aforementioned Gerhard Meyer-Vorfelder, whose career as CDU politician started as the personal assistant of a very controversial CDU politician, Hans Filbinger.⁶⁶ Filbinger had to resign his position as Minister President of the state of Baden-Württemberg in 1978 – a position he held for twelve years – once his participation in the Nazi regime as a navy judge at the *Wehrmacht* (armed forces) during the Second World War and his involvement in death sentences during the last days of the war were revealed (Schmale, 2003). Yet Meyer-Vorfelder's story does not stop at Filbinger's one. During his career as politician and DFB president, he made certain to produce scandals of his own making. For example, in summer of 1986 while he was the Minister of Culture and Sports of Baden-Wuerttemberg, he provided the German people with some excitement when he said that it could not hurt if students would master all three verses of "*Deutschlandliedes*",⁶⁷ and sing it. After all, the French were singing also their *Marseillaise* in full, despite the fact that "their history of the Third Reich [in France] was not much easier than the history of the Third Reich with us." (*Tatort-stadion.de*, 2010). Further, during a discussion about the restrictions of foreign players in the *Bundesliga*, he made himself clear by saying that "the South American and African football ha[d] genetically different conditions". In October 2001, he said, "[w]hen in a game between Bayern Munich

⁶⁴ Rudel had been Hitler's favourite pilot, and was the only soldier during WWII to be honoured with the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Golden Oak Leaves, Swords and Diamonds.

⁶⁵ My translation.

⁶⁶ From 1933 to 1936, Filbinger was a member of the National Socialist German Student Association, from 1934 to 1937 he was member of the SA, and in 1937 he joined the Nazi party (Mohr, 2007).

⁶⁷ The German National Hymn.

and Cottbus only two ethnic Germans are in the early formations something must be wrong”. (Ibid.).

Other equally revealing opinions emerged as result of the triumph of the French NFT in 1998, probably in response to the worldwide acclaim given to the victory of a multicultural team, which had also demonstrated the triumph of an apparently successful project of integration of the minorities of that country. To that event, Meyer-Vorfelder explained, “without trying to sound chauvinistic” (Rühle, 2002), that if Germany had not lost its colonies in 1918, there would probably be only players from the “German Southwest Africa” (ibid.) playing on the national team. According to him, the fact that France had played with a multicultural team was demeritorious and therefore the achievement was, in his own words, “no piece of art” (ibid.).

It seemed like Meyer-Vorfelder had serious concerns about the development of immigration in Germany and Europe, as well as the involvement of non-ethnic German players at the club level and in the NFT, as well as about the future of German football in general. According to Alex Rühle in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Meyer-Vorfelder ended up in trouble already some months after his designation as head of the most important football association in Germany after he rhetorically asked what would become of the *Bundesliga* when “the blonds over the Alps move and, instead, the Poles, these Furtoks and Lesniaks [in Germany] play?”⁶⁸ (Rühle, 2002). His declarations cease to be astonishing once his background and the social circles he has been a part of are understood, and he is placed in his correct ideological and political place, which includes an organization that has awarded him with what they call the “covenant of the displaced plaque for services to East Germany and its self-determination”⁶⁹ (ibid.). This is an organization that, among other things, stands for the reintegration of the Polish Upper Silesia to Germany, and which is one of the regions Hitler wanted to annex, alleging the necessity of protecting the ethnic German minority living there, which was ultimately his reason for invading Poland in 1939, and starting the bloodiest war in history of mankind.

In sum, it can be said that the DFB’s prejudicial and discriminatory attitudes towards foreign elements have been a normal practice among its directives and executives, as well as the entire system of scouts, coaches and volunteers, who in the end are the same women and men that decide how and by whom the German football in general shall be organized and how the

⁶⁸ My translation.

⁶⁹ My translation.

NFTs shall be run. Ever since its re-foundation after the war, but especially during the '80s and '90s, the DFB did not seem to be interested in looking for players with migration background or recruiting them for the NFTs whatsoever. This was due to a combination of arrogance and disinterest, as well as discrimination. "It was previously often the attitude that we had enough good players and that if we lose one, then we would just take on a new one",⁷⁰ admitted the outgoing DFB president Theo Zwanziger to the newspaper *Die Zeit* in 2007. "The Turkish Association had its agency [in Germany] and then we have not even argued against it", continued Zwanziger. "After the World Cup 1990, Euro 1996 and the effects of the Reunification, some have even considered Germany unbeatable."⁷¹ When you're sitting on such a high pedestal you do not go pushing as aggressively as others." (Ibid.). A major problem with attitudes of segregation and arrogance is when they come from the highest authorities, as they are easier to 'infect' the lower levels of the organization and structure. In the end, such attitudes lend legitimacy to having similarly negative attitudes, and indirectly authorize coaches to have similar negative reactions towards players with migration backgrounds, in either ignoring them or discriminating them as a group.

This attitude is something the DFB will be forced to change if it wants to keep Germany NFT at the top of the football nations in the future, not only for purposes of achieving integration within German football and in society, but also for reasons of demography, as already mentioned. According to the demographic projections developed for Germany over the next 40 years, there will be from about 10 to almost 20 million fewer persons living in Germany in 2060 (*Statistisches Bundesamt*, 2009). This, along with the continually aging population now living in the country would theoretically reduce the talent pool of ethnic German players in future generations. Additionally, the current struggle between the German and Turkish Football Associations to take on those dual-eligible players with Turkish roots, pushes the DFB to become more aware of what is happening in its own training camps and football fields, and, more importantly, obliges them to not allow the national talent drain to continue as it has been until now. When, in the early 2000s, the Turkish Football Federation (TFF) established a scout-system based on the former Dortmund player, Erdal Keser, whose main task was to attract and/or recruit young footballers with Turkish origins for the TFF, the DFB was too busy not paying any attention to the players

⁷⁰ My translation.

⁷¹ Here, in clear reference to Franz Beckenbauer, who in 1990 said that with the reunification of both German States the Mannschaft would be unbeatable.

coming from this sector of society, as the TFF even opened an agency in Germany without generating any reaction from the DFB.

When it comes to the current demographic tendencies, there are mainly two factors that may actually slow this process down: new immigration and a higher number of children born to foreign women or women with migration background. One example of the significance of the immigration population is that there are many football clubs in urban areas that would not survive if it were not for the children and teenagers with migration background who play in them. As stated by estimates of the DFB (2007), the same tendency is already emerging in the junior categories for the national team. However, from the estimated 2.5 million Turks or persons of Turkish origin – of which about 840,000 of them have been naturalized (Takle, 2007) – living in Germany (*Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge*, 2010), very few have found their way to the senior NFT. And though the same pattern applies for those with migration backgrounds from Italy or the former Yugoslavia (Schäfer, 2007), the case of the Turkish major minority is especially striking.

Some of the measures taken by the DFB under Theo Zwanziger was to appoint a commissioner for integration: Gul Keskinler, a Turkish-born CDU-member who adopted German citizenship in 1998. “The DFB is working with Gul Keskinler on the legal system and the rules of procedure in the tribunals there will much be changed” (Heybrock, a. 2007: 27), said Zwanziger. In addition, Keskinler shall have jurisdiction over contact with the Turkish Communities. Another measure has been the creation in 2007 of the Integration Award in the amount of €150,000, which is called “Football: many cultures - one passion” (*Fußball: viele Kulturen - eine Leidenschaft*). With this award, the DFB and its main sponsor Mercedes-Benz honour each year those projects and activities that in an exemplary manner promote the integration of children and teenagers – especially girls – with migration background, with the help of football (DFB, 2012). The DFB has similarly tried to exploit the success of its A-team to stimulate an interest for German football among youngsters with migration background as a strategy for integration through football, and deliberately uses the figures of key players like Mesut Özil or Sami Khedira as inspiration.

Playing for the German NFT should become more attractive to the youth. Here, a combination of three factors can be crucial: first, there are the sportive successes that the German team has had in the last four important international competitions – the World Cups in 2002, 2006, and 2010, and the UEFA Euro Championship of 2008 –, finishing in the top three in all of them. Second, there is the media-marketing of the team that has transformed it and its players into products for consumption through multi-million dollar advertising

campaigns shown in almost every public space, including time devoted to its players in the media, transforming many of them into TV stars. And third, there is Mesut Özil's success, whose career rocketed after his outstanding performance in South Africa, and earned him being hired by the Spanish 'überclub' Real Madrid under Portuguese coach José Mourinho, one of the most renowned and successful trainers in the world. This may also play a role in making the German NFT more appealing.

In addition, contemporary communication technology, such as Internet-based social network services like Facebook, Twitter or YouTube, in which the majority of these star players have created personal profiles and use actively, has not escaped the attention of the DFB. All of these communication tools have made these players available to the general public everywhere in the world, which in turn has exponentiated their scope of reach and presence. This again gets translated into monetary profit for the players and the commercial branches that sponsor them, since these communication platforms are also used as fan-shops where diverse objects and memorabilia can be bought. As a reference, it is interesting to observe that footballers such as Real Madrid's star, Cristiano Ronaldo, and Barcelona's main figure, Lionel Messi, who probably are the most famous football stars at the moment, have a total of 43,441,253 and 34,902,859 fans respectively on their Facebook pages alone (Facebook, April 2012). In comparison, Mesut Özil, who right now may be the most prominent of all German players, counts a total of 4,980,589 fans on his Facebook page (ibid.). Thus, in accordance with this trend, the DFB has also created a Facebook and Twitter fans page, for which they have already achieved 1,324,123 and over 300 thousand fans respectively.

Whether these three factors combined will manage to attract more players with migration background is yet to be seen. So far, if we look at the number of German-Turkish players who have debuted for the senior NFT since Özil did in February 2008 (*Transfermarkt.de*, 2012), and especially after he debuted as Real Madrid player in August 2010, we will find that only one more player with Turkish origins has debuted for Germany, namely Ilkay Gündogan, who debuted officially⁷² for Germany in October 2011 against

⁷² FIFA decided in 2004 that it is not possible for players who have a double nationality to play in two NFTs representing different countries. Thus, players who have debuted in official matches of the senior NFT, i.e., not friendly matches or official matches from a category lower than the senior category, but matches corresponding to a tournament or qualification match for an official tournament solely for players older than 21 years old, oblige themselves to play only for the country they have debuted for. As an example of how this works, Ilkay Gündogan was first called to play for the German NFT for a friendly match against Brazil in August 2011, however, since this match was not part of an official football tournament (FIFA tournament), he could still be eligible to play for the Turkish NFT, as he also had the Turkish citizenship. He lost this possibility when he

Belgium (ibid.). Now, this may have several explanations as well, like perhaps that Germany has not played any more official matches since that game in October, but only three friendly matches, in which only one new player, Ron-Robert Zieler, debuted in a match against Ukraine in November of the same year (ibid.). However, the ‘Özil effect’ is not to be totally dismissed or underestimated. As a matter of fact, many of the campaigns to integrate players from the minorities have been developed due to the ‘Özil effect’ with the purpose of retaining promising talents such as Özil for Germany, and not letting players like Nuri Sahin go to another football association. This especially pertains to players of Turkish descent, given the fact that there are many more millions of players with Turkish origins living and being trained as footballers in Germany compared with other ethnic groups. This is a sort of a ‘battle’ started by the DFB against its Turkish counterpart to avoid that players like Mehmet Ekici, Ömer Toprak or Emre Can, all trained and formed within the structures of the DFB and who have played in all different German junior teams, go over to the TFF, as DFB Sports director Matthias Sammer explained German magazine Focus (2012). Additionally, this battle between the sports associations is also a battle that has been waged for two main reasons: prestige and, most importantly, economic resources. As it has been addressed here, the marketing potential of football stars such as Mesut Özil represent the potential to earn million of euros. Not surprisingly, Özil’s market value has reached the amount of €32 million since he arrived to Real Madrid in/during the summer of 2010.

List of players of the German NFT as to February 2012 with Facebook official page, according to popularity (Facebook, 2012).

Player	Number of Facebook fans
Mesut Özil	4,980,589
Thomas Müller	1,044,955
Lukas Podolski	869,519
Bastian Schweinsteiger	706,088
Mario Götze	700,389
Manuel Neuer	643,928
Sami Khedira	434,184
Mario Gomez	298,270
Mats Hummels	206,641
Toni Kroos	159,063
Miroslav Klose	135,542
Cacau	84,930
Holger Badstuber	77,977
Dennis Aogo	8,736
Jérôme Boateng	2,756

finally debuted for Germany in a qualification match for the UEFA Euro 2012 against Belgium in October of the same year.

In terms of their sporting ability, the German team has also been very successful before, but this has neither influenced the number of players of Turkish origin, nor the number of players with a migration background in the *Mannschaft*, in relation to previous or subsequent periods. Moreover, the first Turkish-born footballer to ever play for Germany debuted first in summer 1999. However, this may be the first generation in the team's history to experience full 24/7 media coverage of the NFT and its members at massively global scale, which might be reason enough to cause young people to aspire toward or dream of one day playing for the German NFT. Another important factor to be mentioned is that players from the minorities may consider the *Nationalelf* as a means to achieve social recognition and mobility. However, and as we will see, other variables need to be present for young players from the minority groups to be represented in the German team. In any case, a quick assumption that there may be fewer players with migration backgrounds in the NFT due to a lack of interest from that sector of society could be misleading, because it would imply that if the NFT does not have more players with migration background in its ranks, it is due to the lack of interest by these types of players, and not a lack of interest by those responsible for their recruitment to the NFTs as well. As we have seen, the priority of the DFB when it comes to the recruitment of young promising talents has not been directed at players with migration background at the club and academy level until very recently. As we have seen, the ideological atmosphere that has characterized the DFB since its creation after the war, has been one that has followed Germany's history and notion of nationhood, grounded in a concept of national belonging based on ethnicity, as we also have seen previously in this thesis. In this regard, the DFB's approach to potential players – and that of its members, the top clubs of the German leagues – has been accordingly not interested in seeking out players other than those produced within the majority in society.

However, and perhaps not unexpectedly, there is indeed a combination of these two factors, plus others, that play an important role when it comes to the recruitment of members of minority groups into the NFT. As far as I have been able to document, there are several examples that show that in recent years, at least with regard to German-Turkish players, several of these footballers chose not to play for Germany despite being offered an opportunity at the German NFT. The cases of the Altintop brothers, Hamit and Halil, or Kevin-Prince Boateng can be used to illustrate this.

5.4 The German NFT and its trainers during the last 20 years

Before we go deeper into the periods during which different managers have been in charge of the German NFT in the last 22 years, it may be relevant to disclose a methodological reflection, which is that I am aware that there are more than just one German NFT under the DFB organization. Therefore it would seem that any analysis of German football should include all of male NFTs that represent Germany in international competitions; to be more exact, it should include an analysis of the ethnic composition of these other teams in order to see the continuity or disruption that affects the ethnic composition of the senior NFT. However, such an analysis does not appear throughout this thesis, since there is no link between all these teams beyond the way in which they are organized by the DFB. What I mean here is that while there is a link between the different national team categories with regard to the way they are organized and structured, there is no guarantee that a good and skilled footballer who plays for the NFT for teenagers under 15 or 17 years old will make it to the senior NFT in the future, regardless of his ethnic origin. Accordingly, the fact that the German NFT for players under 15 years old recruits footballers with migration backgrounds does not represent any guarantee that there will be players with migration backgrounds playing for the senior NFT. For this reason, the focus of study for this thesis remains almost exclusively on the senior German NFT, and it does not go into detailed analysis of the other male NFTs. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the data collected from these NFTs is irrelevant to this research, just because it is not as extensively addressed as the data collected from the senior NFT. And yet although the junior categories are not the main focus here, it is necessary to have insight into see the lower levels within the football structure, including the smaller football clubs and sports associations, in order to achieve a broader understanding of who plays in the senior NFT and why. Therefore, and as we shall later see, the recruitment of players with migration background begins even before the DFB gets involved in the process at the local clubs and academies that work mostly with children in different categories. The question of who makes his way up from these levels to the NFT depends on several variables.

One out of five persons in Germany has a migration background (*Statistisches Bundesamt*, 2008), but, as we have seen, the number of players belonging to this group playing for the NFT is not consistent with this fact. Additionally, the biggest group with having a migration background has Turkish roots. Along with the other nationalities previously in this thesis, migrants from this particular country began to arrive to Germany in 1961 as part of the recruitment agreement signed between Germany and Turkey. However, recruitment from this

particular social group to the senior NFT does not seem to have begun in earnest until circa 2008-2009, as preparations for establishing the team that was to play in the World Cup in 2010 had already begun. Indeed, other non-ethnic German players had been recruited before 2008-2009, but almost all of such players who debuted in the NFT from 1990 until 2006 – i.e., the time periods during which Berti Vogts (1990-1998), Erich Ribbeck (1998-2000), Rudi Völler (2000-2004) and Jürgen Klinsmann (2004-2006), were managers – were either half German or had a cultural background from another European country, which would presuppose a better cultural understanding and functioning in the German society, since their cultural environments at home were probably not very different from the cultural environment of the majority. In order to see this development closer throughout the last 22 years, we shall go through the different coaches who have managed the NFT during this time.

5.4.1 Berti Vogts' period (1990-1998)

When a more detailed examination of the periods represented by the different coaches who have managed the senior German NFT since the last time Germany won a World Cup (1990, Italy) is conducted, it can be seen that the recruitment of footballers with migration backgrounds did not start until Berti Vogts assumed charge of the team in 1990. This happened after the team was managed by the legend of 1974, Franz 'Der Kaiser' Beckenbauer, who never called for any player with migration background during his interim as manager (*Transfermarkt.de*, 2012). This might have been because Beckenbauer, like many other functionaries within the DFB, believed it would not be necessary to recruit players with migrant backgrounds due to the reunification of both Germanys in 1990. After all, Germany was supposed to become an invincible football team with in having the choice of so many players from both leagues, i.e., the DFB and the *Deutscher Fußball Verband* (DFV) from the German Democratic Republic (Heybrock, a., 2007).

During his era, Vogts debuted a total of 56 players from August 1990 to September 1998. Of these 56, only six players had migration backgrounds, and none of them came from the Turkish community or had parents (ibid.). Instead, these six players had either mixed or European backgrounds. Two of them were the sons of Italian guest-workers who had emigrated to Germany in the late '50s, and both were born in Germany – Bruno Labbadia in Darmstadt and Maurizio Gaudino in Brühl. Footballers Mehmet Scholl and Oliver Neuville were both half German and half Turkish and Italo-Swiss, respectively. Fredi Bobic was born in Yugoslavia as the son of a Slovene and a Croat who migrated to Germany when he was

still a small child. And, finally, Dariusz Wosz, in being a native from Silesia after 1945, has both German and Polish citizenship (Wikipedia.org, 2011).

List of German players with migration backgrounds called up to the NFT under Berti Vogts's management (from 9.08.90 to 7.09.98).

Name	Background	Debut	Currently NFT Player?
1. Bruno Labbadia	Italian	20.12.92	No
2. Maurizio Gaudino	Italian	22.09.93	No
3. Fredi Bobic	Slovenian-Croatian	12.10.94	No
4. Mehmet Scholl	German-Turkish	26.04.95	No
5. Dariusz Wosz	Polish (repatriate)	26.02.97	No
6. Oliver Neuville	German-Italian	2.09.98	No

Players called up in total: 56

5.4.2 Erich Ribbeck's period (1998-2000)

During Erich Ribbeck's management period there were only 15 new players called to the NFT (*Transfermarkt.de*, 2012). Although he had the shortest period of all five coaches with only one year, eight months and ten days, he was the first to call a Turkish-born player in the history of the German NFT, Mustafa Doğan.

Doğan was a footballer born in Isparta, Turkey, but had emigrated to Germany with his family when he was two years old, and obtained his naturalization in 1992 (Heybrock, a., 2007). According to Heybrock, Doğan's debut in the NFT in July 1999 was somehow inspired by the multicultural French team that had won the World Cup just one year earlier. This is alleged because Doğan's participation was very short, being called two times to the *Mannschaft*, coming into action in an official match as a substitute just one minute before the regular time was over in a UEFA Euro qualification match against Turkey. Heybrock states that this was more of a gesture under the same '*blanc, black, beur-spirit*'⁷³ than a real need by the German team in order to win the game, since the score was 0-0 and Doğan played as a central defender. In Heybrock's own words: "a helpless reaction to the French naturalization policy" (ibid.).

⁷³ After France's victory in 1998, the NFT became the '*blanc, black, beur*' team to denote its racial mixture, as *blanc* stood for white or ethnic French, *black* for those from the Antilles and *beur* for those of Northern African origin (Mediapart, 2011).

List of German players with migration background called to the NFT under Erich Ribbeck's management (from 10.10.98 to 20.06.2000).

Name	Background	Debut	Currently NFT Player?
1. Mustafa Doğan	Turkish	30.07.99	No

Players called in total: 15

5.4.3 Rudi Völler's period (2000-2004)

Rudi Völler's period as manager lasted for almost four years from July 2000 to June 2004. During his time as coach, a total of 26 players debuted for the NFT, five of which had origins from outside of Germany (*Transfermarkt.de*, 2012). Two of the most important footballers in the NFT got their first opportunity with Rudi Völler, namely Miroslav Klose and Lukas Podolski, who have still been active in the NFT after their debut in March 2001 and June 2004, respectively (*ibid.*).

It was also during his period that the first Africa-born player, Gerald Asamoah, was called to represent Germany in an international match. Originally from Mampong, Ghana, and born in 1978, Asamoah joined the *Nationalelf* in 2001 after his after being naturalized that same year, playing for the first time in a friendly match on the 29th of May against Slovakia. Needless to say, Asamoah was the first black player ever to represent Germany in the NFT.

List of German players with migration backgrounds called to the NFT under Rudi Völler's management (from 2.07.2000 to 24.06.2004).

Name	Background	Debut	Currently NFT Player?
1. Miroslav Klose	Polish (repatriate)	24.03.01	Yes
2. Gerald Asamoah	Ghanaian (naturalized)	29.05.01	No
3. Thomas Brdaric	Croatian	27.03.02	No
4. Kevin Kuranyi	German-Brazil-Panama	29.03.03	No
5. Lukas Podolski	Polish (repatriate)	6.06.04	Yes

Players called in total: 26

5.4.4 Jürgen Klinsmann's period (2004-2006)

During Jürgen Klinsmann's period as manager, only a few players with migration background debuted in the NFT. In the two years that Klinsmann led the team, a total of 12 players were called to the NFT for the first time, three of which also had family roots in

places outside of Germany. In debut order, Patrick Owomoyela (of Nigerian origin), Lukas Sinkiewicz (of Polish origin), and David Odonkor (of Ghanaian origin). Again, all of these players either had one German parent or, as in the case of Sinkiewicz, were considered to belong to the German people because of his ethnic German origins as a repatriate from the Silesian area.

List of German players with migration backgrounds called to the NFT under Jürgen Klinsmann's management (from 26.07.2004 to 11.07.2006).

Name	Background	Debut	Currently NFT Player?
1. Patrick Owomoyela	German-Nigerian	16.12.04	No
2. Lukas Sinkiewicz	Polish (repatriate)	3.09.05	No
3. David Odonkor	German-Ghanaian	30.05.06	No

Players called in total: 12

5.4.5 Joachim Löw's period

Of all trainers the German NFT has had in the last twenty-two years, the period during which Joachim Löw served as manager has been witness to the most recruitments of minority players in German history. Since he took over the NFT in 2006, he has called a total of 49 players to the team for the first time, and out of all these players, 16 have migration backgrounds with a/representing a wide spectrum of nationalities. Thus, it may seem as if it was under Löw's management that the German NFT has become more appealing to the minorities of the country, especially those of Turkish origin, which is the biggest community of immigrants in Germany with almost 2.5 million people or 15 percent of the total population having migration background in Germany (*Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge*, 2010). This hypothesis seems to be supported by the number of players with migration background who have been called up compared with the same numbers under previous coaches. However, and as it will be addressed later in this thesis, the recruitment of players with migration background, especially those with Turkish roots, has not been representative for the whole population with migration backgrounds living in Germany today. Unlike Aslak Nore, it is not possible for this me to give one accurate reason for this development in the NFT, or at least not one that exclusively points toward the integration and immigration policies in Germany. What I can do is to trace a line of possible reasons based on the data analysed so far, as I did at the beginning of point 5.3 in this chapter.

List of German players with migration backgrounds called to the NFT under Joachim Löw's management (from 12.07.2006 to 20.06.2011).

Name	Background	Debut	Currently NFT Player?
1. Malik Fathi	German-Turkish	16.08.06	No
2. Piotr Trochowski	Polish (repatriate)	7.10.06	No
3. Mario Gómez	German-Spanish	7.02.07	Yes
4. Gonzalo Castro	German-Spanish	28.03.07	No
5. Jermaine Jones	German-American	6.02.08	No
6. Marko Marin	Bosnia-Herzegovinian	27.05.08	No
7. Serdar Tasci	Turkish	20.08.08	No
8. Marvin Compner	Germany-France	19.11.08	No
9. Mesut Özil	Turkish	11.02.08	Yes
10. Cacau	Brazil (naturalized)	29.05.09	Yes
11. Sami Khedira	German-Tunisian	5.09.09	Yes
12. Jérôme Boateng	German-Ghanaian	10.10.09	Yes
13. Aaron Hunt	German-English	18.11.09	No
14. Dennis Aogo	German-Nigerian	13.05.10	Yes
15. Lewis Holtby	German-English	17.11.10	No
16. Ilkay Gündogan	Turkish	11.10.11	No

Players called in total: 49

Here there are two important moments in the history of the NFT that are worth noting. These moments are the inclusions of the first naturalized Germans in the senior NFT, one of them Turkish-born and the other a black player originally from Ghana. The other moment is the apparent explosion of players with migration backgrounds called up to the senior NFT since Joachim Löw took over as national trainer, right after the World Cup in 2006.

We will now examine the first moment of these two periods more closely. To better comprehend the significance of the inclusion of both Doğan and Asamoah, who are the first Turkish-born and black football players in the history of the NFT, respectively, it is necessary to compare their inclusion to another case in order to make it stand out more. For this purpose, the case of the national French team will be of help. When the comparison is made, the contrast acquires even greater dimensions due to the rather long history of players with migration background playing for the French NFT. France recruited its first black football player, Raoul Diagne,⁷⁴ already in 1931 (Afrik.com, 2002). Already in the World Cup of 1938, Diagne played together with Larbi Benbarek, Abdelkader Ben Bouali and Michel Brusseaux, who were the first players of North African descent to play for the French NFT (ibid.). Throughout France's NFT history, several players with roots in the former French

⁷⁴ Roul Diagne was the son of Blaise Diagne, the first black French deputy in the National Assembly (Afrik.com, 2002). Throughout this research it could not be found any evidence that this fact had played any role in Roul's inclusion in the NFT.

colonies in Africa and South America have had the opportunity to play in the NFT. In part, this is because French citizenship has been granted to all individuals born in French territory under the principle of *ius soli*, which has greatly increased the number of players eligible to play on the French NFT. On the other hand, France's colonial past has played a very important role when it comes to the presence of a big population with a different ethnic and cultural background in French territory, which the common French man and woman has been aware for at least the last 150 years. In the long run, this detail has had an effect on the ethnic composition of the French NFT. Here again, the approach in Germany towards populations with different cultural backgrounds or ethnicities living in its territory has been quite different. Here, such persons are still considered to be immigrants or cultural aliens in Germany by most Germans, and their presence in the country still defies the notion of nationhood that many ethnic Germans share with each other. This still occurs despite the fact that almost all of the players with migration background in the NFT are actually born and raised in Germany and have no migration experience of their own whatsoever. Thus, while France has a colonial history that began in the 16th century in the Americas, and which subsequently became expanded to Africa in the early 19th century, Germany never really became a colonial power despite its efforts in the same century. Indeed, this historical fact may have also contributed to shaping not only the characteristics of the German NFT throughout its history, but also the composition of the entire German population until the arrival of the first *Gastarbeiter* in the middle of the 1950s. Of course, this factor alone is not sufficient to explain this phenomenon. As has already been addressed in this thesis, the notions of nationhood and national belonging in the German people have had a long history since the constitution of Germany as a nation-state back in the times of Bismarck in the middle of the 19th century, notions that still prevail to this day, despite the modification of citizenship laws as promoted by the former coalition government led Chancellor Schröder.

The other moment is that of Löw's era as manager, during which it has seemed that the senior NFT has finally become an arena of integration, as players with origins from almost every continent are represented. However, in accordance with the information collected during this research, there are two elements that, in a way, contradict this sort of 'magical' effect. The first one refers to the circumstances under which Löw found the ideal team for the World Cup, as he first 'inherited' players with migration backgrounds who had already been called up to the NFT by Rudi Völler, specifically Miroslav Klose and Lukas Podolski. Aside from that, he was forced to improvise with new players in order to replace captain Michael Ballack

and Christian Träsch, who had been injured just days before the kick off in South Africa. These losses opened up the opportunity for Sami Khedira and Mesut Özil to prove their worth and contribute to the team. In addition, Löw's era arrived in what can be called a 'lucky' moment, because his arrival also coincided with a period of higher recruitment of players with migration backgrounds from football clubs and academies to the top clubs of the *Bundesliga* (Heybrock, a., 2007). In this way, when he was appointed as Germany's coach, he actually had a new pool of talent to choose from.

5.5 Integration and class: the difference of playing away

This research has been suggesting that the lack of players with migration backgrounds within the NFT is due a logical but complex combination of several elements and variables. Of all of the possible factors already mentioned, there is one that requires the attention of every sociologist, as it is the question of integration, or, in this case, the lack of it among people with foreign cultural backgrounds. Sociologist Åse Strandbu (2002), who has researched the effects of sport on the integration of minorities, writes that an easy explanation of integration can be understood as processes that enable individuals to become part of a community, a society. Because of its international character, sport is regarded to be an ideal arena for interaction between members of different backgrounds. When it comes to the integration of immigrants, sport is viewed as being especially valuable, because it does not presuppose advanced language or cultural knowledge. Both language and cultural differences are considered to be difficult to manage, and that is why sports are often recommended by diverse social researchers as a means to bring two or more people with different backgrounds together. In words of Agnes Elling:

“[b]ecause of its low threshold, its uniform character and its international standardised rules, many people regard sport as a perfect activity in which people of different social and ethnic backgrounds seem to mingle automatically, which leads to mixed friendships and more tolerance for cultural diversity.” (Elling in Strandbu, 2002: 123).

Here, the biggest problem in sport is probably that only a fraction of these sorts of players will actually ever achieve such a high level of performance that he will have the chance to decide the NFT he wants to play for. This is actually the reality of German football at the lower levels and in small clubs, especially for those who have reached higher levels within these clubs. This is because although the children of immigrants in the youth categories are often in the majority in comparison with the amount of children of ethnic Germans, it is more

difficult for them to reach the higher levels. According to an interview given by German-Turkish player Nuri Sahin to *Die Zeit* (2007), the DFB will really only come into play “when the boys have mastered this difficult path” (Schäfer, 2007). For professor Frank Kalter, both foreign and German adolescents have about the same chances up to A-youth level, but when it comes to moving up to the senior level and competing there, ethnic German players are really at advantage. The higher the league level, the more the proportion of ethnic German players increases, while the proportion of Turkish and Italian players drops. “In the Bundesliga only the fewest succeed. And if they ever succeed, the majority of them – like Yildiray Bastürk, the Altintop twilling brothers or Sahin – decide against getting involved with the German national team”⁷⁵ (Heybrock, a., 2007: 25). Aside from this, Kalter has found what he calls a “systematic and massive start disadvantage” (ibid.), which refers to the starting point of every player in the football clubs and academies. According to Kalter, the average Turkish parent registers his/her children in a football club two years later than ethnic German parents do. Those who receive encouragement and are challenged early in life, Kalter says, have better chances of reaching the next stages in their careers. And this tendency continues all the way to the highest levels in football: “These are apparently banal pitfalls, whose effect accumulate over the years and in the end become a deciding factor”.⁷⁶ (Ibid.). This, along with other elements like the simple fact of whether the parents have a car to take their children to training and to the matches or not, are sufficient to have an impact on these children’s future, and they are disadvantages that also accumulate in these players’ path to a life as a professional football player. “Football is the integration machine number one, but integration is also something you have to work for” (ibid.: 26), said former DFB president Zwanziger. For Mathias Heybrock, it is true that, for many immigrant groups, it is easier to acquire/gain social recognition through and within football than in either the education system or the labour market, although only to a certain level. At the start, the possibilities/potential of these children to succeed depends on the education level of their parents. After their first years in a small club have passed, these players’ success/the success of these players will depend on their own education levels.

In his own research,⁷⁷ Kalter discovered that the gap between the average age for entering a club for children of Turkish descent and children of German descent has begun to decrease, and now it has evened out, and this also correlates with the parents’ level of

⁷⁵ My translation.

⁷⁶ My translation.

⁷⁷ “*Chancen, Fouls und Abseitsfallen. Migranten im Deutschen Fußball*”, 2003.

education. The higher their level of education is, the better the children master the German language, and when children with migration backgrounds speak German, it becomes easier for them to make contact with other children within the club and make friends. Additionally, the higher level of education achieved by the parents, the better the children's chances are in coping with failure, having high self-confidence and a greater level of motivation. Similarly, the parents' education level correlates with how frequently their children engage in sports activities. Specifically, the higher their education level is, the longer and more frequently the children will engage in a sports activity. "The main problem is the social background, which is hidden in the formation" (Kalter in Heybrock, a., 2007: 27).

In a research study published by Heinz-Norbert Noll and Stefan Weick (2011), in which performance in school by persons with migration backgrounds is documented, it appears quite clear that the Turkish group is the one that has the most problems in keeping up with their mates from other immigrant groups and, of course, with German mates in school progression.

Table of highest school and vocational education level achieved among adults (25-49 years old) in %.

Ethnic Origin	Not concluded	Primary school	Secondary school	College/High school	University
German	2	25	40	35	19
Turkish	26	45	17	13	5

Source: Mikrozensus SUF 2008.

Thus, if we take the results of Kalter's research into account, we have to consider formal education as a cornerstone for a successful football career in Germany for all kind of players. This fact automatically deprives or excludes those players who do not meet the necessary requirements – from language skills to having both knowledge and understanding of the cultural context of organized sports in Germany – to deal with a football system created to filter the most prepared and talented players out from those who are not, beginning with these players' parents and continuing with the players themselves when they have achieved a certain level within the football structure. Here, we already know that those members of society with Turkish origins are the worst prepared when it comes to formal education in comparison with other groups. So if a career in football in many ways demands a certain degree of integration embedded in formal education and language skills, then we have one of the reasons that Turkish children have short careers within the football clubs. Consequently, a poorly integrated family, i.e., due to their lack of language skills, participation in collective

activities, social networking outside their own group and understanding within the cultural, social and legal settings which hinders them in becoming part of a community within society, will also have other integration problems such as unemployment (becoming social clients) or poorly paid jobs. This in turn will limit their access to the necessary instruments for providing leisure activities such as sport. This gets translated into a family that cannot afford to pay the expenses of having one or perhaps more children as members of a football club, for things like equipment, membership fees, training charges, etc. We know that within the social groups having migration backgrounds, very often an entire family of four or more members depends on only one income (Strandbu, 2002), and such expenses are not seen as necessary or a good investment.

The problems of integration related to low levels of formal education invariably lead to problems of interaction, mainly because people who have problems communicating will consequently also have problems understanding important social and cultural settings that will allow them to master their social context. Thus, many parents will not be able to interact within the same context in the way that is expected by those who do master these settings. Strandbu has documented this phenomenon after a series of interviews with different clubs managers in Norway, who have identified immigrants' lack of understanding of how things work as an important element for completely integrating their children in these clubs. Requirements for parental involvement are an important factor, she writes. Sports clubs often base their activities on the premise that parents can volunteer as chauffeurs, events companions and fundraisers for the operation of the clubs (ibid.). She states further, "[a] sports team leader I interviewed believed that the lack of interest from parents was what caused the development of differences between children with and without migration background in the first place"⁷⁸ (ibid.: 134).

Similar to Kalter's findings, Strandbu has also discovered that on average parents with migration backgrounds start enrolling their children in football and sports clubs two years later than parents without migration backgrounds. This may indicate a pattern not only among individuals with migration background, but also among people in North European societies, in which the socialization of children at an early age through sports is regarded as an important part of their development as human beings and citizens. Another similar result of both studies is that this starting gap, or, to use Kalter's phrase, this 'systematic and massive start disadvantage', in both cases creates important differences in the potential for

⁷⁸ My translation.

success and integration conditions. Only when a player is too good and talented will the gap between him and his ethnic German mates disappear, as well as the differences that become visible due to his delayed start at a football club, when compared to his ethnic German mates.

Given the circumstances exposed here, it may seem perfectly logical that for many of the players with migration backgrounds may find it easier to move to their parents'/family's country of origin, hoping to make a career in what can be viewed as a 'mobility trap'. It is better to become professional fast, and switch to the second Turkish league than continue training for a 'possible' career in a more difficult league like the *Bundesliga*. And as we have seen, leaving Germany to play in their parents'/family's country of origin has nearly become a tradition among the German-Turkish footballers, who regard this strategy as a perfect way to move upwards in the social hierarchy, and gain some social recognition. For German football, however, this represents a loss of talent(s). And the TFF seems to have become much more aware of this trend. According to Heybrock (2007), several offices of different football clubs have been established in Germany. In Cologne, the Turkish Football Federation opened a branch of permanent representation, run by former professional player Erdal Keser who, according to German sports online magazine *Spox.com* (2010), was the man responsible for players like the Altintop brothers and Nuri Sahin not playing for Germany, but Turkey. Other Turkish football clubs have followed the TFF's example and have begun to recruit German players having Turkish backgrounds. Galatasaray Istanbul, for example, holds demonstration junior-matches in different German states, wherein these sorts of players from 15 to 17 years old are allowed to 'audition'. Ankaraspor, on the other hand, has been more aggressive in his attempt to recruit these players, and has established a 'Farm-team' subsidiary called *Berlin Ankaraspor Kulübü 07*. This team arranges tours to Turkey every year, especially during the winter holiday season, to play football matches there. In this way, Ankaraspor has been able to sign several German-Turkish players in recent years. Additionally, several Germany-based football clubs have constant communication and contact with top clubs in Turkey, such as *Türkiyemspor Berlin* (Heybrock, a., 2007).

Thus, the Turkish example is not only relevant due to the quantitative significance of its population in Germany, but also due to their overrepresentation in statistics that measure the lack of social, economic and political integration in Germany among immigrants (Dietrich, 2002; Baier & Pfeiffer, 2008; Noll & Weick, 2011; Schroedter, 2011). This refers mainly to 'immigrants' who have no direct personal experience of migration, and for whom the possibility of 'return' does not quite apply. According to Dirk Halm's (2006) research, the

correlation between sport and integration has an ambivalent character. This is firstly because of the definition of the concept itself – i.e. what does it mean to be integrated through sports? – and secondly, because there is a strange relationship between what is regarded as being ‘integrated’ and ‘unintegrated’ by society. The first one ascribes an integrative power to participation in organized sport, although only as long as it occurs within the sports organizations or associations where native Germans also participate. However, during the ‘80s and ‘90s, there was a tendency among Turkish descent youngsters to create or seek membership solely in single-ethnic football clubs, and although this still remains a practice among young Turkish descendants, it has diminished since the beginning of the 21st century. Yet, since participation in sport clubs is seen as integrative, participation in only single-ethnic sports clubs is inversely regarded as to have a *de-integrative* force in the eyes of many Germans (ibid.). Additionally, there exists a clear segregation of the people of Turkish descent in Germany based on their cultural otherness or “physical foreignness” (Halm, 2006: 74). On the other hand, among all of the immigrant groups from the traditional guest-worker sending states, it is particularly the people of Turkish descent who face more problems of integration into sports, and who, according to general social indicators, “have a significant influence on behaviour and which, despite noticeable differentiation among Turks over the past few years, overall remain unfavourable in comparison with other immigrant groups [...]” (ibid.) and, obviously, in comparison with native Germans.

These tendencies also largely explain why players with migration background are underrepresented in the German NFT, and if we are to stand by Kalter’s and Stranbu’s findings, as well as by the findings published by Noll and Weick, it becomes very apparent that integration within sports, but first and foremost in society, plays a key part in the recruitment of players from these sectors of society. Finally, the level of integration of players with migration backgrounds can either help them to develop a sense of belonging to the nation, or it can be a factor in their rejection of the culture and values of the majority. This element is of vital importance because it involves the manner in which these types of players view and regard themselves, and as consequence, it affects the manner in which they are regarded and treated by the members of the majority, both on and off the football pitch. I will address the way in which these two intertwine below, namely with regard the self-image of players with migration backgrounds and its correlation with their sense of national belonging, and the discrimination and rejection that their presence at national and local levels generate in society. This reverberant effect, in which lack of integration leads to prejudice

and discrimination, which then eventually leads to a devalued sense of national belonging and self-image, has a de-integrative effect in people's everyday's life.

5.6 The white bench: discrimination and the absence of players with migration backgrounds in the German NFT

Some of the main arguments against immigration is that people from certain cultures are difficult to integrate, they exploit the welfare system, and they concentrate in ghettos where they become criminals and a burden to society. These arguments have not been absent in Germany. As we have seen throughout this thesis, the ethnocentric notion of nationhood among Germans makes it difficult for everyone who does not fit into this definition to participate in any arena under equal circumstances. This does not mean that countries with a less ethnic-based notion of nationhood have happier citizens and less social problems related to immigration. The riots in October and November 2005 across France are a good reminder that other concepts of national belonging – like the French's notion, which is mostly based on the legal principle of *ius soli*, a concept already addressed in this work – do not necessarily entail the eradication of problems between groups or the marginalization of certain sectors due to ethnic origin, religious attachment or different cultural background. Nonetheless, Germany's own national foundation, together with its crisis of national identity – which include the remains of the atrocities caused by national socialism – have made it more difficult for the average German to understand his/her nation as being a multicultural State. The truth is that, for many Germans, including top members of political parties in Germany such as the CDU, and its sister party the CSU, the multicultural model has “utterly failed” in a nation that is basically “no country of immigration” (quoting Angela Merkel and Horst Seehofer in Peter, 2010), despite the evidence of the contrary, as addressed previously in this work

Now, it can be argued that these kind of statements were made as a desperate attempt to attract voters for the local elections scheduled for 2011, as University of Mainz professor Jürgen Falter said in an interview given to *Time* several days after they were made:

“[t]his was a response to her party's disastrous approval ratings. Angela Merkel is reaching out to disgruntled conservative supporters and to many Germans who harbour strong prejudices about immigrants. Immigration used to be a sensitive topic and for decades it was suppressed in Germany. The issue has suddenly exploded onto the public stage, and Merkel is hoping that anti-immigration rhetoric will be a vote-winner.” (Ibid., 2010).

This statement is true; politicians have consequently tried to win voters to their campaigns by appealing to the public's desires and fears (fears also created by the same politicians). This is called populism. But the reason for why they decided to use anti-immigrant slogans and arguments in this case is because many voters have strong objections to the presence of alien nationals or foreigners among them. On many occasions, these objections are reflected in discriminatory practices that marginalize and alienate even those people who are born and raised in Germany, the so-called third generation of immigrants, though none of these 'new' Germans have immigration experience themselves, i.e., they never migrated to Germany in the first place.

Interestingly enough, football has for decades been one of the areas that has been less influenced by democratic processes and democratization. As an example, it should be sufficient to mention the fact that football, as a discipline and as a market product, is still strongly dominated by men. Aside from this, football culture is often linked to extreme environments where violence, hooliganism, racism, homophobia and women's discrimination have been heavily present throughout the years. Things that generally are not tolerated in other areas within a democracy, are minimized or ignored in football, which to a certain degree guarantees some impunity for those involved. To briefly illustrate this argument, I will use again one of the examples already given. Two years before the events in Ascochinga, Argentina took place, several generals of the *Bundeswehr* were suspended from their duties after it had become known that they had invited Herr Rudel to a traditional celebration arranged in a military garrison (Rühle, 2002). However, this same action – the invitation and assistance of Rudel to the headquarters of the NFT during the World Cup of 1978 by Neuberger – had no consequences at all for the executives or the president of the DFB at that time.

Currently in Germany, negative attitudes towards immigrants are reaching new heights. About a third of the population would like to have the foreigners repatriated when jobs become scarce, as well as they also believe that immigrants have come to Germany to exploit the country's welfare benefits. Further, 35 per cent find that the German Republic is 'over alienated' (*überfremdet*, in German) or 'overrun' due to the number of foreigners living in it, and over 55 per cent find 'Arabs' unpleasant, compared to the 44 per cent who held the same opinion seven years ago, according to one of the most recent reports that measure the attitudes of the Germans towards foreigners and Muslims (Friedrich-Eber-Stiftung, 2010). Given these figures, we might start to wonder why there are footballers with migration

backgrounds being recruited for the clubs and for the NFTs. Perhaps one of the answers is that good athletes are always easy to integrate. As has been discussed in this work, no one in France complained about having players with migration backgrounds, like Zidane, Karembeu or Djorkaeff, when France became world champion in 1998. The same principle applies to the German NFT. With the exception of the ultranationalists, very few complain in Germany about Özil's status as a world football star, or about his goals with the NFT.

In the opinion of Frank Kalter, the least amount of discrimination exists where the performance principle applies alone, i.e., at the professional level. No coach, according to him, can afford to put a top player on the bench just because he has racist sentiments. Still, he argues that once volunteers run the clubs, non-performance criteria are added. Then it becomes difficult for immigrants, and then many of them lose interest. (Heybrock, a., 2007). Outgoing DFB president Theo Zwanziger recognizes this problem within the football structures, and says that in order to maintain a balance in opportunities between players of different ethnic or cultural groups, it would be necessary to professionalise all of those who serve as volunteers in the DFB. There is one problem, though: the DFB has about one million volunteers, without which the many small clubs associated with it would be inoperable, the professionalization of these volunteers would be enormously expensive and no one in the government would be willing to pay for it. Zwanziger has point out that “the DFB provides the means to improve the infrastructure, but a concrete financial support of the clubs is not possible” (ibid).⁷⁹

Thus, discrimination at these levels occurs quite often, especially where the differences between players are more noticeable, and volunteers are in charge of these small clubs, although not exclusively under this circumstance. Otto Addo, a professional footballer in the *Bundesliga*, in talking about how things were when he started his career, remembered a German-Turkish colleague who once loudly complained to the coach because another member of the team, a German, had been telling jokes about Turkish people: “After that he was considered a ‘stress-maker’. Suddenly, the coach started to review and analyse his actions in the game differently than [he did] with me, who instead had being ‘swallowing everything’”⁸⁰ (Heybrock, a. 2007: 26). ‘Everything’ refers to the nigger-jokes told by his teammates: “If you wanted to move up, you needed to be able to swallow those kind of

⁷⁹ My translation.

⁸⁰ My translation.

things”⁸¹ (ibid.). According to Addo, foreigners and those with migration backgrounds had to do more than the Germans if they wanted to impress the coach. For example, Addo states that “when two players were equally good, then the coach would take Hans-Werner rather than Mehmet for the team” (ibid.). Discrimination can be found everywhere in the structures of football, as it is found everywhere in the structures of society, and in every person. Therefore, it is not a phenomenon that occurs solely at the lowest levels of football, but at every level, because football – as everything else in society – also depends on who imagines it, who makes decisions, who leads, and who the coach is.

5.7 “*Es geht um die Fahne auf der Brust*”: German players with migration background, a matter of national identity

At the beginning of this thesis, I gave some reflections about my naturalization process, becoming a Norwegian citizen versus my previous nationality, and how this ‘new me’ affected or influenced my own perception of myself. As we have seen, being a citizen is a requirement for everyone who aspires to be considered for any national team in sports. However, as we also have seen, having or getting German – or any other – citizenship does not make one German as such. Feeling German – or Norwegian for that matter – is part of a sentiment that becomes especially apparent when one is representing one’s own nation in an international context, as we have also already addressed with help from Ismer, Elias and Smith in chapter three.

In this sense, Germany already has the laws that allow for the inclusion of those who until 2000 were born as foreigners in Germany; however, being or becoming a citizen of a country that one is not considered to be a part of, definitely has its side effects. As pointed out by Marianne Takle, a “rigid division between foreigners and Germans is reinforced on a daily basis” (Takle, 2007: 232), symbolically creating a “process of social exclusion that influences both the foreigners’ self-perception and the perception of them by mainstream society” (ibid.). And though both the modification of the Foreigners Act of 1990 and the Citizenship Law of 1999 has indeed added thousands of new Germans to the national demography, as well as the fact an estimated 50 percent of the foreign population would have fulfilled the naturalization criteria (*Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge*, 2010), these numbers demonstrate that not all foreigners consider naturalization an option or a necessity.

⁸¹ My translation.

As the statistical numbers show, the naturalization rates increased from an annual average of 1.1 percent in the period from 1990 to 1999, to 2.5 percent in the year 2000. However, rates started to decrease already in the year 2001, and continued to decrease in the years 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005, then went up modestly in 2006 just to go down again in 2007 and 2008, following the same tendency until now (*Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge*, 2010).

Naturalization of foreigners from 2000 to 2010: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge. Einbürgerung in Deutschland.

Year	Number of Persons
2000	186,688
2001	178,098
2002	154,547
2003	140,731
2004	127,153
2005	117,241
2006	124,566
2007	113,030
2008	94,470
2009	96,122
2010	101,570

Surely there are many ways to interpret this lack of interest among foreigners. Perhaps for many of them, residence permits obtained during their years living in Germany may seem sufficient for continuing with their lives without compromising their loyalty to both their country of origin and their country of residence. Alternatively, maybe the alienation caused by their exclusion from social, economic and cultural arenas, along with their “weak position in the educational system, labour market and housing market” (Takle, 2007: 232) carries more weight all together than their citizenship status. After all, according to Young, “access to equal citizenship does not eliminate oppression” (Young in Takle, 2007: 232).

Norbert Elias (1994) ascribes to any individual’s national identity the same kind of powerful feeling that accompanies and strengthens that individual’s own self-identity: a part of himself and his own self-image is assembled by a strong identity and image built up from the notion of a collective ‘we’. For this reason, Elias says, “when somebody characterizes himself as ‘American’, ‘French’ or ‘Russian’, he expresses much more than if he would said: ‘I am born in this country’, or ‘I have a French, American or Russian passport’.”⁸² (ibid.: 30-31). In sum,

⁸² My translation.

what a person does in including national belonging to his/her own characterization of self, is to add special national characteristics and values important to this person's own self-identity. Elias adds: "He who says: 'I'm a Russian, American, French man, etc.' normally also means: 'I and we believe in particular values and ideas'." ⁸³ (ibid.).

On the other hand, Richard Jenkins (2008) gives us a more pragmatic concept of identity: "As a very starting point", he writes, "identity is the human capacity – rooted in language – to know 'who is who'." (Ibid.: 5). As stated referred to in chapter one, Jenkins regards identity as "knowing who we are, knowing who others are, then knowing who we are, us knowing who they think we are, and so on: a multi-dimensional classification or mapping of the human world and our places in it, as individuals and members of collectivities" (ibid.). Thus, knowing who we are also depends on how the 'others' regard and see us and, more importantly, treat us. For many people with migration backgrounds, identity and national belonging are tricky areas of the 'self'. As we have learned, sometimes people from immigrant communities are often regarded, seen and treated as alien elements in society by the majority. Their adaptation, integration and loyalty to the nation and its laws and values are constantly debated in the media, schools, parliaments and academia, etc. Further, the effects of their alleged constant unreliability and disloyalty has caused a strong sense of 'not-being-good-enough' for society due to physical and/or cultural characteristics that are considered determinant and unchangeable for individuals with migration background.

Both approaches explaining the cornerstones of identity and national identity are very relevant to an understanding of what lies behind a footballer's decision to join one NFT and not the other. However, I find that Elias and Ismer's (see chapter three for the latter) contributions emphasizing the importance of feelings and sentiments attached to a person's perception of his/her national belonging are essential for grasping what is at stake for these types of players. In the case of the German NFT, or of any other national football team, for that matter, it is natural to assume that a football player's participation in an NFT is very likely to be directly connected to his own self-identity. Simultaneously, it would be naïve to deny that a player's own social circle, i.e., primarily his family and friends, does not exercise any influence in the form of expectations or even requirements when it comes for his decision regarding what a NFT he would be playing for. As an example, I can mention Mesut Özil's words in an interview given to Heybrock (2007), where he stated he knew many players of

⁸³ My translation.

his own generation who were told by their parents that, if the possibility should come, then they would only be “playing for their country of origin” (ibid.: 24). And this kind of influence happens already long before the DFB gets interested in these types of players.

Besides, and referring back to Benedict Anderson, it is not certain that the ‘imagined community’ to which ethnic Germans can relate to is the same ‘imagined community’ to which the German-Turks can relate. As a matter of fact, I am quite sure it is not.

Is it then a matter of ‘feeling German’ rather than being one? German-Ghanaian footballer Otto Addo had something like the latter in mind when he said that the most prominent reason for the lack of integration of players with migration background was the player’s own national identity: “In my opinion, what’s in the foreground [of integration problems] is that the players don’t see themselves as Germans. I feel German, but I don’t get recognition as such from sectors of society.” (Heybrock, a., 2007: 26). To underline his last argument, he told the interviewer about the day the police stopped him twice because the officials apparently found it rare to see a black man driving a Mercedes.

One example of this is the controversy aroused by the international Turkish football player Hamit Altintop about the German football star Mesut Özil and his decision to play for Germany instead of Turkey. After the World Cup in South Africa was over, Hamit Altintop referred to Mesut Özil’s decision to play for Germany as being the result of what seemed a calculated and very rational move in order to gain more international recognition and attention by playing for a more renowned and prestigious football team than the Turkish one. In an frank interview offered to Christof Kneer of the German newspaper *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (2010), Hamit Altintop appealed directly to the feelings and emotions linked to national identity when he suggested that if Özil had decided with his heart, he would have chosen to play for Turkey and not Germany. For Altintop, there was apparently no doubt: if Özil had chosen to play for Germany despite ‘being’ Turkish, or having a Turkish family, friends and social circle, it had to be because he had rationalized his decision and turned off his feelings for his real national identity. Unlike Özil, Hamit Altintop and his twin brother Halil Altintop, both born and raised in the German state of Gelsenkirchen, decided early in their careers to represent the Turkish NFT.

Another important factor here is the manner in which players with double nationality are problematised by the media, which seems more like a sort of an examination, wherein their loyalty to the nation and its people gets particularly scrutinized and thoroughly tested. When one of them – like Özil – decides to play for the *Mannschaft*, this decision itself is the very

proof of his degree of integration, or of his willingness to ‘pay back’ what Germany has done for him and his family, in allowing them to arrive, settle, work and become better people thanks to the kindness of the State on behalf of an entire nation. He demonstrates his willingness to ‘sacrifice’ himself for the sake and honour of Germany. However, when the decision is against joining the *Mannschaft*, the loyalty and gratitude players with migration backgrounds have towards Germany gets immediately questioned. These kinds of players have somehow ‘betrayed’ the nation by taking advantage of it – in getting an education and reaping other benefits from the welfare system – by exploiting its resources for their own benefit and that of another nation. In this context, Özil is seen by many Turks, both in Germany and Turkey, as someone who denies his roots and origins, and is even labelled by many as a ‘traitor’ (Heybrock, a., 2007), on one hand, but as an example of integration by Germans on the other. At the same time, Turks in both countries regard Nuri Sahin as a person who is loyal to his origins, family and ancestors, and who is proud of his culture, while Germans have criticized him for not having chosen to represent their country despite being born and raised in Germany.

As noted by Sanna Inthorn (2006), the representation and broadcasting of annual national sport events depend upon a shared feeling of national identity that emerges through a sense of belonging to an ‘imagined’ community, as argued by Benedict Anderson (1991), i.e., a group of individuals who view themselves as belonging together for reasons of shared ethnicity, heritage, language, culture, race or territory. Accordingly, the ‘syntax’ of the game of football, e.g., the syntax created by the media on international events, creates the perfect conditions for the development of such an identity, because it is based on the notion of collective identity formation, and the defining of borders that separate ‘us’ from ‘them’, or that distinguishes us from other nations – in-group versus out-group – (ibid.). Thus, the representation of a football match between two nations is often represented in stereotypical images that allegedly define the characteristics of ‘our’ nation against those of ‘other’ nations, and generally those representations are often based on the images created about players and fans (ibid.). Inthorn names one example of this when she recalls the way in which Italians are ‘known’, i.e., represented, by the public everywhere compared to the manner in which Germans are reputed internationally: Italians “are the ‘fiery’ and ‘volcanic’”, while the Germans are “slightly less exciting but reliable who [...] are the personification of discipline, dedication and hard work” (ibid.: 155). According to Inthorn, this discursive construction is crucial to an understanding of one’s own national identity, especially when it gets linked to

the supposed qualities of the national football team. In this sense, the manner in which players with migration backgrounds are represented by the national media is a very important ingredient in the formation of an idea of ‘we’ and ‘us’ for the entire population; those players with migration backgrounds who ‘offer’ themselves to the nation are thus acknowledged as members of the common national project, or alien elements ‘redeemed’ by their sacrifice. Here, what symbolically gets sacrificed is these players’ loyalty to a previous master, the cultural ties that kept them attached to a foreign, unknown and feared nation. On the other hand, those players who are represented as disloyal by having picked the ‘wrong’ nation clearly become the antithesis of the *good immigrant*, or the symbol of the enemy within who, both cynically and heartlessly, betrayed the hand that fed them.

List of German-Turkish (dual-eligible) players according to the NFT they played for in the Youth Categories and their current NFT affiliation.

Germany			Turkey		
Name	Birthplace	Youth NFT	Name	Birthplace	Youth NFT
Mustafa Doğan	Isparta	-	Serhat Akin	Bretten	TUR
Malik Fathi	Berlin	-	Halil Altintop	Gelsenkirchen	TUR
Mesut Özil	Gelsenkirchen	GER	Hamit Altintop	Gelsenkirchen	-
Mehmet Scholl	Karlsruhe	GER	Volkan Arslan	Hannover	TUR
Serdar Tasci	Esslingen	GER	Yildiray Bastürk	Herne	-
Ilkay Gündogan	Gelsenkirchen	GER	Mehmet Ekici	Munich	GER
			Ceyhun Gulselam	Munich	TUR
			Tayfur Havutcu	Hanau	-
			Umit Karan	Berlin	-
			Tayfur Korkut	Stuttgart	-
			Ilhan Mansiz	Kempten	-
			Nuri Sahin	Ludenscheid	TUR
			Gokhan Tore	Cologne	TUR
			Turnay Torun	Hamburg	TUR
			Cenk Tosun	Wetzlar	GER
			Ömer Toprak	Ravensburg	GER
			Tolgay Arslan	Paderborn	TUR

A good example of the latter is the Altintop twins, who have experienced something bordering on media harassment, in repeatedly asking them the same question. When asked why he had decided to play for Turkey, despite being born and raised in Germany, Hamit Altintop answered that it was because, in his opinion, there was more passion and emotion in Turkey, even if you lose. “You can tell by the way they cheer [...] I think there is more fire, more life inside [the Turkish people]” (YouTube, 2008). Years later, and visibly annoyed about being asked the same question, he plainly answered: “There was absolutely no choice! I’m a Turk, and if I had not been invited to play by Turkey, then I would not have played for Germany either.”⁸⁴

However, and in an ironic twist, after having a brilliant season at FC Bayern München, Real Madrid’s coach Jose Mourinho did hire him for the 2011-2012 season, which would contradict Hamit’s theory that Özil was able to join Real Madrid only because he had played for a more renowned and better NFT than the Turkish team. While Turkey did not make it to the World Cup in South Africa, yet Altintop is currently also playing in the Spanish league together with other two German-Turks, namely Özil and Sahin, nonetheless.

Similarly, when asked why he had chosen to play for Turkey and not Germany, Hamit’s brother, Halil, struggled to find an adequate answer: “In many situations I realize I’m Turkish. This may lie on Turkish music, exuberant celebrations, or other small details. Then, I suddenly feel very comfortable. On the other hand, the German sense of purpose is important for me. The tenacity. The diligent work.”⁸⁵ (Blaschke, 2010). I would like to point out the qualities that are attached to being German or Turkish. While Halil’s ‘Turkishness’ rests on what is joyful and warm, such as music and celebrations, his ‘Germanness’ is bound with typical clichés about ‘German nature’ such as tenacity, sense of purpose and diligence at work. His sentiments and feelings are linked to the Turkish side of him, the wild and explosive emotional side, while the German side is linked to his rationality, where emotions can be controlled and suppressed. Yet national identity plays a role in both sides. This has also been Halil’s experience, who has found it difficult to adapt to the concepts of Turkishness while playing for the Turkish NFT. “In Germany I’m considered by many as a foreigner, but this happens in the Turkish NFT too. There the media and my teammates call me ‘the German’, allegedly because I’m so emotionless”⁸⁶ (ibid.).

⁸⁴ My translation.

⁸⁵ My translation.

⁸⁶ My translation.

Still, national identity, which here seems to be very salient, is not the only reason for why a footballer decides to play for a particular NFT. To illustrate this, we will examine the case of the Boateng half-brothers. Unlike the Altintop brothers, who play for the same NFT, the Boateng represent two different NFTs, despite the fact that they were both born and raised in Germany, and the fact that both of them were developed as footballers in the same club, Hertha BSC (Grossekathöfer, 2010). Jérôme and Kevin-Prince had never been to Ghana – the country of their father – and for that reason it seemed rather weird that Kevin-Prince, at the last minute before the 2010 World Cup, decided to play for Ghana and not Germany, even when he had already played for Germany's Junior team from 2001 to 2009 (U-15, U-16, U-17, U-19, U-20 and U-21 teams). For Jérôme, the decision had always been easy: it was not logical for him to play for a NFT other than the German NFT, where he feels at home. In comparison, national Turkish player Nuri Sahin said that one of the reasons he had chosen to play for Turkey and not Germany was that he already had played all the games in all categories of the Turkish Football Federation, i.e., junior teams, and "it just would not have been respectful towards the Association, if had chosen to play for another one". (Interview by *Aktuelle Sportstudio der ZDF*, 2010)

Although he has never admitted it, many people close to Kevin-Prince, among them his father (ibid.), believe that his decision to play for Ghana was more the result of a tantrum because he had been excluded from the U-21 NFT just before the U-21 UEFA Euro Cup in Sweden in 2009, allegedly due to repetitive indiscipline. For Kevin-Prince, there was no choice: if he wanted to go the World Cup, he had to choose Ghana. The requirement of loyalty towards the nation got totally abandoned by Kevin-Prince, who is often called 'the Ghetto kid', and too often gets compared to his brother Jérôme, the good one, while he gets characterised as the bad one. Once again, the force of the representations made by others plays an important role. It is therefore important not to discard the influence that these players' closest environment has over them. Most importantly, loyalty towards and expectations from the family members, parents and siblings can be determinant in these players' decisions. Similarly, the expectations of the social network one belongs to should not be underestimated, including friends, acquaintances, teachers at school, neighbours, etc. These are also variables to be considered. As an example, we can refer again to Heybrock (2007), whose journalistic research showed how important these elements can be. When the DFB tried to secure Nuri Sahin's services, it sent some of its directors to speak directly to him and his family in order to convince him to play for Germany and not Turkey. However, the attempt failed. Sports Director of the DFB, Matthias Sammer, said to Heybrock in an

interview that, in certain areas, namely the family, the DFB could only exert partial influence: “When questions of faith, national pride and identity come into play, we have only limited arguments.”⁸⁷ (Ibid.).

As we have seen, national identity is clearly related to relegation, integration and discrimination. Further, while national identity may play a determinant role in a player’s choice of NFT, the other three elements will almost always determine whether a person with migration background will ever get to play for a particular country’s NFT.

5.8 The white bench: some historical and sociological arguments

So far in this thesis, several reasons or possible reasons have been discussed in order to understand the absence of players with migration background from the German NFT. However, there are several other reasons that have to be taken into account, namely the non-colonial past of Germany, and the effect that this historical fact has had on the ethnic composition of German society today, as has already been addressed in section 5.4.5 in this thesis.

Beyond the fact that this historical factor stands in contrast to countries with the colonial experiences of England or France (which have had people from other ethnic groups living among them for a long time now as is the case of Indians in England or North Africans in France), there are also cohort effects of people with migration background born in Germany. As we have already seen, Germany’s first encounter with mass immigration happened in the mid ‘50s with the arrival of the first *Gastarbeiter*. From these types or migrants, those coming from Turkey did not begin to arrive until 1961. This reduces the number of persons with Turkish origins born in Germany, compared with the number of, for example, persons of Indian origin born in England. This, coupled with the rigid citizenship and naturalization policies held in Germany until 2000, contributed toward significantly reducing the number of potential players with migration background who *could* have been eligible to play for the NFT, but did not do so due to their citizenship status.

Additionally, is not only a question of cohort, but of tradition as well. Immigrant groups may tend to retain and reproduce certain traditions according to the customs of their native communities. Thus, it is important to note that although immigrants will learn from the traditions and customs of their host societies and adapt to them, it will still be more common

⁸⁷ My translation.

for them to nurture their own traditions to a greater degree by teaching them to their children and encouraging their practice. This is one of the reasons that, for example, people with Indian or Pakistani origins are more prone to practicing cricket than football, even when they live in a country that favours football above all other sports such as France or Germany (which are two countries that do not have any player with such origins/backgrounds represented in their NFTs). Consequently, a country that has a high representation of immigrants coming from a country that traditionally does not regard football as its ‘national’ sport will have a lower production of football players from among those immigrants. Such is the case of Norway, a country in which the largest non-Western immigrant groups have Pakistani or Vietnamese background. As might be expected, the Norwegian senior NFT does not have any players with any of these two ethnic backgrounds. On the contrary, among certain immigrant groups, for example, the Turkish, football is a very popular sport. According to Turkish literature Nobel Prize winner Orhan Pamuk (2008), football in Turkey is a “machine for the reproduction of nationalism, xenophobia and authoritarianism” (Biermann, C. a., 2008: 142), which gives us an idea of the importance of football in that country. Furthermore, Turkey has a very decent and competitive NFT, winning third place in the 2002 World Cup in Korea and Japan – its best achievement ever. Accordingly, the better a NFT plays and the more games or trophies/titles it wins, the more attractive it will become to its fans. This argument adds another explanation to the pattern followed by German-Turks, who, despite being raised and themselves growing up in Germany, eventually decide to play for Turkey instead.

Chapter Six - Final Reflexions

6.1 Short summary

It was two years ago that the Norwegian writer Aslak Nore suggested that there was a correlation between the integration policies of a country and the number of football players with migration background playing for its national football team. Nore was referring to Denmark, a country which, according to him, had xenophobic attitudes towards its immigrant population, which in turn were reflected in the integration and immigration policies of that country. However it did not take long to realize that Nore's hypothesis was too simplistic to be the only possible explanation for the absence of players of migration background in the Danish NFT in 2010.. Nevertheless, Nore's suggestion aroused my curiosity about the theme. Indeed, other countries around the world have not had players with a migration background in their NFT despite the long-standing presence of large immigrant communities, for example Spain, Italy or Germany. However, Germany's case stood out as it suddenly started recruiting footballers produced by its immigrant communities. Why?

Throughout this thesis, many possible explanations for the transformation of the 'white' German NFT into a more colourful national representation, despite the strong ethno-centric notions of nationhood that characterize that country, have been explored. And in doing so, this thesis has gone through important moments in Germany's history, analyzing its foundation as a nation-state and addressing the nationalistic forces that formed the notions of nationhood in that country. A further analysis of what it means to be German, what it means to belong to the German nation and the German people, and how these notions have affected policy- and law-making throughout the years, has also been made. At the same time, it has been analyzed how and why this "Volk-centered and differentialist" (Brubaker, 1992: 1) and ethno-cultural understanding of Germanness has been modified and made more flexible in order to include an important proportion of the population in the past 12 years. This analysis was intended to establish the historical background that helps us understand the current situation in German football and, especially, in the German NFT when it comes to the recruitment of players with migration background. Next, this research has analyzed the history of football as a social phenomenon and as a political instrument in the creation and formation of the national-state, as well as the history of German football in particular.

Equally important has been the inclusion of an analysis of why football fascinates us, and what the effects of this fascination are.

The questions raised in the opening chapter have had an explorative character. Instead of trying to give a conclusive answer to every one of them, they have been used as a platform to find other possible explanations for the studied phenomena, and raise further questions and hypotheses. This work has focused its analysis on mainly three elements: at macro-level, how the institutional Germany has contributed or not to the inclusion of people with migration background into society through the modification of its laws and policies. At a micro-level, the attitudes towards immigrants among those responsible for the functioning of organized football in Germany, from the highest positions in the German Football Federation to the volunteers in charge of coaching and leading the small football clubs associated with the DFB. At the same time, it has been taken into account the role that every single player has on its own future as footballer and professional player, as well as the factors that may influence his decisions, such as national identity, discrimination, integration, and pressure from family and peers.

6.2 Findings

After the exhaustive analysis of the data collected for this thesis, it is possible to reach a conclusion regarding the findings of this research, based firstly on the questions raised in the introductory chapter, and secondly on the questions created during the analysis of the collected data.

The first finding is that Aslak Nore's hypothesis, as predicted, is not sustainable. The immigration and integration policies in a country alone do not explain neither the lack nor the presence of football players with migration background in a NFT. In the specific case of Germany, due to its own ethno-cultural understanding of Germanness and nationhood throughout its history, the modifications to particular laws, namely the Foreigners Act of 1990 and the Citizenship Law of 1999, have indeed had an effect on the number of non-ethnic Germans who can apply for citizenship or who now acquire the citizenship at birth, but it is not certain that this has had an effect on the number of non-ethnic German players in the NFT. Before 1999 every newborn in Germany from foreign parents was legally considered a foreigner too, but since 2000 German naturalization and citizenship laws grant German citizenship to all children born in German territory regardless of the nationality of their parents (as long as they fulfil certain criteria). Equally, naturalization has been made easier,

which has allowed hundreds of thousands of immigrants to obtain German nationality. Theoretically, this should increase the chances for players with migration background to reach the NFT. However, this has not been the case. At this time, despite the fact that there are more players with migration background playing in the German NFT than ever before, this number is still not representative for the total amount of people with migration background living in Germany. Especially underrepresented is the Turkish minority, which actually is the largest minority in the country. This suggests a paradox.

When other factors are analyzed, this paradox acquire a more complex composition. It is true that the Turks are the largest minority group in Germany – they constitute approximately the 3,9% of the entire population – but at the same time, this group is the least integrated, when variables such as education, unemployment, political participation and representation, to mention a few, are taken into account.

Besides, and maybe because of this, the structure of organized football in Germany has had a peculiar development politically. For years, this resulted in a lack of interest in players with a migration background, along with discriminatory practices at all levels in the DFB, which includes its associated clubs throughout the country. Discrimination against certain players whether because of their skin colour or because their cultural or ethnic origin is still widespread in German football at a structural level, which in many ways corresponds with the negative attitudes towards immigrants and foreigners that many Germans have developed in recent years, especially against Germany's Muslim minorities, of which the Turks are the biggest group. This is not a coincidence, but one of the sides of the same coin.

It has been found that the better educated the parents of children with migration background are, the better their chances are of making their way through the different levels in club football up to the NFT. Education correlates with the degree of integration, and again this correlates with the degree of acceptance among the majority. A child coming from a family with integration problems has poorer prospects: he/she may have problems at school, and therefore end up in the lowest paid jobs as an adult, reproducing his/her parents' social stagnation. Football can be seen as an escape from this destiny, which encourages many teenagers to aim for a footballing career at an early age. However, it has also been found that becoming a successful football player in Germany requires a certain level of formal education in order to cope with the mentality and attributes embedded in German organizations. This again has a direct effect on minority players, especially those of Turkish origins, who may find it 'easier' to pursue a football career in Turkey in a lower division, rather than going the extra mile in Germany to become a professional player in the highly demanding *Bundesliga*.

This is in many cases the main reason that players with Turkish origins end up playing for Turkey rather than Germany. Yet there is another important reason: the player's own national identity and sense of belonging. Living in a parallel society as a member of a poorly integrated minority group, marginalized from the rest, can result in young players struggling to form a national identity. The lack of social recognition by the majority, as well as the negative debate around immigrants in the media and public life in Germany,⁸⁸ may lead to a lack of identification of these youngsters with the German nation. As we have seen, national identity plays an important role when a player has to decide between two countries, as it was exemplified with the case of the brothers Hamit and Halil Altintop.

Other variables have been addressed in this work as possible explanations for the current situation of the underrepresentation of players with migration background in the senior German NFT: (a) the absence of colonialism in German history. This one affects the composition of society today, as well as the notions of what belongs and does not belong to the nation, in comparison to England or France; (b) the differences in sport preferences embedded in the cultural traditions of the minority groups living in Germany, and that will have an effect on the production of individuals wanting to become footballers or not; (c) the generational gap, i.e., the cohorts of persons born in Germany who due to their birth date could not be eligible to play for the NFT, whether because they could not apply for the German citizenship, or because they were too young to be eligible to play for any of the NFTs.

Yet, the most important finding is the continuity in the exclusion practices attached to the old notions of nationhood and belonging to the German people that have permeated the society since the foundation of the German nation, and that automatically set aside those German citizens who are not regarded as such because of their ethnic, cultural or religious backgrounds.

Mary Fulbrook (1999) argues that every national identity is only a construction. Nations exist in part because people believe in the importance of certain criteria and not others, she writes. Likewise, she says that the creation of a nation serves those who want to define their group as different from – and often superior to – others in part because one set of particular beliefs is held by people who are in position to propagate their particular criteria

⁸⁸ See the case of Thilo Sarrazin bestseller *Deutschland schafft sich ab*, or “Germany deconstructs itself”, and its effects on the German debate about immigrants from the Arab/Muslim world.

for inclusion and exclusion in such way that these are politically dominant and can hence be institutionalised, or because particular constructions seem to be part of the “natural” order of things (ibid.: 15). Fulbrook argues that for these reasons, the racist practices and policies of the Nazis in the past cannot be made representative for the whole German population of that time. This might be partially true if the intention is to explain the Holocaust and other war atrocities solely through the actions of every single citizen in Germany before and during the Nazi regime. However, I would like to use the same argument to oppose Fulbrook’s reasoning, and state that if certain group of people manages to impose and propagate their criteria about inclusion and exclusion of citizens in the nation, it is because, directly or indirectly, they can rely on the ‘approval’ or at least ‘consent’ of a significant proportion of the population. Otherwise, the agency of individuals in a nation’s life would be underestimated. Thus, it is probable to think that the Holocaust was possible due to the passivity with which the Nazi authorities were allowed to imprison, deport and eventually murder millions of people regarded by them as ‘inferior’. Consequently, it is probable to suppose that such passivity was close related to a shared hatred of Jews, Gypsies and homosexuals.

The democratization of Germany since 1945 can be regarded as fulfilled both politically, institutionally and socially, however it is still possible to detect a line of continuity when it comes to the exclusionary and discriminatory practices embedded in the notions of nationhood and national belonging that have characterized Germany since its foundation as a nation-state 140 years ago, as different surveys measuring people’s attitudes towards immigrants, and Muslims in particular, reveal and which have already been discussed in this thesis.

The continuity I detect is a line of thought around the notions of belonging to the German people that still make it very difficult for Germans with migration background to be regarded as equals and part of the national project, which includes the education system and the working market, in the first place.

6.3 Final comments on the present findings

Further research on the subject of ethnic diversity in German football should focus on the current structures of the sport, which have largely remained anachronistic, and have not kept up with the democratic processes in society in general, especially when it comes to rights that women, homosexuals and ethnic minorities have achieved in modern democratic societies such as Germany. Additionally, these findings also suggest that, sometimes, a change in a

country's policies does not mean a change of attitude in people. The law says that persons with a different ethnicity can and should be regarded as Germans when certain criteria has been fulfilled, but the collective and individual consciousness does not necessarily think the same way. In this sense, integration should be understood as a reciprocal process, and therefore all policy aimed to help immigrants to adapt and cope, should also aim to encourage a change of attitude toward immigrants and their descendants among the members of the majority. This is necessary to achieve an acceptance that these communities are here to stay, and now form part of the nation.

List of abbreviations

DDR: *Deutsche Demokratische Republik* (German Democratic Republic)
CDU: *Christliche Demokratische Union* (Christian Democratic Union)
CSU: *Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern* (Christian Social Union of Bavaria)
DFB: *Deutscher Fußball-Bund* (German Football Association)
DFV: *Deutscher Fußball Verband* (German Football Union)
DSB: *Deutscher Sport-Bund* (German Sports Federation)
DTN: *Direction Technique National* (National Technical Board)
FIFA: *Fédération Internationale de Football Association* (International Federation of Association Football)
FFF: *Fédération Française de Football* (French Football Federation)
GDR: German Democratic Republic (Eastern Germany)
GFR: German Federal Republic (Western Germany)
NFT: National Football Team
TFF: *Türkiye Futbol Federasyonu* (Turkish Football Federation)
UEFA: Union of European Football Associations

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Total words: 49 658.

All works and sources used in this thesis have been cited and listed.